2-163. Space operations influence the conduct of all corps, division, and brigade operations. Space operations enable operations by providing positioning, navigation, timing, satellite communications, space-based intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, missile warning, and weather. Army units are consumers of information generated in the space domain and influence space operations by their demands for space-based capabilities. Space operations heavily impact daily operations in Army units. Deliberate planning and targeting processes must request space-based capabilities and effects through the JFC in a timely manner. Commanders who assume short notice responsiveness for space-based capabilities without understanding the limitations of those capabilities increase risk to the mission and their units.

1-21. Sustainment maintenance is performed by Department of Defense (DOD) civilians and contractors who return equipment to a national standard, after which the equipment is placed back into the overall supply system. The United States Army Materiel Command (USAMC) through the Army Sustainment Command (ASC) and its subordinate Army field support brigades (AFSBs) and Army field support battalions execute contingency sustainment maintenance missions. When a unit sends equipment to a sustainment maintenance organization the owning unit, in most cases removes the equipment from the property book. Only in rare instances such as unit reset, will the equipment be returned to the unit. Sustainment maintenance is composed of two subcategories; below depot-level sustainment maintenance and depot-level sustainment maintenance. Units utilize sustainment maintenance when crew, operator, operator-maintainer or Ordnance Corps trained maintainers lack the requisite skills, special tools, proper repair parts, or references to complete repairs using field maintenance. Based on the extent of damage to the specific item, leaders must decide the best course of action based on operational and mission variables. There is no absolute checklist. Field-level maintenance is the preferred method of repair. The intent of sustainment-level maintenance is to perform commodity oriented repairs to return items to a national standard, providing a consistent and measureable level of reliability. Sustainment-level maintenance supports both operational forces and the Army supply system. See ATP 4-33 for a description of the sustainment maintenance subcategories.

2-22. For example, a cyberattack on the electric power grid could have cascading effects on other critical infrastructure, or a pandemic disease outbreak could quickly sicken thousands of people. The strategic planning assumption is that the magnitude of requirements in such an event would exceed local and state civil authorities' capabilities to respond from the outset, inhibiting the tiered response. The effect of the emergency on responders (disaster victims themselves) would compound the need. Although a formal request for assistance under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (commonly known as the Stafford Act) would follow the process for mission assignments, the President could commit federal aid, including military forces, simultaneously with a governor's commitment of state resources. Based on initial assessments from DHS and the supported combatant commander, the Secretary of Defense could authorize significant deployments of federal military forces. (See figure 4-2 on page 4-5, and chapter 4 for details on mission assignments and initial military responses.)

3-24. Consolidate gains is integral to the conclusion of all military operations, and it requires deliberate planning, preparation and resources to ensure sustainable success. This planning should ensure U.S. forces operate in a way that actively facilitates achievement of the desired post-hostilities end state and transition to legitimate authorities. Planners should anticipate task organization changes as conditions on the ground change over time, based on mission and operational variables. For example, additional engineer, military police, civil affairs, psychological operations, and sustainment capabilities are typically required to support the security and stability of large areas as they stabilize over time. In some instances, Army forces will be in charge of integrating and synchronizing these activities, in others Army forces will be in support. However, by backwards planning from the end state, and prioritizing the transition to legitimate authority, rather than simply planning from deployment of forces to the quick and efficient defeat of the enemy, commanders facilitate long-term success, limit mission creep, and minimize post-conflict problems.

2-45. Planning and coordinating the intelligence architecture is critical during all types of operations. When developing the intelligence architecture, the intelligence staff considers all personnel, organizations, systems, and procedures necessary for developing intelligence, including those needed for intelligence operations. The architecture must address bandwidth requirements, preparing for operations, collecting the required information and analyzing it, producing the required products, disseminating the resulting intelligence, and assessing both the intelligence produced and the process that produced it. It is critical for the intelligence staff to work with the commander and the staff as early as possible and throughout planning to ensure the intelligence architecture is addressed adequately. The G-2/S-2 also ensures the unit or organization and its subordinates are adequately integrated into their intelligence architecture to enable effective information collection, PED, and analysis to support mission requirements. This ensures the intelligence architecture supports the necessary operational and technical connections between collection assets, control elements, PED nodes, analytical cells, and headquarters to enable an effective and efficient information flow of intelligence to decision makers and the rest of DOD.

3-82. All staff sections and subordinate units should inspect their paper and electronic archives. The purpose of this inspection is to ensure that the unit has not inadvertently retained personal information on any civilian or civilian organization. In general, units should only retain operational records and documents related to expenditures. They should delete or destroy any information containing civilian names, phone numbers, addresses, or any other personal identifying information, even if acquired incidental to the mission (such as from an aircraft manifest). Information on U.S. persons not affiliated with the DOD contained in files, databases, and repositories is retained in accordance with disposition criteria in AR 25-400-2. Information about U.S. persons deleted from user electronic files, but remaining on servers or archived files, may remain until systems administrators purge or retire them in accordance with systems maintenance policies, AR 25-400-2, or Archivist of the United States disposition instructions. Commanders should ensure their subordinates who have taken any photographic images, audio, or video of U.S. persons during the operation purge their military and personal electronic devices of that sensitive information.

