9-37. Organizational leaders are stewards of their people’s time and energy, as well as their own. They do not waste resources but skillfully evaluate objectives, anticipate resource requirements, and efficiently allocate what is available. They balance available resources with organizational requirements and distribute them in a way that best achieves organizational goals. Because of the more indirect nature of their influence, organizational leaders continuously assess interrelated systems and design longer-term plans to accomplish missions.

2-270. All components of the Total Army (including Active, Reserve, National Guard, and Department of the Army [DA] civilians) bear responsibility for achieving the required levels of collective readiness. Each component has resident capabilities that enable the others, and as such must be trained to the same standard against peer threats. Units not training for specific missions focus on training for proficiency in large-scale combat operations. There are numerous implications across the warfighting functions that impact training, education, and priorities of effort, and they apply across all components. The scarcity of resources, particularly available time in the Army Reserve and Army National Guard, requires a clear prioritization of effort that is informed by the missions particular units perform during large-scale combat operations.

10-3. Strategic leaders serve inside or outside the Army and must thoroughly understand political-military relationships. Army strategic leaders have responsibilities that extend beyond the Army to the national government, its leaders, and ultimately, to the American people. Senior Army leaders are the strategic stewards of the profession. At the strategic level, senior Army leaders address ends, ways, and means to accomplish global missions. They maintain the trust of the American people by living and upholding the Army Values in their decisions and actions taken in regard to policies, programs, systems and the care they provide to Soldiers, DA Civilians, and Army Families. Those serving in strategic leadership positions may lead complex organizations composed of members of the U.S. Army, other U.S. armed services, and those of other nations, members of federal agencies, and non-governmental entities. Strategic leaders, regardless of position, apply professional expertise and uphold the Army Values.

2-313. Large-scale combat operations will create high demands for logistics, personnel services, and Army health services. Sustaining units in the corps, division, and brigade AOs will incur significant risk due to the presence of conventional and hybrid threats. Sustainment units must be equipped, structured, trained, and prepared to execute reconnaissance and security tasks during large-scale combat operations to ensure they can complete sustainment missions when maneuver support is unavailable.

2-20. Friendly, enemy, adversary, and host nation networks, communications systems, computers, cellular phone systems, social media websites, and technical infrastructures are all part of cyberspace. Cyberspace operations are the employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace (JP 3-0). The interrelated cyberspace missions are Department of Defense information network operations, defensive cyberspace operations, and offensive cyberspace operations. For more information on cyberspace operations, see FM 3-12 and JP 3-12 (R).

1-131. A theater of operations is an operational area defined by the GCC for the conduct or support of specific military operations. A theater of operations is established primarily when the scope of the operation in time, space, purpose, and employed forces exceeds what a JOA can normally accommodate. More than one joint force headquarters can exist in a theater of operations. A GCC may establish one or more theaters of operations. Different theaters will normally be focused on different missions. A theater of operations typically is smaller than a theater of war, but is large enough to allow for operations in depth and over extended periods of time. Theaters of operations are normally associated with major operations and campaigns and may cross the boundary of two AORs.

3-17. Security operations—screen, guard, cover, area security, and local security—are essential during preparation. During preparation, the force is vulnerable to surprise and enemy attacks. Leaders are often away from their units and concentrated together during rehearsals. Parts of the force could be moving to task- organize. Required supplies may be unavailable or being repositioned. Units assigned security missions execute these missions while the rest of the force prepares for the overall operation. Every unit provides local security to its own forces and resources.

1-118. A forcible entry operation can be by parachute, air, or amphibious assault. The Army’s parachute assault and air assault forces provide a formidable forcible entry capability. Marine Corps forces specialize in amphibious assault; they also conduct air assaults as part of amphibious operations. Special operations forces (SOF) play an important role in forcible entry; they conduct shaping operations in support of conventional forces while executing their own missions. These capabilities permit JFCs to overwhelm enemy A2 measures and quickly insert combat power. The entry force either resolves the situation or secures a lodgment for delivery of larger forces by aircraft or ships. The three forms of forcible entry produce complementary and reinforcing effects that help JFCs seize the initiative early in a campaign.

4-1. The Army creates doctrine for the conduct of operations that accounts for the Army’s view of the nature of war. We use taxonomies (the classification of things or concepts) to organize thoughts about the conduct of operations. They provide a conceptual framework to help Soldiers understand an operational environment; to organize and guide thinking about operations; to visualize how to move from the current state to the desired end state; to derive the tasks, missions, and other responsibilities assigned to units; and to assess both plans and the execution of operations. They are aids for thinking about and conducting operations. The terms of Army doctrine should facilitate, not constrain, that thinking.

3-78. Stability operations are operations conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to establish or maintain a secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (See ADP 3-07, Stability.) Sustainment in operations with a dominant stability component often involves supporting U.S. forces, multinational forces, and other contributing partners in a wide range of missions and tasks. It will require interaction with other governmental agencies and nongovernmental organizations.

