5-18. The 389th Military Intelligence Battalion (Special Operations) (Airborne) is the nexus for continental United States-based intelligence support, integrating the efforts of each U.S. Army Special Operations Command component. The military intelligence battalion, with the component intelligence staffs, coordinate with their staff counterparts and their units’ communications elements to ensure continuous intelligence reach through the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System. By ensuring interoperability within theater of operations systems and access to national and Service-unique information sources, the commander should have the required intelligence support for the full range of missions.

2-25. Every organization requires an authorization document that states a headquarters’ approved structure and resources. It is the basis and authority for personnel assignments and equipment requisitions. This document is a table of organization and equipment (TOE), a modified TOE, or a table of distribution and allowances (known as TDA). Commanders establish authorizations by developing a modified TOE from the TOE for their individual units. Commanders prescribe in more detail the organization, personnel, and equipment to be authorized to accomplish missions in specific operational environments. Commanders can change their individual modified TOEs with Department of the Army approval.

3-54. Command and support relationships pose challenges for synchronizing federal and state forces conducting DSCA tasks. As previously discussed in chapter 2, section III, Key Legal Considerations, the laws and legal authorities differ between federal and state forces operating within the homeland. The two usual and customary models used in domestic support are parallel command and dual status command. Under parallel command, federal forces take orders from the DOD chain of command, and state National Guard forces take orders from the state's chain of command. If dual status command is used, the President and the governor sign an agreement appointing one officer to command both federal and state National Guard forces. That officer serves simultaneously in Title 10, USC and Title 32, USC duty status. Although dual status command enhances command and control, it does not create unity of command. Missions for federal and state National Guard forces originate separately and must be conducted by their respective forces.

6-96. Subordinate brigades preparing their defense require significant quantities of barrier material and ammunition. The assistant chief of staff, logistics (G-4) ensures that the supporting sustainment brigade provides materiel in times and locations that expedite defensive preparations. Consumption of Class IV and V supplies in the defense is typically higher than in the offense. The division or BCT constituting the command’s forward security force or striking force require a greater amount of Class III and maintenance support than their MBA counterparts. In both cases, the more distance the forward security force and striking force must cover to accomplish their missions, the greater sustainment they require. When these two forces are located at a significant distance from the support area, establishing a forward logistics area to support the planned employment of these two forces may be necessary. The preparation phase is also a good time to provide unit replacements.

3-41. The country team informs various organizations of operations, coordinates elements, and achieves unity of effort. Military engagement with a host country is conducted through the security cooperation organization. However, several other attachés and offices may be integral to security cooperation activities, programs, and missions as well. The country team provides the foundation of local knowledge and interaction with the host-country government and population. As permanently established interagency organizations, country teams represent the single point of coordination, integration, and synchronization of security cooperation activities supported by combatant commands and the theater army.

2-2. The Army special operations forces’ core activities are derived from Title 10, United States Code. The Secretary of Defense, in DODD 5100.01, Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components, assigned these activities to Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command. Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, in U.S. Special Operations Command Directive 10-1, Terms of Reference—Roles, Missions, and Functions of Component Commands, directed these activities to Commander, U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

5-15. Information collection is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations (FM 3-55). Information collection is an integrated intelligence and operations function. The intelligence staff conducts information collection in collaboration with the operations staff to collect, process, and analyze information the commander requires concerning threats, terrain and weather, and civil considerations that affect operations. The primary Army information collection missions/means are reconnaissance, surveillance, security operations, and intelligence operations.

1-49. Army special operations forces’ ability to operate in small teams in permissive, uncertain, or hostile environments allows the development and execution of special operations based on core principles. The core principles of discreet, precise, and scalable special operations enable the achievement of objectives unilaterally, or with or through indigenous forces and populations. These principles enable the force to conduct a wide range of missions that often have high risk, are clandestine, or require a posture of low visibility and help characterize special operations. Discreet, precise, and scalable operations provide combatant commanders and ambassadors a flexible application of military capabilities in politically sensitive and culturally complex environments.