9-168. During the war game, the G-3 (S-3) and assistant chief of staff, plans (G-5 [S-5]) are responsible for movement and maneuver. The G-3 (S-3) normally selects the technique for the war game and role-plays the friendly maneuver commander. Various staff officers assist the G-3 (S-3), such as the aviation officer and engineer officer. The G-3 (S-3) executes friendly maneuver as outlined in the COA sketch and COA statement. The G-5 (S-5) assesses warfighting function requirements, solutions, and concepts for each COA; develops plans and orders; and determines potential branches and sequels arising from various war-gamed COAs. The G-5 (S-5) also coordinates and synchronizes warfighting functions in all plans and orders. The planning staff ensures that the war game of each COA covers every operational aspect of the mission. The members of the staff record each event’s strengths and weaknesses and the rationale for each action. They complete the decision support template and matrix for each COA. They annotate the rationale for actions during the war game and use it later with the commander’s guidance to compare COAs.

5-25. +The consolidation of gains is an integral part of all operations. Corps and division headquarters assign purposefully task-organized forces designated consolidation areas to begin consolidate gains activities concurrent with large-scale combat operations. Consolidate gains activities provide freedom of action and higher tempo for those forces committed to the close, deep, and support areas. Units begin consolidate gains activities after achieving a minimum level of control and when there are no on-going large-scale combat operations in a specific portion of their AO. Corps and divisions can designate a maneuver force responsible for consolidation areas. Forces assigned the mission of consolidating gains execute area security and stability tasks. This enables freedom of action for units in the other corps and division areas by allowing them to focus on their assigned tasks and expediting the achievement of the overall purpose of the operation. Initially the focus is on combined arms operations against bypassed enemy forces, defeated remnants, and irregular forces to defeat threats against friendly forces in the support and consolidation areas, as well as those short of the rear boundaries of BCT in the close area. Friendly forces may eventually create or reconstitute an indigenous security force through security cooperation activities as the overall focus of operations shifts from large-scale combat operations to consolidating gains. Optimally, a division commander would assign a BCT to secure a consolidation area. A division is the preferred echelon for this mission in a corps AO. The requirement for additional forces to consolidate gains as early as possible should be accounted for early during planning with appropriate force tailoring by the theater army.

3-47. Successfully executing stability operations depends on informing the local populace and, when applicable, influencing behaviors. Although more tangible objectives mark the success of stability activities, the final measure of success or failure often rests with the perceptions and behaviors of the population. Military forces must go beyond defeating an enemy—they must secure the trust and confidence of the population. This requires a mastery of information operations—the integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own (JP 3-13). Since forces conduct operations within a broader global and regional context, success often depends on the integration of information efforts among military forces and the various agencies and organizations participating in the operation. Based on mission objectives, commanders may employ themes and messages as part of planned activities designed to influence specific foreign audiences for various purposes that support current or planned operations. Information themes are overarching and apply to the capabilities of public affairs, military information support operations, and Soldier and leader engagements. A message is a narrowly focused communication directed at a specific audience to support a specific theme (JP 3-61). Information efforts must support and complement those of higher echelon headquarters, national interests, and broader USG policy. (See FM 3-13 for more information on information operations.)

9-122. War-gaming is a disciplined process, with rules and steps that attempt to visualize the flow of the operation, given the force’s strengths and dispositions, the enemy’s capabilities, and possible COAs; the impact and requirements of civilians in the area of operations; and other aspects of the situation. The simplest form of war-gaming is the manual method, often using a tabletop approach with blowups of matrixes and templates. The most sophisticated form of war-gaming is computer-aided modeling and simulation. Regardless of the form used, each critical event within a proposed COA should be war-gamed using the action, reaction, and counteraction methods of friendly and enemy forces interaction. This basic war-gaming method (modified to fit the specific mission and environment) applies to offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities operations. When conducting COA analysis, commanders and staffs perform the process actions and produce the outputs shown in figure 9-6.

2-4. Civil Affairs operations are actions planned, coordinated, executed, and assessed to enhance awareness of, and manage the interaction with, the civil component of the operational environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; and/or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government (JP 3-57). Civil Affairs operations are performed by assigned Civil Affairs forces. Civil Affairs are designated Active Component and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct Civil Affairs operations and to support civil-military operations (JP 3-57). Military commanders must consider not only military forces but also the entirety of the operational environment in which they operate. This operational environment includes a populace that may be supportive, neutral, or antagonistic to the presence of military forces, both friendly and opposing. A supportive populace can provide resources and information to facilitate friendly operations. Civil Affairs operations ensure that commanders are advised on civil considerations, to include fulfillment of legal and moral obligations to the populace (in conjunction with the commander’s legal advisor), which can impact foreign policy objectives. Commanders and staffs use the principle of precise operations to ensure that noncombatants are treated with dignity and respect, minimizing harm to them and protecting their personal property, and to establish trust with the host-nation populace. A hostile populace threatens the operations of deployed friendly forces, can undermine mission legitimacy, and can often undermine public support at home for the nation’s policy objectives. Civil-military operations are activities of a commander performed by designated military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions by directly supporting the achievement of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation (JP 3-57).

