2-22. The CCDR, through exercising directive authority for logistics, may assign joint logistics responsibilities to a Service component to establish a joint command for logistics (JP 4-0). The assignment as a joint command for logistics is clearly designated by orders and establishes the organization as a joint command. This command authority is not to be confused with executive agent, common-user logistics, or any other type of Army support to other services. Generally, the CCDR will designate the Service with the preponderance of forces or the most capable logistics structure to fill the joint command for logistics requirement. The designated joint command for logistics requires staff augmentation from other Services to meet joint force requirements. See JP 1-0, JP 3-31, and JP 3-33 for more information on establishing a joint command. In the event the ASCC is assigned responsibility for establishing a joint command for logistics, the TSC or expeditionary sustainment command (ESC) with staff augmentation from other Service components may be designed to fulfill that mission.

3-40. An essential element of friendly information is a critical aspect of a friendly operation that, if known by the enemy, would subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or limit success of the operation and therefore should be protected from enemy detection (ADRP 5-0). Although EEFIs are not CCIRs, they have the same priority. EEFIs establish an element of information to protect rather than one to collect. EEFIs identify those elements of friendly force information that, if compromised, would jeopardize mission success. EEFIs help commanders protect vital friendly information. Their identification is the first step in the operations security process and central to the protection of information.

7-22. The protection of civilians from deliberate attack is distinct from the legal obligations of U.S. forces to minimize harm to civilians during the conduct of operations. Effective protection of civilians starts before deployment by understanding and acknowledging the complexity of the operational environment, creating rules of engagement and policies that prioritize and account for the protection of civilians, and conducting realistic training that tests Soldiers’ decision-making ability. Failure to properly account for and address civilian causalities during tactical operations can create immediate local effects that impact maneuver units and provide opportunities to create global effects through the use of information technologies. Commanders and staff consider the protection of civilians in all activities in order to maintain legitimacy and accomplish the mission.

2-18. Readiness for ground combat is and will remain the U.S. Army’s first priority. The Army accomplishes its mission by supporting the joint force in four strategic roles: shaping operational environments, preventing conflict, prevailing in large-scale ground combat, and consolidating gains. The strategic roles clarify the enduring reasons for which our Army is organized, trained, and equipped. Army forces are further organized, trained, and equipped to provide specific core competencies delivering essential and enduring capabilities aligned with joint doctrine. The Army’s operational concept of unified land operations described in ADP 3-0 is built on the conceptual framework established by the Army’s strategic roles and its core competencies. Title 10, USC, the National Military Strategy, and DODD 5100.01 provide the overall guidance on the capabilities that the Army must provide to the Nation. The Army shapes operational environments and prevents conflict based upon the requirements of combatant commanders. The ability to prevail against any enemy during large-scale ground combat is what provides the military credibility necessary to deter war. Every operation must consolidate gains to make temporary operational success enduring and set the conditions for a sustainable and stable environment. Our non-negotiable obligation to the Nation is to win by achieving the combatant commander’s operational objective when the Army is committed to any type of operation.

7-95. Forms of maneuver are distinct tactical combinations of fire and movement with a unique set of doctrinal characteristics that differ primarily in the relationship between the maneuvering force and the enemy (ADRP 3-90). The Army has six forms of maneuver: envelopment, flank attack, frontal attack, infiltration, penetration, and turning movement. Maneuver units accomplish their missions by synchronizing the contributions of all warfighting functions to execute these forms of maneuver. Commanders generally choose one form on which to build a course of action. A higher echelon commander rarely specifies the specific form of maneuver. However, that higher commander’s guidance and intent, along with the mission and any implied tasks, may impose constraints—such as time, security, and direction of attack—that narrow the forms of maneuver to one alternative. Additionally, the AO’s characteristics and the enemy’s dispositions also help commanders determine the form of maneuver. A single operation may contain several forms of maneuver, such as a frontal attack to clear an enemy’s disruption zone followed by a penetration to create a gap in enemy defenses. Then, the commander might use a flank attack to expand that gap and destroy the enemy’s first line of defense.

