2-40. Regionally aligned forces and other specified Army units require ready access to and seamless interaction with their associated combatant command's intelligence architecture. When an Army headquarters enters a GCC theater as a joint force command, joint task force, or combined joint task force, it primarily receives intelligence support through the joint intelligence architecture. Specifically, the GCC joint intelligence center/joint intelligence operations center (also called JIC/JIOC) provides all-source intelligence support unless another support relationship is established. Other Army units within the GCC depend on the combatant command's MIB-T for situational awareness throughout the area of responsibility. This relationship allows units to tailor mission planning and training, establish an effective intelligence architecture, and leverage DOD intelligence effectively. This concept refers to the MIB-T as the anchor point within that specific theater.

6-17. The manner in which organizations and Soldiers learn from mistakes is key in protecting the force. Although the evaluation process occurs throughout the operations process, it also occurs as part of the after action review and assessment following the mission. Leaders at all levels ensure that Soldiers and equipment are combat-ready. Leaders demonstrate their responsibility to the sound stewardship practices and risk management principles required to ensure minimal loss of resources and military assets due to hostile, nonhostile, and environmental threats and hazards. Key lessons learned are immediately applied and shared with other commands. Commanders develop systems to ensure the rapid dissemination of approved lessons learned and TTP proven to save lives and protect equipment and information. The protection working group at each command echelon evaluates the integration of lessons learned and constantly coordinates protection lessons with other staff elements within and between the levels of command. Postoperational evaluations typically—

5-79. A relief in place is an operation in which, by the direction of higher authority, all or part of a unit is replaced in an area by the incoming unit and the responsibilities of the replaced elements for the mission and the assigned zone of operations are transferred to the incoming unit (JP 3-07.3). (See figure 5-1. Note. The Army uses AO instead of a zone of operations.) The incoming unit continues the operation as ordered. A commander conducts a relief in place as part of a larger operation, primarily to maintain the combat effectiveness of committed units. The higher echelon headquarters directs when and where to conduct a relief and establishes the appropriate control measures. Normally, during the conduct of large-scale combat operations, the unit being relieved is defending. However, a relief may set the stage for resuming the offense. A relief may also serve to free the relieved unit for other tasks, such as decontamination, reconstitution, routine rest, resupply, maintenance, specialized training, or redeployment. Sometimes, as part of a larger operation, a commander wants an enemy force to discover the relief, because that discovery might cause an enemy to do something in response that is contrary to its interests, such as move reserves from an area where the friendly commander wants to conduct a penetration.

1-66. In general terms, risk is the exposure of someone or something valued to danger, harm, or loss. Because risk is part of every operation, it cannot be avoided. Commanders analyze risk in collaboration with subordinates to help determine what level of risk exists and how to mitigate it. When considering how much risk to accept with a course of action, commanders consider risk to the force and risk to the mission against the perceived benefit. They apply judgment with regard to the importance of an objective, time available, and anticipated cost. Commanders need to balance the tension between protecting the force and accepting and managing risks that must be taken to accomplish their mission.

4-42. In large-scale ground combat operations, generating and maintaining combat power is essential to success. Commanders combine and apply the elements of combat power to produce overwhelming effects throughout operations. In short, a warfighting function is a set of capabilities, whereas an operation is designed to produce an outcome that uses the capabilities provided by the warfighting function. Within most of the warfighting functions, there are tasks that can be used as a task to some formation (type of unit), which when combined with the when, where, and why constitute a mission to be executed by that unit—that is, it becomes an operation for that unit.

1-28. Commanders and leaders charged with providing or ensuring protection must begin with a thorough understanding of the OE, the risks and opportunities resident there, and the ways and means available for preserving combat power through protection. Army doctrine recognizes the eight operational variables of political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT) for analyzing and understanding any OE. To support military plans, missions, and orders, relevant information from these operational variables can be filtered into the categories of the six Army mission variables of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). Using the METT-TC factors, leaders examine the environment as it relates to their mission and begin the process of identifying threats and hazards. Joint and Army doctrine recognizes the need to understand sociocultural factors, which are key to understanding populations proximate to friendly forces. It can be easy to focus on known enemy capabilities or adversaries and heavily concentrate analytical efforts in that direction. However, applying due diligence in operational variable and sociocultural analyses can help identify potential threats from previously unknown hostile groups, neutral groups, and isolated groups within a larger, friendly population. These analyses provide an understanding of the OE that helps to identify current, developing, and potential hazards and threats and enable the protection tasks to be taken to mitigate or eliminate them. (See ATP 2-01.3, ATP 3-05.20, and JP 2-01.3 for additional information.)

