9-37. The commander and staff examine additions to and deletions from the current task organization, command and support relationships, and status (current capabilities and limitations) of all units. This analysis also includes capabilities of civilian and military organizations (joint, special operations, and multinational) that operate within their unit’s area of operations. They consider relationships among specified, implied, and essential tasks, and between them and available assets. From this analysis, staffs determine if they have the assets needed to complete all tasks. If shortages occur, they identify additional resources needed for mission success to the higher headquarters. Staffs also identify any deviations from the normal task organization and provide them to the commander to consider when developing the planning guidance. A more detailed analysis of available assets occurs during COA development.

2-293. Training in a realistic environment allows staffs to practice planning, integrating, and synchronizing defensive and offensive cyberspace operations, DODIN operations, and EW operations. A realistic training environment provides the appropriate defensive and offensive aspects of cyberspace and EW operations, and it allows units to integrate actions and effects in support of maneuver commanders. Training of forces tasked to engage targets in cyberspace and the EMS is critical to mission success. This requires specialized technical training, instrumentation, and ranges at home station and combat training centers to allow realistic and combat-focused training.

2-123. Ultimately, command reflects everything a commander understands about the nature of war, warfighting doctrine, training, leadership, organizations, materiel, and soldiers. It is how commanders organize their forces, structure operations, and direct the synchronized effects of organic and allocated assets toward their visualized end state. Command is built on training and shared understanding by all Soldiers within a command about how it operates. It is the expression of the commander’s professional competence and leadership style, and the translation of the commander’s vision to the command. However, command alone is not sufficient to translate that vision and to assure mission accomplishment; control, the subject of chapter 3, is also necessary.

9-191. Plans and orders reconciliation occurs internally as the staff conducts a detailed review of the entire plan or order. This reconciliation ensures that the base plan or order and all attachments are complete and in agreement. It identifies discrepancies or gaps in planning. If staff members find discrepancies or gaps, they take corrective actions. Specifically, the staff compares the commander’s intent, mission, and commander’s CCIRs against the concept of operations and the different schemes of support (such as scheme of fires or scheme of sustainment). The staff ensures attachments are consistent with the information in the base plan or order.

2-135. The corps echelon is where properly conceived and employed MILDEC is most likely to succeed and mislead enemy commanders as to the true disposition, capabilities, and intentions of friendly forces. Divisions and lower echelons often lack the density of forces and capabilities to successfully deceive a regional peer enemy. Tactical headquarters employ TAC-D measures assigned by a higher echelon headquarters or develop their own measures to support their own concept of operations. These measures must be nested. +The tactical headquarter’s higher echelon headquarters must vet and approve all TAC-D operations. TAC-D requires synchronization across multiple domains and echelons. An enemy is not likely to be deceived when friendly actions do not match the available information. Tactical units assigned to conduct MILDEC activities are often not informed of their mission’s true purpose.

3-73. Once units are deployed, they conduct rehearsals of AMD actions (such as crew drills) focused on their AO and defense of their designated assets. These actions, in general, have been ongoing as continuous training events prior to deployment and mission assignment, but now are conducted in coordination with the supported unit or site and other AMD elements in the area for defense of a specific asset. For example, ADA commanders and staffs may participate in maneuver units’ staff exercises and ADA crews may concentrate their training on the expected aerial threats and firing doctrine to be employed in given situations in coordination with other supported or supporting AMD forces. Rehearsing actions is a continuous process that is conducted throughout the deployment.

4-89. Explosive ordnance disposal teams and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive response teams respond to CBRN incidents in support of a combatant commander. If requested, they respond to USNORTHCOM and USPACOM for specialized domestic CBRN incident support. Support includes unknown explosive ordnance, improvised explosive devices, homemade explosives and weapons of mass destruction, movement of munitions, and disposal of unusual unexploded ordnance. These units frequently deploy for NSSEs. The CBRN incident response teams deploy with mission specific sustainment capabilities, but life support assistance comes from the supported combatant commander.