1-11. A whole-of-government approach guides the development, integration, and coordination of all instruments of national power and integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the USG to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal. This approach enables achieving the balance of resources, capabilities, and activities that reinforce progress made by one of the instruments of national power while enabling success among the others. Success in this approach depends upon the ability of civilians and military forces to plan jointly and respond quickly and effectively through an integrated, interagency approach to a fundamentally dynamic situation. Civilian and military efforts often encounter challenges during a whole-of-government approach. Military forces must coordinate efforts with USG departments and agencies and host-nation and other government civilian agencies to mitigate these challenges. These challenges may include differing organizational capacities, perspectives, approaches, and decision-making processes. In practice, USG civil-military interaction is often not as robust or complete as desired. To encourage collaboration and to coordinate the myriad of stability operations tasks among military forces, host nations, intergovernmental agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and international partners force establish a civil-military operations center. Additionally, USG civilian departments and agencies may not be able to participate until the operational environment is conducive and resources are available. Joint force commanders may have to temporarily assume responsibility for tasks outside those normally associated with the joint stability functions. The joint force commander must work with the chief of mission, Department of State (DOS), and other interagency entities to integrate civil-military operations with the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power in unified action. Additionally, the whole-of-government approach must address the root causes of the instability. Other USG departments and agencies may remain after military forces have departed. (For more on the whole-of-government approach, see JP 3-07 and JP 3-08.)

3-43. Commanders assign missions commensurate with the capabilities of the units in their task organization. The commander’s role in the operations process is to understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess the performance of tasks by their units.

6-13. A successful defense requires the integration and synchronization of all available assets. The defending commander assigns missions, allocates forces (including the reserve), and apportions functional and multifunctional support and sustainment resources within the construct of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations in an operational framework of deep, close, support, and consolidation areas (if applicable). The commander determines where to concentrate defensive efforts and where to take risks based on the results of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process. Commanders strive to defeat enemy attacks across each relevant domain. Commanders can rapidly redirect manned or unmanned attack reconnaissance aviation and artillery systems initially allocated to shaping operations to support the decisive operation at the appropriate time. Commanders organize forces differently for contiguous and noncontiguous areas of operations.

3-32. The land component commander or Army forces commander is normally assigned a large portion of the joint operations area land mass as his area of operations. With this assigned geographic space comes authority and responsibility to accomplish assigned missions within it. The land component commander becomes the supported commander for all operations within his area of operations. The joint special operations commander may be designated a supporting commander to this land component commander or Army forces commander for missions conducted in that specific area of operations. This supported and supporting relationship does not have to include command relationships—it can primarily focus on requirements for coordination of operations. Thus a higher echelon, such as special operations joint task force, can retain operational control of its subordinate elements while those elements coordinate their activities in a supported commander’s area of operations so interdependence is maintained.

1-28. Theater distribution is the flow of personnel, equipment, and materiel within a theater to meet the geographic combatant commander's missions (JP 4-09). Theater distribution is a process of synchronizing all elements of the logistics system to deliver the right things to the right place at the right time to support the geographic combatant commander (GCC). Theater distribution begins at the port of debarkation and ends at the unit. Personnel and materiel enter the theater by surface (land or water) or by air and move through the various transportation modes/hubs/nodes to their destination or point of use.

3-60. Regionally assigned or aligned forces are those forces that provide a combatant commander with scalable, tailorable capabilities to shape OEs. They are those Army units assigned or allocated to combatant commands, or those Army capabilities distributed and prepared by the Army for combatant command regional missions. A corps headquarters prepares, exercises, and ensures readiness of its assigned forces to support security cooperation using the Guidance for Employment of the Force as a planning tool for prioritization of resources and support.

theater distribution – (DOD) The flow of personnel, equipment, and materiel within theater to meet the geographic combatant commander’s missions. (JP 4-09) Referenced in ADP 4-0, ATP 4-0.1, ATP 4-48.

regionally aligned forces – Those forces that provide a combatant commander with up to joint task force capable headquarters with scalable, tailorable capabilities to enable the combatant commander to shape the environment. They are those Army units assigned to combatant commands, those Army units allocated to a combatant command, and those Army capabilities distributed and prepared by the Army for combatant command regional missions. (FM 3-22)

2-39. Regionally aligned forces are those forces that provide a combatant commander at up to joint task force capable headquarters with scalable, tailorable capabilities to enable the combatant commander to shape the environment. They are those Army units assigned to combatant commands, those Army units allocated to a combatant command, and those Army capabilities distributed and prepared by the Army for combatant command regional missions (FM 3-22). Regionally aligned forces also include capabilities that are Service- retained but aligned with a combatant command. Regional missions include theater security cooperation and other shaping efforts. A large portion of joint and Army intelligence is regionally aligned.