1-1. The Army depends upon itself to develop adaptable leaders able to achieve mission accomplishment in dynamic, unstable, and complex environments. A robust, holistic leader development program is essential. Through a mix of education, training, and experience, Army leader development processes produce and sustain agile, adaptive, and innovative leaders who act with boldness and initiative in dynamic, complex situations to execute missions according to doctrine, orders, and training. Furthermore, it also produces leaders that possess the integrity and willingness to act in the absence of orders, when existing orders, doctrine or their own experience no longer fit the situation, or when unforeseen opportunities or threats arise. Properly designed leader development programs develop trusted leaders of character, competence, and commitment. The goal is to develop Army leaders who clearly provide purpose, direction, motivation, and vision to their teams and subordinates while executing missions to support their commander’s intent. Leaders at all levels need to be prepared to understand the strategic context for execution and success of any mission.

2-33. The Army has the largest number of headquarters that are joint task force headquarters capable and can combine all elements of national, multinational, and joint power. Army headquarters are designed to be the core components that integrate unified action partner capabilities into a Service headquarters or rapidly transition from a Service headquarters into a joint or multinational joint task force or land component command. These headquarters provide the capability to plan, prepare, execute, and assess joint and multinational operations. Army forces support partners with situational understanding, security, and logistics. Army forces ensure combatant commanders possess the ability to reinforce and sustain land forces rapidly through forward positioning, theater infrastructure capabilities, and the use of prepositioned equipment and supplies. Army headquarters and forces help impose order to chaotic situations and synchronize plans, programs, and efforts necessary to accomplish the mission.

5-4. The responsibility for accomplishing reconnaissance does not reside solely with reconnaissance units. Every unit has an implied mission to report information about the terrain, civilian activities, and friendly and enemy dispositions. Troops in contact with an enemy and reconnaissance patrols of maneuver units, at all echelons, collect information on enemy units and activities. In echelon support and consolidation areas, reserve maneuver forces, functional and multifunctional support and sustainment elements, other governmental agencies, and multinational forces observe and report civilian, adversary, and enemy activity and significant changes in terrain trafficability. Although all units conduct reconnaissance, ground cavalry, aviation attack reconnaissance units, scouts, and special forces are specifically trained to conduct reconnaissance operations. Some branches, such as the Corps of Engineers and Chemical Corps, conduct specific reconnaissance operations that complement the force’s overall reconnaissance effort. However, BCT, division, and corps commanders primarily use their organic or attached reconnaissance—ground or air—and intelligence elements to accomplish reconnaissance.

5-92. Clearing is a mobility task that involves the elimination or neutralization of an obstacle that is usually performed by follow-on engineers and is not done under fire (ATP 3-90.4). It is generally accomplished by destroying, altering, or removing obstacles. Clearing of a route or an area is often performed by a combined-arms force built around an engineer-based clearance unit. Clearing is conducted when a commander orders enemy obstacles to be cleared within an assigned area or along a specified route. A route clearance may include a transition to an in-stride combined arms breach, if the encountered obstacles are covered by fire and an effective breach organization is available within the task organization or can be established. Once the in-stride breach is completed and the enemy’s ability to interfere with route clearing has been neutralized, the clearing force reverts to the primary mission of route clearance. A clearing mission is not limited to reducing a lane or lanes through the identified obstacles as is the case in a breaching, since a clearing mission is focused on movement along the route or within an area rather than supporting the maneuver of a combat assault force. In route and area clearance, engineer and EOD units destroy or remove explosive obstacles that are a threat to mobility along the route or within the specified area. Routes and areas cleared are considered cleared only if they remain controlled by friendly forces. (See ATP 3-90.4 for additional information on the performance of the clearing task.)

