1-56. Mission orders contain the proper level of detail in the context of a particular situation; they are neither so detailed that they stifle initiative nor so general that they provide insufficient direction. The proper level of detail is situationally dependent. Some phases of operations require tighter control over subordinate elements than other phases require. An air assault’s air movement and landing phases, for example, require precise synchronization. Its ground maneuver plan requires less detail. As a rule, the base plan or order contains only the specific information required to provide the guidance to synchronize combat power at the decisive time and place while allowing subordinates as much freedom of action as possible. Commanders rely on subordinates’ initiative and coordination to act within the commander’s intent and concept of operations.

3-11. A criticality assessment identifies key assets that are required to accomplish a mission. It addresses the impact of a temporary or permanent loss of key assets or the unit ability to conduct a mission. A criticality assessment should also include high-population facilities (recreational centers, theaters, sports venues) that may not be mission-essential. It examines the costs of recovery and reconstitution, including time, expense, capability, and infrastructure support. The staff gauges how quickly a lost capability can be replaced before providing an accurate status to the commander. The general sequence for a criticality assessment is—

1-12. These options that support operational or strategic purposes represent a starting point for developing a course of action (COA) to a specific tactical problem. Each decision represents a choice among a range of options. Each option balances competing demands and requires judgment. Tacticians use experience and creativity to outthink their opposing enemy commanders. The mission variables have many combinations that make each new tactical situation unique. Because enemy forces change and adapt to friendly moves during operations, there is no guarantee that the current plan remains valid throughout a single operation.

5-14. A relief in place is an operation in which, by direction of higher authority, all or part of a unit is replaced in an area by the incoming unit and the responsibilities of the replaced elements for the mission and the assigned zone of operations are transferred to the incoming unit (JP 3-07.3). (Note. The Army uses an AO instead of a zone of operations.) The incoming unit continues the operation as ordered. Commanders conduct a relief in place as part of a larger operation, primarily to maintain the combat effectiveness of committed units. The higher echelon headquarters directs when and where to conduct a relief, and it establishes the appropriate control measures. The commanders participating in the relief in place communicate when the relieving commander has sufficient combat power and understanding of the AO to assume responsibility of the area.

5-29. Task-organizing is the act of designing a force, support staff, or sustainment package of specific size and composition to meet a unique task or mission. Characteristics to examine when task-organizing the force include, but are not limited to, the mission, training, experience, unit capabilities, sustainability, the operational environment, and the enemy threat. Task-organizing includes allocating assets to subordinate commanders and establishing their command and support relationships. This occurs within tailored force packages as commanders organize subordinate units for specific missions and employ doctrinal command and support relationships. As task-organizing continues, commanders reorganize units for subsequent missions. The ability of Army forces to task-organize gives them extraordinary agility. It lets commanders configure their units to best use available resources. It also allows Army forces to match unit capabilities to tasks. The ability of sustainment forces to tailor and task-organize ensures commanders have freedom of action to change with mission requirements.

12-4. Adequate time is essential when conducting rehearsals. The time required varies with the complexity of the mission, the type and technique of rehearsal, and the level of participation. Units conduct rehearsals at the lowest possible level, using the most thorough technique possible, given the time available. Under time-constrained conditions, leaders conduct abbreviated rehearsals, focusing on critical events determined by reverse planning. Each unit will have different critical events based on the mission, unit readiness, and the commander’s assessment.

3-35. Liaison and coordination elements ensure the timely exchange of necessary operational and support information to aid mission execution and to prevent fratricide, duplication of effort, disruption of ongoing operations, and loss of intelligence sources. They may help coordinate fire support, overflight, aerial refueling, targeting, deception, information, influence and other theater of operations issues based on current and future missions. These efforts are crucial in coordinating limited resources and assets and in maintaining unity of effort and the tempo of an operation or campaign. Special operations unit commanders may also establish or receive additional liaison and coordination elements with higher and adjacent units or other agencies, as appropriate.

5-90. Bulling or forcing through is not the preferred breaching technique. Bulling or forcing through is a decision made when a commander (based on a rapid risk assessment) must react immediately to extricate a force from an untenable position within an obstacle and no other breaching assets are available. When a force is in a minefield and it is receiving fires and taking heavy losses, the commander may decide immediately bulling through the minefield is the lesser risk to the force rather than a withdrawal or reducing the obstacle. When breaching, a unit develops a scheme of movement and maneuver specifically designed to neutralize the effects of the obstacle and continue its mission. Maneuver company teams, tasks forces, and BCTs conduct the breach. Normally, a task force executes a breach and the company teams are assigned as support, breach, and assault forces. Higher echelon units will conduct a breach when the force-allocation ratio indicates that a confirmed enemy situation is beyond subordinate unit capabilities. When a subordinate unit cannot successfully conduct a breach, the higher echelon unit will task organize to conduct the breach. It will also conduct a higher-level breach when a subordinate unit has failed in its attempt to breach enemy obstacles.

7-88. Anticipating sustainment requirements effectively requires an understanding of the type of battle the corps and division commanders expect to fight. For example, fighting peers with air forces requires large quantities of AMD munitions. Consumption may be relatively light in attacks against weakly defended locations. Units fighting enemy infantry in restricted and urban terrain use large quantities of small arms and artillery ammunition and water. Breaching and wet-gap operations consume large amounts of obscurants. Units attacking enemy armored forces require large quantities of anti-armor munitions and fuel. Ensuring that maneuver and sustainment commanders share a common visualization of how a battle should unfold enables more responsive sustainment. Sustainers operationalize their support based on the mission variables unique to each case.

