4-51. Assessment is the determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective (JP 3-0). Assessment precedes and guides planning and other activities of the operations process. Assessment involves deliberately comparing forecasted outcomes with actual events to determine the overall effectiveness of force employment. More specifically, assessment helps commanders determine progress toward attaining the desired end state, achieving objectives, and performing tasks. It also involves continuously monitoring and evaluating an operational environment to determine what changes might affect the conduct of operations. Assessment is vital to successful stability operations.

3-15. Peace building is the long-term post-conflict process of creating conditions for a lasting peace. It strengthens host-nation capacities to address the root causes of conflict, rebuild institutions, infrastructure, and civic life, and maintain effective and harmonious political and societal order. Peace building is stability actions that strengthen and rebuild a society’s institutions, infrastructure, and civic life to avoid a relapse into conflict (JP 3-07.3). Stability operations promote reconciliation, strengthen and rebuild civil infrastructures and institutions, build confidence, and support economic reconstruction to prevent a return to conflict.

3-72. A key intelligence activity to support stabilization is to include criminal organizations, cells, networks and known activities (or tactics, techniques and procedures) into intelligence preparation of the battlefield. (See ATP 2-01.3 for more on intelligence preparation of the battlefield.) Success staffs understand what criminal groups existed prior to arrival of Army forces and how the crisis has shaped the criminal networks during stability operations. Information collection during stability operations includes specific tasks for military police units focused on criminal activities.

4-47. Force tailoring is the process of determining the right mix of forces and the sequence of their deployment in support of a joint force commander (ADP 3-0). Force tailoring involves selecting the right force structure from available units. Commanders then sequence the selected forces into an operational area as part of force projection. Commanders request and receive forces for each phase of an operation, both for combat and stability actions tasks, adjusting the quantity and capabilities of forces to match the weight of effort required. Commanders must carefully consider forces required for executing stability operations, especially during consolidation of gains, and plan accordingly.

3-60. Army units may be required to participate in a mass atrocity response operation that includes military activities conducted to prevent or halt hostile activities, such as genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, or war crimes. A mass atrocity response operation may be directed for the specific purpose of mitigating such activities, or it may occur within the context of other complex situations such as civil wars or insurgencies. Mass atrocity response operations efforts include offensive, defensive, and stability operations to protect vulnerable populations or neutralize perpetrators. (See JP 3-07.3 and ATP 3-07.6 for additional information on mass atrocity response operations.)

4-39. Compel involves maintaining the threat—or actual use—of force to establish control and dominance, effect behavioral change, or enforce cessation of hostilities, peace agreements, or other arrangements. Compliance is related to legitimacy. While legitimacy is vital to achieving host-nation compliance, compliance itself depends on how a local populace perceives a military force’s ability to exercise force to accomplish a mission. The appropriate and discriminate use of force often forms a central component to success in stability operations; it closely ties to legitimacy. Depending on the circumstances, the threat or use of force can reinforce or complement efforts to stabilize a situation, gain consent, and ensure compliance with mandates and agreements. The misuse of force—or even the perceived threat of the misuse of force— can adversely affect the legitimacy of a mission or the military instrument of national power. Lethal force is only used in accordance with the laws of land warfare and the rules of engagement authorized for an operation. (See FM 27-10 for more information on the law of land warfare.)

2-15. Army forces determine who can provide services. These forces analyze the host nation’s capability to provide services. They also determine the ability of other agencies of government (both host nation and U.S.), international agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and contractors to provide services that can enable, complement or conduct as needed. A capable organization can address drivers of conflict, foster host-nation resiliencies, and create conditions that enable sustainable peace and security by transitioning capabilities to local authorities and returning to peacetime engagement characterized by security cooperation. During actions to consolidate gains, Army forces are responsible for accomplishing both minimum-essential stability operations tasks and Army stability operations tasks.