9-28. Well-trained subordinates who work hard and fight tenaciously sense they are part of a first-rate team. Collective confidence comes from succeeding under challenging, stressful conditions. Sense of belonging derives from experiencing technical and tactical proficiency—first as individuals and later collectively. That proficiency expresses itself in the confidence team members have in their peers and leaders and trust shared with each other. Ultimately, cohesive teams combine into a network—a team of teams. Cohesive organizations work in synchronized fashion to complete tasks and missions.

16-1. An after action review is a guided analysis of an organization’s performance, conducted at appropriate times during and at the conclusion of a training event or operation with the objective of improving future performance. It includes a facilitator, event participants, and other observers (ADRP 7-0). Leaders can use action reviews not only for training situations, but also for operations. Leaders can also employ after action reviews during pauses in action, as individual missions are completed, or after phases of the operation as time permits, enabling units to also learn during operations.

1-1. War is a lethal clash of wills and an inherently human endeavor that requires perseverance, sacrifice, and tenacity. The United States Army’s primary reason for existence is to conduct large-scale combat operations for as long as is required to prevail as part of the joint force. Army leaders provide purpose, direction, and motivation required to endure the physical hardship, privation, and danger of combat. Army leaders inspire others to risk their lives to accomplish missions of importance to the Nation. All the other contexts where leaders exercise leadership daily ensure the Army is prepared to do what the Nation requires.

1-22. Three qualities measure good teamwork: identity, cohesion, and climate. Team identity develops through a shared understanding of what the team exists to do and what the team values. Cohesion is the unity or togetherness across team members and forms from mutual trust, cooperation, and confidence. Teamwork increases when teams operate in a positive, engaging, and emotionally safe environment. An engaging environment is one where team members desire to work together on required missions; they feel a sense of self-worth and they are accomplishing something more important than they are. A safe environment occurs when team members feel they can be open and are not threatened by unwarranted criticism.

6-72. BCTs use their cavalry squadrons with organic brigade UAS or augmenting CAB assets to collect information. Combining air and ground assets can provide greater fidelity and timeliness than either capability used alone. Aerial assets can cue ground assets to possible enemy locations either to avoid them or get into a better position to observe them. Ground assets can also cue aerial assets to enemy locations so they can track enemy forces when they move. This information allows BCT direct support artillery battalions, the corps field artillery brigade, and the CAB to coordinate strike coordination and reconnaissance operations, Army aviation attack missions, and joint fires. They can also act as observers during strikes and provide battle damage assessments.

5-16. A successful information collection effort results in the timely collection and reporting of relevant and accurate information, which either supports the production of intelligence or is disseminated as combat information. The information collection effort includes organic units and capabilities and support from DOD intelligence assets, as well as nonintelligence sources, which provide civil considerations and sociocultural information. (See FM 3-55 and ATP 3-55.4.) The information collection tasks are collection management, direct information collection, execute collection, and conduct intelligence-related missions and operations.

1-45. The national security strategy is a document approved by the President of the United States for developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power to achieve objectives that contribute to national security (JP 1). A major strategic goal stated in the 2010 document and reinforced in the 2015 update is strengthening security and resilience in the homeland. The United States must be able to meet threats and hazards including terrorism, disasters, cyberspace attacks, and pandemics. Army forces contribute to the nation's capability to manage emergencies effectively by conducting DSCA missions. (See the National Security Strategy for more information).

2-31. Limiting factors include proximity, legal considerations, and operational commitments. Regular Army units are concentrated at several large installations spread across the country, and they may be based far from an incident's location. Their ability to respond is less a factor in their readiness than available intra-theater transportation. While certain legal considerations affect all Soldiers alike, there are additional legal limitations on the use of Regular Army Soldiers. Perhaps the most important limitation on the use of Regular Army forces is their operational tempo: the rapidity with which Regular Army forces are committed to support ongoing campaigns and other missions outside the United States.

3-78. There are legal restrictions on using information about individuals and organizations physically located within the United States and its territories unless they are part of DOD (military, civilian, or contractor). The core regulations pertaining to these restrictions are DODD 5200.27 and AR 380-13. The restrictions on the use of law enforcement information govern the activities of all members of DOD (uniformed members and civilians). These restrictions are designed to ensure that the rights of, and information on, individuals or organizations not affiliated with DOD are protected unless such information is essential to the accomplishment of specified DOD missions. Any information collected on people not affiliated with DOD must pertain only to the protection of DOD functions and property, personnel security, or operations related to civil disturbance. Seven specific prohibitions regarding information acquisition are that—

3-74. Maintaining and training Army systems is part of readiness. Operational readiness reflects the professionalism of a force able to maintain its tools. Properly maintained equipment and weapons, coupled with tough, realistic training, is what creates cohesive, adaptive, and effective teams. Leaders ensure equipment readiness and accountability through technical competence, discipline, a commitment to stewardship of resources, and the integration of maintenance into training and operations. Leaders and units must be prepared for employment before a crisis; during a crisis they will be committed to missions as they are, not as how they might wish to be.