3-93. Reconstitution consists of two major elements—reorganization and regeneration. Reorganization is the expedient cross-leveling of internal resources within an attrited unit in place to restore necessary combat effectiveness and maintain endurance. Regeneration is the intentional restoration of a unit’s combat power that requires time and resource intensive operations which includes equipment repairs/replacements, supply replenishment, mission essential training, and personnel replacements in accordance with theater commander guidance. See appendix C of FM 4-0 for additional details on reconstitution.

concept of operations – (DOD) A verbal or graphic statement that clearly and concisely expresses what the joint force commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources. (JP 5-0) Referenced in ADP 3-0, FM 3-07, ATP 3-52.2, FM 3-53, FM 3-90-1, FM 6-05. (Army) A statement that directs the manner in which subordinate units cooperate to accomplish the mission and establishes the sequence of actions the force will use to achieve the end state. (ADP 5-0) See also commander’s intent, operation plan.

2-254. Survivability is a quality or capability of military forces which permits them to avoid or withstand hostile actions or environmental conditions while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission (ATP 3-37.34). Survivability operations are those military activities that alter the physical environment to provide or improve cover, camouflage, and concealment (ATP 3-37.34). Survivability operations are critical to offensive, defensive, and stability operations, but they may be emphasized differently in each. Commanders may rely more on mobility and terrain to provide concealment during the offense, while stressing camouflage, survivability positions, and hardened facilities to avoid or withstand hostile actions during the defense.

2-49. A transition occurs for several reasons. Transitions occur when delivering essential services, retaining infrastructure needed for reconstruction, or when consolidating gains. (See paragraphs 3-28 through 3-38 for a discussion of consolidating gains.) An unexpected change in conditions may require commanders to direct an abrupt transition between phases. In such cases, the overall composition of the force remains unchanged despite sudden changes in mission, task organization, and rules of engagement. Typically, task organization evolves to meet changing conditions; however, transition planning must also account for changes in mission. Commanders continuously assess the situation, and they task-organize and cycle their forces to retain operational initiative. Commanders strive to achieve changes in emphasis without incurring an operational pause.

2-53. A culmination may be a planned event. In such cases, the concept of operations predicts which part of a force will culminate, and the task organization includes additional forces to assume the mission after culmination. Typically, culmination is caused by direct combat actions or higher echelon resourcing decisions. Culmination relates to the force’s ability to generate and apply combat power, and it is not a lasting condition. To continue operations after culminating, commanders may reinforce or reconstitute tactical units.

5-3. Generating and maintaining combat power throughout an operation is essential. Factors that contribute to generating and maintaining combat power include reserves, force rotation, network viability, access to cyberspace and space enablers, and joint support. Commanders balance the ability to mass lethal and nonlethal effects with the need to deploy and sustain the units that produce those effects. They balance the ability to accomplish the mission with the ability to project and sustain the force.

2-8. Army design methodology results in an operational approach, a broad description of the mission, operational concepts, tasks, and actions required to accomplish the mission (JP 5-0). A good operational approach provides the basis for detailed planning, allows leaders to establish a logical operational framework, and helps produce an executable order. As detailed planning yields new information, leaders reassess their operational approach—and the Army design methodology that informed it—and adjust it accordingly to ensure relevancy. These actions continue throughout preparation and execution, and they inform commanders’ decision-making. When assessing operations, the logic of the operational approach provides the basis for developing assessment criteria, including measures of performance and effectiveness. (See ADP 5-0 for more information on assessments.)

2-39. Plans and orders often require adjustment beyond the initial stages of the operations. A branch is the contingency options built into the base plan used for changing the mission, orientation, or direction of movement of a force to aid success of the operation based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions and reactions (JP 5-0). Branches anticipate situations that require changes to the basic plan. Such situations could result from enemy action, friendly action, or weather. Commanders build flexibility into their plans and orders by developing branches to preserve freedom of action in rapidly changing conditions.

1-50. A peer threat’s use of systems warfare during the shape and deter phases of a joint operation focuses primarily on the systems within each instrument of national power, seeking vulnerabilities that can be exploited to preclude the achievement of U.S. objectives. During subsequent phases, peer threats use systems warfare in combat to assist threat commanders in decision making and the planning and execution of their mission. Peer threats believe that a qualitatively or quantitatively weaker force can defeat a superior foe, if the weaker force can dictate the terms of combat. Peer threats believe that the systems warfare approach allows them to move away from the traditional attrition-based approach to combat. Systems warfare makes it unnecessary to match an opponent system-for-system or capability-for-capability. Threat commanders and staffs will locate the critical components of the enemy combat system, patterns of interaction, and opportunities to exploit this connectivity. (See TC 7-100.2 for a more in depth discussion of systems warfare.)

4-14. The theater army and its supporting commands assess the adequacy of infrastructure in an operational area to support anticipated military operations, determine requirements for additional infrastructure, and manage infrastructure development programs assigned to Army forces for execution. The theater army and the TSC develops these plans in close collaboration with the combatant command’s logistics directorate of a joint staff (J-4) and the Army Corps of Engineers. Infrastructure development activities may include identifying requirements for forward basing and air, land, and sea transit rights through the sovereign territories of partner or neutral nations. However, the Department of State and the appropriate U.S. diplomatic mission must negotiate any bilateral or multilateral agreements.

9-12. The MDMP can be as detailed as time, resources, experience, and the situation permit. Performing all steps of the MDMP is detailed, deliberate, and time-consuming. Commanders use the full MDMP when they have enough planning time and staff support to thoroughly examine two or more COAs and develop a fully synchronized plan or order. This typically occurs when planning for an entirely new mission.