2-70. The ACOS, G-9 (S-9) is the principal staff officer responsible for all matters concerning civil affairs. The G-9 (S-9) establishes the civil-military operations center, evaluates civil considerations during mission analysis, and prepares the groundwork for transitioning the area of operations from military to civilian control. The G-9 (S-9) advises the commander on the military’s effect on civilians in the area of operations, relative to the complex relationship of these people with the terrain and institutions over time. The G-9 (S-9) is responsible for enhancing the relationship between Army forces and the civil authorities and people in the area of operations. The G-9 (S-9) is required at all echelons from battalion through corps, but it is normally authorized only at division and corps. Once deployed, units below division level may be authorized an S-9. The G-9 (S-9) prepares Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) to the operation order or operation plan. (See FM 3-57 for more information.) G-9 (S-9) responsibilities include, but are not limited to—

7-44. Commanders may also commit the reserve to sustain the momentum of the attack of a committed unit. There are three basic options for the use of the reserve in this case. First, the reserve continues the attack as a separate force under the control of the corps or division headquarters, and it is given responsibility for the remainder of the committed unit’s AO. The second option is to place the reserve in a command relationship— attached, OPCON, or TACON—to the committed unit. This reinforces the committed division or BCT whose commander is probably most knowledgeable of local conditions without needing to change control measures. The third option is for the reserve to assume control of the AO from the committed unit by means of a passage of lines, a relief in place, or a follow on and assume tactical mission task. This allows the rapid introduction of fresh forces. It also allows the higher commander to reconstitute a reserve from the formerly committed unit after that unit has had enough time to resupply and reorganize itself.

3-15. USACE operates separately from state National Guard forces and federal Army forces. its capabilities are employed for DSCA through traditional Army command structure, USCs, public law, or DODDs. During natural disasters and other emergencies, USACE can respond under its own authority, Public Law 84-99 (PL 84-99); as a component of the Department of Defense; and as the designated lead agency in support of FEMA for Emergency Support Function Number 3, Public Works and Engineering (ESF #3.) USACE receives priorities from the joint field office directly. Federal military forces may also receive mission assignments under ESF Annex #3, but they remain under the federal joint task force's command.

3-15. An attack is a type of offensive operation that destroys or defeats enemy forces, seizes and secures terrain, or both. Attacks incorporate coordinated movement supported by fires. They may be part of either decisive or shaping operations. A commander may describe an attack as hasty or deliberate, depending on the time available for assessing the situation, planning, and preparing. A commander may decide to conduct an attack using only fires, based on an analysis of the mission variables. An attack differs from a movement to contact because in an attack commanders know at least part of an enemy’s dispositions. This knowledge enables commanders to better synchronize and employ combat power.

4-42. Army forces arrive via the most efficient use of available lift, and speed is usually a critical factor during DSCA operations. Based on mission and mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC), the theater army may be required to establish reception, staging, onward movement, and integration operations. The theater army normally assigns reception, staging, onward movement, and integration to the theater sustainment command (Army) and its attached expeditionary sustainment command (ESC). Upon arrival in the AOR, attachment of the unit transfers from the force provider (United States Army Forces Command or the National Guard Bureau) to the theater army. The theater army passes tactical control of the unit to the ESC or other Army headquarters responsible for reception, staging, onward movement, and integration. Upon arrival of the deploying unit's chain of command, the theater army and gaining operational commander establish a relationship of direct liaison authorized in order to facilitate communications and planning. The ESC receives personnel and equipment at the joint theater base established in or near the joint operations area (reception). When the unit is fully assembled, it moves as a unit to a designated assembly area within the joint operations area (staging). For DSCA, the joint theater base may be a BSI, but the arriving forces could also self-deploy and move directly to their designated areas of operation, bypassing a staging area, and establishing logistics support from the ESC and designated BSI from there.

1-40. For stability operations, commanders often require more detailed intelligence and IPB products to determine how best to conduct operations and influence the local populace to enhance stability. The identification and analysis of threats, terrain and weather, and civil considerations are critical in determining the most effective missions, tasks, and locations to conduct specific stability tasks. A lack of knowledge concerning insurgents, local politics, customs, culture, and how to differentiate between local combatants often leads to U.S. actions that can result in unintended and disadvantageous consequences. Consequences can include attacking unsuitable targets or offending or causing mistrust among the local population. This lack of knowledge could potentially threaten mission accomplishment. The G-2/S-2 and G-3/S-3, in coordination with the rest of the staff, develop a synchronized and integrated information collection plan that satisfies the commander's information requirements. (For more information on stability operations, see ADP 3-07.)

