4-14. Army leaders plan, prepare, execute, and assess operations by analyzing an operational environment in terms of the operational variables and mission variables. The methods in which these variables interact in a specific situation, domain (air, land, maritime, space, or cyberspace), area of operations, or area of interest describe a commander’s operational environment.

4-220. Each state has RUF, which vary from state to state. National Guard commanders ensure that all Guardsmen train on them. While there are many similarities between the joint SRUF and state RUF, there are key differences between the two. Commanders should always consult their servicing staff judge advocate to determine the current RUF and their potential effect on operations. Each National Guardsman carries a RUF instruction card (see example in Figure 4-8, page 4-37), and small unit leaders review the rules before each mission.

2-126. Mission orders contain the proper level of detail; they are neither so detailed that they stifle initiative nor so general that they provide insufficient direction. The proper level of detail is situationally dependent. Some phases of operations require tighter control over subordinate elements than others require. An air assault’s air movement and landing phases, for example, require precise synchronization. Its ground maneuver plan requires less detail. As a rule, the base plan or order contains only the specific information required to provide the guidance to synchronize combat power at the decisive time and place while allowing subordinates as much freedom of action as possible. Commanders rely on subordinate initiative and coordination to act within the commander’s intent and concept of operations.

6-5. Each operation is unique and requires mission-specific analysis that develops a tailored sustainment force. Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational activities add complexity to the sustainment system. Special operations may be conducted in locations that make theater organic sustainment infrastructure support unfeasible. In these cases, the theater sustainment organizations facilitate, but do not provide, required sustainment support. In order to acquire support in these situations, planning efforts must incorporate a mix of theater assigned personnel; for example, geographic combatant command sustainment planners, theater sustainment command planners, and sustainment planners from the theater special operations command.

3-7. Army forces in the prevent role focus on support to political and developmental efforts to lessen the causes of tension and unrest. Military forces tailor these activities to meet political and developmental demands. In stability operations, including those where lethal actions are not likely, commanders understand that any accidental harm to civilians—traffic accidents, collateral damage, and so on—can severely impact their mission success. Commanders proactively plan for civilian casualty mitigation. (See ATP 3-07.6 for more information on protection of civilians.)

1-13. Peer threats will attempt to isolate friendly forces in all domains and the information environment to force friendly forces to culminate prior to accomplishing their mission. Examples of enemy operations to isolate include disruption of friendly communications, deception operations, operations to separate allies diplomatically, or operations to physically fix units. The threat will employ their fires in an attempt to isolate friendly units. In large-scale combat operations, peer threats will attempt to isolate tactical forces to prevent their mutual support, allowing the defeat of friendly forces in detail. Commanders create effects with fires that remove the threat’s ability to isolate by destroying, disrupting, or otherwise defeating the threat’s means to isolate friendly forces.

3-59. Risk management is the process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks that arise from operational factors and of making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits. Threat, hazard, capability, vulnerability, and criticality assessments are used to evaluate the risk to the force, determine critical assets, ascertain available resources, and apply security or defensive measures to achieve protection. Risk management helps commanders to preserve lives and resources, avoid or mitigate unnecessary risk, identify and implement feasible and effective control measures where specific standards do not exist, and develop valid COAs. Risk management integration during operations process activities is the primary responsibility of the unit protection officer or operations officer.

3-58. Seizing or retaining terrain that provides advantages to friendly force maneuver allows commanders to gain and maintain positions of relative advantage. For military purposes, terrain includes physical (geographic) and non-physical (virtual and cognitive) components. Commanders and staffs include the cognitive and virtual considerations of an operational environment when describing terrain. Terrain that is of importance to commanders is described as key or decisive terrain. Key terrain is an identifiable characteristic whose seizure or retention affords a marked advantage to either combatant. Decisive terrain is key terrain whose seizure and retention is mandatory for successful mission accomplishment. If decisive terrain is present, commanders designate it to communicate its importance in the commander’s concept of operations, first to the echelon staff and later to subordinate commanders.

6-36. A defensive situation may require the headquarters staff to plan for retrograde tasks in combination, sequentially, or subsequent to the defensive mission. Planning and rehearsing a rearward passage of lines of security forces forward of the MBA is critical to ensuring proper execution while under enemy pressure. The complexity and fluidity of retrograde operations and the need to synchronize the entire operation dictate the need for detailed, centralized planning and coordination with decentralized execution. A retrograde may be forced or voluntary. In either event, a higher echelon commander must approve it.