12-89. The G-3 (S-3) briefs friendly maneuver unit dispositions, including security forces, as they are arrayed at the start of the operation. Subordinate commanders and other staff officers brief their unit positions at the starting time and any particular points of emphasis. For example, the chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) officer states the mission-oriented protective posture level, and the chief of fires (fire support officer) or fires unit commander states the range of friendly and enemy artillery. Other participants place markers for friendly forces, including adjacent units, at the positions they will occupy at the start of the operation. As participants place markers, they state their task and purpose, task organization, and strength.

9-179. The decision matrix is a tool to compare and evaluate COAs thoroughly and logically. However, the process may be based on highly subjective judgments that can change dramatically during the course of evaluation. In table 9-7, the weights reflect the relative importance of each criterion as initially estimated by a COS (XO) during mission analysis and adjusted or approved by the commander. During COA comparison, rankings are assigned from 1 to however many COAs exist. Lower rankings are more preferred. After assigning ranks to COAs, the staff adds the unweighted ranks in each row horizontally and records the sum in the Total column on the far right of each COA. The staff then multiplies the same ranks by the weights associated with each criterion and notes the product in parenthesis underneath the unweighted rank. No notation is required if the weight is 1. The staff adds these weighted ranks horizontally and records the sum in parenthesis underneath the unweighted total in the Total column to the right of each COA. The staff then compares the totals to determine the most preferred (lowest total) COA based on both unweighted and weighted ranks. Although the lowest total denotes a most preferred solution, the process for estimating relative COA ranks and relative criteria weighting may be highly subjective. Upon review and consideration, the commander—based on personal judgment—may accept the results of the decision matrix or elect to execute one of the other COAs.

2-81. In multinational operations, sustainment of forces is primarily a national responsibility. However, relations between the United States and its NATO allies have evolved to where sustainment is viewed as a collective responsibility (NATO Military Committee Decision 319/1). In multinational operations, the multinational commander must have sufficient authority and control mechanisms over assets, resources, and forces to effectively achieve the mission. Nations performing their own and separate sustainment functions would prove to be inefficient and expensive. It would also hinder the multinational commander’s ability to influence and prioritize limited resources to support the operation and accomplish the mission.

2-42. Most multifunctional support brigades do not routinely control AOs but conduct operations throughout a corps or division AO. Normally these brigades coordinate their airspace use with the divisions and brigades that have AOs. Airspace control becomes more complex when a corps tasks these multifunctional support brigades to accomplish a mission that affects airspace use in other AOs. The multifunctional support brigade conducting the operation submits its airspace requirements with the higher echelon headquarters airspace element providing planning and airspace control support to the multifunctional support brigade’s air defense airspace management element. The division airspace element checks that it adjusts the airspace plan to account for the multifunctional support brigade commander’s priorities and concept of operations.

2-23. Commanders must integrate personnel recovery throughout operations. This requires an understanding of the complex, dynamic relationships between friendly forces and enemies and of the other aspects of the OE (including the populace). This understanding helps commanders visualize and describe their intent for personnel recovery and assists them in developing focused planning guidance. Personnel recovery guidance is contained in various parts of the order, including the base order, appropriate annexes, appendixes, tabs, and exhibits. Commanders translate the personnel recovery guidance into recommendations known as isolated Soldier guidance. The commander gives guidance for developing isolated Soldier guidance during initial planning. Effective isolated Soldier guidance addresses the challenges of isolation within the unit AO and mission.

2-22. Operations to consolidate gains make temporary operational successes enduring and set the conditions to facilitate the transition of control over territory to legitimate authorities. Army forces enable the joint force commander to capitalize on operational success by following through to ensure sustainable conditions on the ground. Consolidation of gains is an integral part of winning armed conflict and is essential to retaining the long-term initiative over determined adversaries. Army forces reinforce and integrate the efforts of all unified action partners when they consolidate gains. Operations serve a higher national purpose in support of U.S. interests and are planned and executed to support that purpose at each echelon. A clear understanding of the higher purpose of the mission and operational environment determines what must happen to consolidate gains during the course of operations. How well ground forces consolidate gains determines in large part how enduring the results of operations will be. Effectively consolidating gains increases options for national leaders and contributes to decisive outcomes. (See figure 2-3.)