2-3. Army planners use the operational variables to describe an operational environment. Operational variables are those aspects of an operational environment which affect operations, and they differ from one area of operations to another. Army planners analyze an operational environment in terms of eight interrelated operational variables: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (also known as PMESII-PT). As soon as a commander and staff have an indication of where their unit may deploy, they begin analyzing that location’s operational environment using the operational variables. They continue to refine and update their analysis even after receiving a mission and throughout the course of the ensuing operation. (See ADP 3-0 for additional information on the operational variables.)

2-202. The movement and maneuver warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that move and employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy and other threats (ADRP 3-0). Direct fire and close combat are inherent in maneuver. The movement and maneuver warfighting function includes tasks associated with force projection related to gaining a position of relative advantage over the enemy. Movement is necessary to disperse and displace the force as a whole or in part when maneuvering. Maneuver is the employment of forces in the operational area through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage with respect to the enemy. It works through movement and with fires to achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy to accomplish the mission and consolidate gains. Commanders use maneuver for massing the effects of combat power to achieve surprise, shock, and momentum. Effective maneuver requires close coordination of movement with fires. The movement and maneuver warfighting function includes the following tasks:

13-21. Army forces may participate in interagency operations across the range of military operations, especially when conducting stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks. Frequently, Army forces conduct operations in cooperation with or in support of civilian government agencies. Relations in these operations are rarely based on standard military command and support relationships; rather, national laws or specific agreements for each situation govern the specific relationships in interagency operations. Defense support of civil authorities provides an excellent example. Federal military forces that respond to a domestic disaster will support the Federal Emergency Management Agency, while National Guard forces working in state active duty status (Title 32 United States Code) or conducting National Guard defense support of civil authorities will support that state's emergency management agency. National Guard forces federalized under Title 10 United States Code will support the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The goal is always unity of effort between military forces and civilian agencies, although unity of command may not be possible. Effective liaison and continuous coordination become keys to mission accomplishment. (See FM 3-28.)

1-7. All Army personnel—military, civilian, and contractor—must understand the state's rules for the use of force (RUF) and federal standing rules for the use of force (SRUF). State authorities establish RUF consistent with state laws. (SRUF are further discussed in the Operational Law Handbook). RUF and SRUF are the equivalent of rules of engagement, except that they apply in domestic situations. They are restrictive, not permissive, and vary from state to state. Leaders must review them with their subordinates before every mission. Commanders stress the same emphasis to RUF and SRUF as to rules of engagement in a restrictive environment. Commanders must keep in mind that the first purpose of DSCA is to save lives; lethal force is always a measure of last resort. (See Chapter 4, for more information on use of force in regards to DSCA tasks.)

5-28. Army forces may conduct large-scale combat operations in urban areas within the JOA or theater of operations. Currently more than 50 percent of the world’s population lives in urban areas, and this is likely to increase to 70 percent by 2050, making large-scale combat operations in cities likely. Commanders may conduct urban operations because they provide a tactical, political, or economic advantage, or when not doing so threatens the joint campaign. Army forces conduct large-scale combat operations in urban areas either as a specific, unique operation, or more typically, as one of a larger series of operations in a joint campaign. Urban operations focus on the threat to or within the urban area and allow other forces to conduct operations elsewhere. Conducting operations in dense urban terrain is complex and resource intensive. Due to the complexity of an urban environment, commanders must carefully arrange their forces and operations according to purpose, time, and space to accomplish the mission. In most urban operations, the terrain, the dense population, military forces, and unified action partners will further complicate this arrangement. (See FM 3-06 for an in depth discussion of operations in urban areas.)

4-201. Army leaders directing DSCA tasks must understand how U.S. laws, federal government policies, and military policies and regulations limit the types of information that can be collected, processed, analyzed, and retained during domestic operations. Army intelligence staffs and units must understand the authorities for conducting IAA activities. Leaders and staffs must become familiar with the doctrine in this publication and with DOD directives and Army regulations that apply to operations in the homeland. They must be thoroughly familiar with the limits spelled out in AR 381-10. If alerted to prepare for a DSCA mission, unit staffs should obtain the governing operation plan and standard operating procedures from their gaining combatant command's joint task force. Before units begin deployment, S-2s and G-2s should clarify all contentious information collection areas with their higher headquarters. Intelligence staffs should analyze each fragmentary order carefully for support requirements. The S-2s and G-2s should consult with the command staff judge advocate for legal review or with the inspector general for guidance on intelligence oversight requirements.