6-214. Encirclement of a friendly force is most likely to occur during highly mobile and fluid operations, or when operating in restrictive terrain. A unit may find itself encircled as a result of its offensive actions, as a detachment left in contact, when defending a strong point, when occupying a combat outpost, or when defending an isolated defensive position. Commanders anticipate becoming encircled when assigned a stay-behind force mission, when occupying either a strong point or a combat outpost, or at the outset of forcible entry operations before a linkup is completed. The principles of defending encircled also apply to base and base cluster defense in support and consolidation areas.

2-26. Movement control is the dual process of committing allocated transportation assets and regulating movements according to command priorities to synchronize distribution flow over lines of communications to sustain land forces (ADP 4-0). Units transiting another unit’s AO are required to coordinate with that unit’s headquarters. Generally, the unit assigned an AO controls movement within that AO. The designation, maintenance, route security, and control of movement along routes within an AO are the responsibility of the owning unit unless the higher echelon coordinating instructions directs otherwise. The commander of an AO may designate movement routes as open, supervised, dispatch, reserved, or prohibited. Each route’s designation varies based on the mission variables. (See ATP 4-16 for a discussion of movement planning and control measures.)

3-5. Sustainment is inherently joint and requires a coordinated and collaborated effort between the Services, UAPs, and multinational partners. Sustainment determines the depth and duration of Army operations. It is essential to retaining and exploiting the initiative and it provides the support necessary to maintain operations until mission accomplishment. Failure to provide sustainment could cause a pause or culmination of an operation resulting in the loss of the initiative and failure to exploit tactical successes. It is essential that sustainment planners and operation planners work closely to synchronize all of the warfighting functions, in particular sustainment, to allow commanders the maximum flexibility to conduct decisive action.

12-15. A full-dress rehearsal produces the most detailed understanding of the operation. It includes every participating Soldier and system. Leaders conduct the rehearsal on terrain similar to the area of operations, initially under good light conditions, and then in limited visibility. Leaders repeat small-unit actions until units execute them to standard. A full-dress rehearsal helps Soldiers clearly understand what commanders expect of them. It helps them gain confidence in their ability to accomplish the mission. Supporting elements, such as aviation crews, meet and rehearse with Soldiers to synchronize the operation.

3-64. Regardless of the level of integration, there is also an interdependence tied to the objectives each force is supporting. Both may be conducting shaping activities in the same country simultaneously or sequentially. Each must account for the other’s actions and their impact on the environment. Accounting occurs during the review of trip reports, after action reports, and other post-mission reports conducted at theater echelon or below. At the theater echelon this accounting occurs between theater special operations command and theater Army through lateral staff activities and at the GCC staff, as they track progress towards achieving objectives laid out in the theater security cooperation plan.

4-114. Host-nation civil and military force capabilities may integrate with U.S. security forces for area and local protection tasks. Military police (MP) units provide a unique set of capabilities that support police operations, detention operations, and security and mobility support. Corps MP support is performed on a command, area, functional, or mission basis. MP capability for the security force should be considered when analyzing the mission variables. (See FM 3-39 for additional information regarding MP operations. ATP 3-39.30 addresses MP conduct of security and mobility support. FM 3-63 addresses Army detainee operations. ATP 4-02.46 addresses Army Health System support to detainee operations.)

5-38. Stability operations require commanders to balance protection needs between military forces and civil populations. Because U.S. forces and the local population frequently interact, planning for their protection is important and difficult. Threats attack to weaken U.S. resolve and promote their individual agendas. Such enemies, who may be nearly indistinguishable from noncombatants, view U.S. forces and facilities as prime targets. An additional planning consideration during stability operations is to protect the force while using the minimum force necessary, which is consistent with the approved rules of engagement. The escalation of force TTP must also be rehearsed and be flexible enough to change with the local threat conditions. Collateral damage caused by military operations can negatively impact the mission and can support enemy or adversary provocation tactics. Conversely, overly restrictive rules of engagement can limit the freedom of action and the ability to protect the force.