2-29. In today’s complex and rapidly evolving information environment, perceptions, decisions, and, ultimately, behavior are influenced by the psychological effects of actions and information. Emphasis on psychological objectives gives Psychological Operations Soldiers the responsibility to advise U.S. military commanders, ambassadors, or host-nation civilian and military leadership on the potential impact of messages and actions on targets and audiences. Military information support operations can be conducted unilaterally or in conjunction with economic, social, and political activities to limit or preclude the use of military force and to more effectively and efficiently use special operations forces for other high payoff missions. In some cases, the military objective may be relevant only in terms of the psychological effect. This emphasis on psychological effects has created a fundamental shift in the way Army special operations forces view military objectives from a planning standpoint. No longer can commanders look at just the physical aspects of an objective without taking into account the affected populations or targets and audiences in the area of operations. This shift affects all Army special operations forces operating in or through the information environment and increases the relevance of military information support operations as a core activity and capability to affect the environment.

2-104. Large-scale combat operations executed through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability tasks require continuously generating and applying combat power, often for extended periods. Combat power is the total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply at a given time (ADRP 3-0). Combat power includes all capabilities provided by unified action partners that are integrated, synchronized, and converged with the commander’s objectives to achieve unity of effort in sustained operations. The purpose of combat power is to accomplish missions.

3-5. When integrating fires into their plan, each echelon must consider both the needs of their own commander, as well as their role in executing the plan of the echelons above them. Lower echelons will generally have more tactical information available to them and are therefore responsible for refining and executing their portion of the plan of the higher echelon to ensure that the intent of the higher commander is met. An example of this type of refinement is refinement of the location of a target from a general location to a specific location based on the subordinate commander’s understanding of the terrain and use of obstacles. To integrate fires with the other elements of combat power, planners must build an environment that is permissive for the use of fires capabilities. In the physical domains, this is accomplished primarily through the use of control measures to delineate responsibilities. A control measure is a means of regulating forces or warfighting functions (ADP 6-0). This delineation of responsibilities begins with the assignment of an AO. An area of operations is an operational area defined by a commander for land and maritime forces that should be large enough to accomplish their missions and protect their forces (JP 3-0). Unit responsibilities within their assigned AO include:

1-6. The leadership of the United States determines the level of required or acceptable military commitment and effort. The decision to conduct special operations and commit special operations forces is always validated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The role of Army special operations forces is to conduct special operations. This concise role contrasts with the broad definition of special operations. United States Army Special Operations Command provides forces that can operate as small teams or task forces to develop and execute discreet, precise, and scalable special operations in permissive, uncertain, and hostile environments. They are trusted Army professionals of character, competence, and commitment who live by, adhere to, and uphold the moral principles of the Army Ethic and accomplish missions in the right way— ethically, effectively, and efficiently.

1-27. The United States Army Special Operations Command and the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, provide Army conventional force commanders, joint force commanders, and U.S. Ambassadors with forces that can execute discreet, precise, and scalable special operations in permissive, uncertain, or hostile environments. This organized, trained, and equipped force contributes to unified effort at every echelon. The force can operate in denied or sensitive areas to collect, monitor, and verify information of strategic and operational significance, using a variety of tactics and techniques to meet the requirements of discreet operations. The activities listed in figure 1-1, page 1-7, generate information that special operations forces can provide directly to a joint force commander or ambassador and integrate into intelligence processes. The resulting products are disseminated to military and other governmental departments and agencies, as well as indigenous military, police, or other personnel to facilitate execution of their missions.

7-122. During the performance of offensive tasks there may be enemy counterattack penetrations into the flanks of advancing divisions and BCTs. The divisions and BCTs employ security forces on exposed flanks to provide early warning and reaction time. If flank security forces cannot defeat or fix enemy counterattacks, Divisions and BCTs affected by these enemy counterattacks quickly transition to a defense or a delay. The corps or division commander determines size, composition, direction of attack, probable objective, and rate of movement of the counterattacking enemy force. This allows the corps or division commander to assess risk and develop courses of action to defeat the counterattacking enemy force. These courses of action will employ a mix of dynamic defensive actions to turn the enemy force into engagement areas and block its further advance. This may require changing task organization. It will require adjusting subordinate unit boundaries, assigned missions, and control measures. The commander directs the execution of situational or reserve obstacles, the shifting of priority of fires, and the assumption of risk. Corps and division commanders employ offensive actions to isolate and destroy a counterattacking enemy force once it is fixed in these engagement areas.