3-66. ADA planners review the initial DAL to ensure that sufficient resources are available and allocated to provide adequate protection. ADA planners review and revise the list continuously throughout an operation, in accordance with changes in missions, threat capabilities, available ADA forces, and related factors. For instance, when a mission changes, subordinate commanders and their staffs may nominate additional assets for inclusion into a re-prioritized list. The updated DAL then becomes the basis for revised AMD planning and defense design.

1-6. State and federal laws define almost every aspect of DSCA. They circumscribe tasks units may perform and from whom they take direction. Depending on their duty status, laws prohibit many Soldiers from undertaking certain missions, especially those associated with law enforcement. Laws also specify professional requirements for skills such as medical treatment. Commanders should consult with their staff judge advocate before authorizing Soldiers to perform any task outside the mission. Disregarding the laws affecting DSCA tasks can lead to issues that will hinder mission accomplishment. Leaders at every level ensure their Soldiers comply with applicable U.S. and state laws, even when doing so seems to hamper rapid accomplishment of the task. Unless there is an imminent risk to life or limb, or risk of catastrophic property damage, commanders in doubt about the legal consequences of an action should seek guidance from their higher headquarters before proceeding.

7-74. Engineer units operating in the corps or division support and consolidation areas primarily conduct general engineering, survivability, and route and area clearance tasks. These engineer units may also be assigned responsibility for base camp defense, area defense, or terrain management. However, commanders must weigh the risks associated with assigning these missions. In addition to removing them from their engineer-specific mission, these engineer units require time to assemble because they are normally dispersed when conducting engineer missions on an area basis. They also require fire support and anti-armor augmentation.

2-60. For commanders and staffs, stability operations require a unique combination of knowledge and understanding, the ability to achieve unity of effort, and cultural awareness. Military forces have a finite amount of combat power to apply to the tasks associated with a given operation. Stability operations lay the foundation for the success of the instruments of national power. This foundation must sustain the burdens of governance, rule of law, and economic development that represent the future viability of a state. Establishing this foundation depends on applying combat power to the essential stability operations tasks identified during the initial assessment of the situation and the framing of the basic problem. Decisions about using combat power are more than a factor of the size and composition of the force, the strategic mission, and long-term objectives. Commanders and staffs also consider the ethical consequences of those decisions and the signals those actions send to the government and local population of the host nation, as well as to the American people. Resources will never be adequate to cover all stability requirements; thus, essential tasks must be prioritized by leaders at all levels.

1-20. The levels of warfare model the relationship between national objectives and tactical actions. There are no fixed limits or boundaries between these levels, but they help commanders visualize a logical arrangement of operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks to appropriate commands. Echelon of command, size of units, types of equipment, and types and location of forces or components may often be associated with a particular level, but the strategic, operational, or tactical purpose of their employment depends on the nature of their task, mission, or objective.

1-10. Army forces complete their tasks and redeploy on order in the least amount of time needed by civil authorities to resume providing for citizens and carry on the response. The military end state for domestic support missions is based on the capability of civil authorities to discharge their responsibilities without further military support. As soon as that threshold is achieved, commanders report it to the supported agency through the military chain of command. This does not imply a complete return to normalcy; it means that civilian resources are able continue the mission without further military support. Measures of effectiveness should be based on civilian capability to perform tasks unaided. Army forces, regardless of their duty status, plan to accomplish their tasks and hand over any remaining essential tasks or duties to appropriate civilian organizations as soon as feasible.

2-23. The institutional Army consists of those Army organizations within the strategic support area whose primary mission is to generate and sustain the operational Army’s capabilities for employment. The strategic area is the space where friendly strategic forces gain their combat power, project combat power, and sustain operations. Institutional Army activities in the strategic area, include materiel integration, support of readiness, Army force generation, strategic lift, and the routine performance of functions specified and implied in Title 10, USC. Because of its performance of functions specified and implied by law; the institutional Army also possesses operationally useful capabilities for employment by or in direct support of joint force commanders. These organizations enable strategic reach by helping to project Army capabilities into the support, close, and deep areas of combat operations. Institutional Army capabilities include analyzing, understanding and adapting, and generating operational forces tailored to the specific context in which they will be employed.

8-5. A comprehensive running estimate addresses all aspects of operations and contains both facts and assumptions based on the staff’s experience within a specific area of expertise. Each staff element modifies it to account for its specific functional areas. All running estimates cover essential facts and assumptions, including a summary of the current situation by the mission variables, conclusions, and recommendations. (See appendix A for information on the mission variables.) Once they complete the plan, commanders and staff elements continuously update their estimates. (See figure 8-1 on page 8-2 for the base format for a running estimate that parallels the planning process.)