4-49. Task-organizing is the act of designing a force, support staff, or sustainment package of specific size and composition to meet a unique task or mission (ADP 3-0). Characteristics commanders and staffs examine when task-organizing a military force include, but are not limited to, training, experience, equipage, sustainability, operational environment, enemy threat, and mobility. For Army forces, it includes allocating available assets to subordinate commanders and establishing their command and support relationships. Task-organizing occurs within a previously tailored force package as commanders organize groups of units for specific stability operations. Task organization must be considered when assigning a unit a follow and support mission, which includes execution of stability operations. Task-organizing continues as commanders reorganize units for subsequent missions. The ability of Army forces to task-organize gives them extraordinary agility. It lets operational and tactical commanders configure their units to best use available resources. It also allows Army forces to rapidly match unit capabilities to priorities.

1-16. Legitimacy is a condition based upon the perception by specific audiences of the legality, morality, or rightness of a set of actions and of the propriety of the authority of the individuals or organizations in taking them. The operational principle of legitimacy is closely associated with trust—the bedrock of the Army Profession. Legitimacy during stabilization has two aspects. One is the legitimacy of the host-nation government and is principally conferred by the local populace. The other is legitimacy of the mission which is derived from four factors: mandate, manner, consent, and expectations. Treating the local populace with dignity and respect is how leaders and Soldiers earn the legitimacy and trust of the host nation. Serving honorably, conducting operations ethically, effectively and efficiently to the extent possible is how the Army maintains the trust of the American people and our allies. The joint operations principle of legitimacy impacts every aspect of operations from every conceivable perspective. Legitimacy of the host-nation government and mission enables success characterized by conduct of stability operations.

1-52. While military forces strive to establish a safe and secure environment by establishing civil security and support to civil control, the rule of law requires much more, including detaining and trying individuals accused of committing crimes. These basic elements enable a broader culture of rule of law to exist in a society emerging from conflict. A broad effort integrates activities of many actors, focusing civilian, customary, and military law and order capabilities to support host-nation civil institutions in establishing and supporting the rule of law. These hybrid justice systems often form the intermediate step between the temporary detention and adjudication that occurs under “Establishing Security” and the more mature, civilian-led efforts to build a sustainable and capable criminal justice system. These activities come from a shared sense of confidence among the population that the justice sector focuses on serving the public rather than pursuing narrow interests. Planning, preparing, and executing the transfer of responsibility from military to host-nation control for rule of law—although critical for building public confidence—often proves the most difficult and complex transition conducted in stability operations. Failure to ensure continuity of rule of law through this transition threatens the safety and security of the local populace, erodes the legitimacy of the host nation, and impedes long-term development and achieving the desired end state.

1-11. A whole-of-government approach guides the development, integration, and coordination of all instruments of national power and integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the USG to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal. This approach enables achieving the balance of resources, capabilities, and activities that reinforce progress made by one of the instruments of national power while enabling success among the others. Success in this approach depends upon the ability of civilians and military forces to plan jointly and respond quickly and effectively through an integrated, interagency approach to a fundamentally dynamic situation. Civilian and military efforts often encounter challenges during a whole-of-government approach. Military forces must coordinate efforts with USG departments and agencies and host-nation and other government civilian agencies to mitigate these challenges. These challenges may include differing organizational capacities, perspectives, approaches, and decision-making processes. In practice, USG civil-military interaction is often not as robust or complete as desired. To encourage collaboration and to coordinate the myriad of stability operations tasks among military forces, host nations, intergovernmental agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and international partners force establish a civil-military operations center. Additionally, USG civilian departments and agencies may not be able to participate until the operational environment is conducive and resources are available. Joint force commanders may have to temporarily assume responsibility for tasks outside those normally associated with the joint stability functions. The joint force commander must work with the chief of mission, Department of State (DOS), and other interagency entities to integrate civil-military operations with the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power in unified action. Additionally, the whole-of-government approach must address the root causes of the instability. Other USG departments and agencies may remain after military forces have departed. (For more on the whole-of-government approach, see JP 3-07 and JP 3-08.)

4-46. For stability in operations, commanders organize forces using force tailoring and task-organizing.