2-9. The ASCC completes its administrative responsibilities through ADCON—the direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support. ADCON includes organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. It is a Service authority, not a joint authority. It is exercised under the authority of and is delegated by the Secretary of the Army. Regardless of whether Army forces are OPCON to the theater army or not, the theater army commander retains responsibility for ADCON of all Army forces. The ASCC normally has responsibility for—

8-37. This refocusing of priorities will require a force restructuring for more tactical units capable of horizontal and vertical engineering, CA, military information support, communications, logistics, protection assets, and other critical stability-related capabilities. Forces tasked with the consolidation of gains should be tailored (task-organized) for these tasks. For example, medical personnel may be necessary in the short term to provide immediate medical treatment. Engineer assets may be given on-order missions to improve civil infrastructure as the conditions improve. CA personnel will have a large role in assessing the situation and providing guidance to the commander on the prioritization of allocated resources.

2-96. Brigades, regiments, and groups are higher echelons than battalions. A brigade is a unit consisting of two or more battalions and a headquarters company or detachment. A brigade normally contains between 2,500 and 5,000 Soldiers. Its capacity for independent action varies by its type. Division commanders use armored, infantry, or Stryker BCTs, supported by multifunctional support brigades (including field artillery brigades, combat aviation brigades, maneuver enhancement brigades, and sustainment brigades) and functional brigades (including air and missile defense brigades, engineer brigades, civil affairs brigades, and military police brigades) to accomplish their missions. All types of brigades and BCTs can task-organize by the attachment or detachment of outside organizations to become brigade task forces.

11-23. Military deception is considered in all activities of the operations process. Planning, preparing, executing, and continually assessing military deception does not take place in isolation. It occurs simultaneously with the operations process. If it does not, then the risk increases exponentially for the military deception to be under resourced and not integrated into the larger operation as the military deception evolves. It is unlikely that an under resourced and nonintegrated military deception will succeed. Because military deception supports a range of missions, and to prevent one unit’s military deception from compromising another unit’s operations, leaders coordinate military deceptions both laterally and vertically. Deception operations are approved by the headquarters two operational echelons higher than the originating command. Only two authorities can direct a military deception: a higher headquarters and the originating unit commander.

3-1. Unity of effort and global integration requires coordination among government departments and agencies; nongovernmental organizations and intergovernmental organizations; and partners, allies, and nations in any alliance or coalition. Unity of effort, action, and command enables the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of the governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to support a strategy. Global integration is the arrangement of cohesive military actions in time, space, and purpose, executed as a whole to address transregional, all-domain, and multi-functional challenges. Geographic, global, and functional combatant commanders are directly responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense for the implementation of a strategy, U.S. policy, and the execution of assigned missions. The National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and National Military Strategy—shaped to support the implementation of national security policies, and articulated through global, regional, and functional campaign plans—provide strategic direction for combatant commanders. In turn, combatant commanders design, plan, and execute campaign plans in accordance with this guidance as well as the Unified Command Plan, Contingency Planning Guidance, and Joint Strategic Campaign Plan. The Joint Strategic Campaign plan identifies which combatant commander is the coordinating authority for specific subordinate campaign plans. Specifying the coordinating authority facilities synchronization of U.S. operations between combatant commanders; with allies, coalitions, and multinational forces; and with nonmilitary organizations.

3-34. A best practice is to exchange liaisons between higher, lower, supporting, supported, and adjacent organizations. To integrate fully with conventional and joint operations, Army special operations units must maintain effective liaison and coordination elements with all components of the force to synchronize effects created in the joint operational area. To support this effort, joint forces, conventional forces, and special operations units exchange a variety of liaison and coordination elements in addition to the special operations command and control element provided by the higher special operations echelon commander. They range in size from individual liaisons to small coordination elements. Whatever their size or location, these elements coordinate, synchronize, and deconflict missions in the other unit’s area of operation.