7-15. Explosive ordnance disposal supports, enhances, and enables unit operations, planning, and training across direct and indirect lines of effort. Explosive ordnance disposal competencies specifically provide organic force protection capability, elevate and deepen the level of training assistance to indigenous forces, and reduce risks to missions and to forces during direct action missions, as well as other specialized tasks. Explosive ordnance disposal units provide both general support to Army special operations forces commanders, based on requested theater allocations, as well as direct support with specialized and designated explosive ordnance disposal units to specified units. The increasing proliferation and technological complexity of improvised weapons and other chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards drives this critical requirement of continued and embedded explosive ordnance disposal support to all Army special operations units in order to maintain required core mission capabilities.

9-115. After determining the broad concept, planners create a task organization by assigning headquarters to groupings of forces. They consider the types of units to be assigned to a headquarters and the ability of that headquarters to control those units. Generally, a headquarters controls at least two subordinate maneuver units (but not more than five) for fast-paced offensive or defensive tasks. The number and type of units assigned to a headquarters for stability tasks vary based on factors of the mission variables: mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). If planners need additional headquarters, they note the shortage and resolve it later. Task organization takes into account the entire operational organization. It also accounts for the special command requirements for operations, such as a passage of lines, or air assault.

1-138. Understanding the relationship between an AO, area of influence, and area of interest assists commanders in developing their operational framework. It also requires physically, temporally, cognitively and virtually understanding operations in depth. The proper application of the operational framework enables simultaneous operations and converging of effects against an enemy. An area of influence is a geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander’s command or control (JP 3-0). Understanding an area of influence helps commanders and staffs plan branches to the current operation in which the force uses capabilities outside the AO. An AO should not be substantially larger than a unit’s area of influence. Ideally, an area of influence would encompass the entire AO. An AO that is too large for a unit to control can allow sanctuaries for enemy forces, creates friendly vulnerabilities and positions of advantage for the enemy to exploit and may limit joint flexibility. An area of interest is that area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory (JP 3-0). This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. An area of interest for stability tasks may be much larger than that area associated with the offense and defense. Cognitive and virtual aspects of an area of interest are often broader than physical aspects.

5-59. The responsibility for conducting reconnaissance operations does not reside solely with specifically organized units. Every unit has an implied mission to report information about the terrain, civilian activities, and friendly and enemy dispositions. This is regardless of a unit’s location or primary function. Troops in contact with an enemy and reconnaissance patrols of maneuver units at all echelons collect information on enemy units and activities. In the support and consolidation areas, reserve maneuver forces, functional and multifunctional support and sustainment elements, other governmental agencies, and multinational forces observe and report civilian, adversary, and enemy activity and significant changes in terrain trafficability. Although all units conduct reconnaissance, those specifically trained in reconnaissance tasks are ground cavalry, aviation attack reconnaissance units, scouts, Ranger units, CA units, and SOF. Some units, such as engineers, CA, and the chemical corps, have specific reconnaissance tasks to perform that complement the force’s overall reconnaissance effort. However, BCT, division, and corps commanders primarily use their organic or attached reconnaissance—ground or air—and intelligence elements to conduct reconnaissance operations.

8-7. Shaping activities are directly tied to authorities provided in various titles of United States Code (including Titles 10, 22, and 50) and approved programs and are integrated and synchronized with the Department of State, other government agencies, country teams, and ambassadors’ plans and objectives. The Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development develop the joint strategy to address regional goals, management, operational considerations, and resources. Each country team develops an individual country plan to address country context, joint mission goals, and coordinated strategies for development, cooperation, security, and diplomatic activities. Combatant commands consider these plans along with functional, regional, and global campaign plans as they develop their campaign plan.