4-36. Operational contract support (OCS) is important in the sustainment of operations and helps obtain support for division or corps stability-focused operations. OCS augments other support capabilities by providing an additional source for required supplies and services. Because of the importance and specific challenges of OCS, commanders and staffs need to understand their role in planning for and managing contract support in an AO. (See ATP 4-10 for information regarding OCS roles and responsibilities.)

1-59. The stabilize phase is typically characterized by a shift in focus from sustained combat operations to stability activities. These operations help reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. The intent in this phase is to help restore local political, economic, and infrastructure stability. Civilian officials may lead operations during part or all of this phase, but typically the JFC will provide significant supporting capabilities and activities. Until legitimate local entities are functioning, the joint force may be required to perform essential civil administration and integrate the efforts of other supporting interorganizational partners. The JFC assesses the impact of operations in this phase on the ability to transfer authority for remaining requirements to a legitimate civil entity, which marks the end of the phase.

8-35. Normally, most of a unit’s efforts are focused on the performance of area security tasks at the onset of operations to consolidate gains. Area security includes activities to protect friendly forces, installations, and routes within a specific area. The protected forces and installations may be the civilian population, civil institutions, and civilian infrastructure. The weight of effort will shift toward the performance of stability tasks as operations progress. Ultimately, a military commander will transfer control of the area to a legitimate civilian authority. +Therefore, when considering force structure, commanders should consider the progression of capabilities required over time as area security and minimal-essential stability objectives are met within the consolidation area.

1-5. Army forces must be organized, trained, and equipped to meet worldwide challenges against a full range of threats. The experiences of the U.S. Army in Afghanistan and Iraq in the early 21st century are not representative of the most dangerous conflicts the Army could face in the future. While the Army conducted combat operations in both locations, for the most part it focused its efforts on counterinsurgency operations and stability tasks. Only a fraction of the forces committed in either theater were engaged in offensive and defensive tasks on any given day. While undoubtedly dangerous and lethal at times, these operations reflected the reality that the enemy operated from positions of disadvantage across all domains. The enemy lacked capabilities in the form of sustained long-range precision fires, integrated air defense systems, robust conventional ground maneuver, and electronic warfare. Seldom were friendly units larger than platoons ever at risk of destruction in ground combat. In the future, large-scale combat operations against a peer threat will be much more demanding in terms of operational tempo and lethality.

8-49. Operations focused on stability seek to stabilize the environment enough so that the host nation can begin to resolve the root causes of conflict and state failure. During consolidation of gains, these operations focus on stability tasks to establish conditions that support the transition to legitimate authorities. +Initially, this is accomplished by performing the minimum-essential stability tasks of providing security, food, water, shelter, and medical treatment. Once conditions allow, these tasks are a legal responsibility of Army forces. However, commanders may not need to have Army forces conduct all of these essential tasks. Other military units or appropriate civilian organizations may be available to adequately perform them. As the operational environment (OE) and time allow, the effort will transition to the more deliberate of execution of the six stability tasks (See ADRP 3-07 for additional information on stability tasks.)

2-77. Operations such as stability and humanitarian support are often sustainment intensive particularly in logistics, financial management, medical and engineering capabilities. Therefore, the overall sustainment concept should be closely tied into the operational strategy and be mutually supporting. Planning also should consider the potential requirements to provide support to nonmilitary personnel (IGOs, NGOs, indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector).

2-18. The combination of stability tasks performed during operations depends on the situation. In some operations, the host nation can meet most or all of the population’s requirements. In those cases, Army forces work with and through host-nation authorities. Commanders use civil affairs operations to mitigate how the military presence affects the population and vice versa. Conversely, Army forces operating in a failed state may need to support the local population and work with civilian organizations to restore capabilities. Civil affairs operations are essential in establishing the trust between Army forces and civilian organizations required for effective working relationships.

5-8. Whether conducting major combat operations or operations dominated by stability tasks, assessment consists of the major activities shown in figure 5-1. These activities include—