3-10. Tempo is the relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy (ADP 3-0). Controlling tempo is necessary to retain the initiative. An attack that achieves results more quickly than enemy forces can respond disrupts enemy plans. Maintaining a high tempo requires initiative on the part of subordinates within their commander’s intent. Mission orders allow subordinates the flexibility to react swiftly to opportunities and threats and maintain a high tempo.

4-41. The anticipate phase begins with the identification of a potential DSCA response mission, a no-notice incident, or when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense. The phase ends when the decision is made, by appropriate authority, to deploy elements in response to a potential or actual incident or when the determination is made that there is no incident requiring a DSCA response. Key tasks during this phase are: identification of the mission, interagency coordination, alerting key assigned enablers such as the DCO, identification of the BSI(s), and planning command and control and JRSOI.

6-32. The defense plan retains a reserve regardless of the defensive task assigned. The reserve is an uncommitted force available for commitment at the decisive moment. It provides flexibility for the commander through offensive action. The reserve is more difficult to resource in the mobile defense because so much of the available combat power is allocated to the striking force. The division or BCT tasked to provide the defensive forward security force—conducting either a cover or a guard—should not also be designated as the corps or division reserve on completion of its security operations due to the likelihood of requiring extensive reconstitution following completion of the security mission.

13-8. Digital liaison detachments provide Army commanders units to conduct liaison with major subordinate or parallel headquarters. Digital liaison detachments consist of staff officers with a broad range of expertise who are capable of analyzing the situation, facilitating coordination between multinational forces, and assisting in cross-boundary information flow and operational support. These 30-Soldier teams are essential not only for routine liaison, but also for advising and assisting multinational partners in conducting planning and operations at intermediate tactical levels. These detachments can operate as a single entity for liaison with a major multinational headquarters, or provide two smaller teams for digital connectivity and liaison with smaller multinational headquarters. Commanders can also tailor digital liaison detachments to match a given mission. The basis of digital liaison detachments allocation is five per committed theater Army, one per corps and division serving as a joint task force headquarters, or as approved by the Department of the Army. The support requirement for a coalition during counterinsurgency or foreign internal defense is one digital liaison detachment for each multinational headquarters (division or above) and one for the host-nation Ministry of Defense.

1-20. The activities of the operations process are not discrete; they overlap and recur as circumstances demand. While planning may start an iteration of the operations process, planning does not stop with the production of an order. After the completion of the initial order, the commander and staff continuously revise the plan based on changing circumstances. Preparation for a specific mission begins early in planning and continues for some subordinate units during execution. Execution puts a plan into action and involves adjusting the plan based on changes in the situation and the assessment of progress. Assessing is continuous and influences the other three activities.

2-82. Risk, uncertainty, and chance are inherent in all military operations. Success during operations depends on a willingness to identify, mitigate, and accept risk to create opportunities. When considering how much risk to accept with a COA, commanders consider risk to the force and risk to the mission. Commanders need to balance the tension between protecting the force, and accepting risks that must be taken to accomplish their mission. They apply judgment with regard to the importance of an objective, time available, and anticipated cost.

1-13. An Army leader, by virtue of assumed role or assigned responsibility, inspires and influences people to accomplish organizational goals. Army leaders motivate people both inside and outside the chain of command to pursue actions, focus thinking, and shape decisions for the greater good of the organization (ADP 6-22). These occur through leadership—the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization (ADP 6-22). The nation and the Army has articulated the expectations of leaders in the Army. The Army leadership requirements model (see figure 1-1 on page 1-4) illustrates expectations of every leader, whether military or civilian, officer or enlisted, active or reserve. This model aligns the desired outcome of leader development activities and personnel practices to a common set of characteristics valued throughout the Army. It covers the core requirements and expectations of leaders at all levels of leadership. Attributes are the desired internal characteristics of a leader—what the Army wants leaders to be and know. Competencies are skills and learnable behaviors the Army expects leaders to acquire, demonstrate, and continue to enhance—what the Army wants leaders to do.

4-24. Army headquarters provide the command structure to plan, prepare, execute, and assess operations with the joint force and partner nations. Army forces support partners with situational understanding, area security, and sustainment. Army forces ensure combatant commanders possess the ability to scale-up and sustain land forces rapidly through force projection, forward positioning, placement and maturity of theater infrastructure capabilities, and the use of Army pre-positioned equipment and supplies. Army headquarters help impose order in chaotic situations and synchronize plans, programs, and efforts necessary to accomplish the mission.

2-44. A phase is a planning and execution tool used to divide an operation in duration or activity. A change in phase usually involves a change of mission, task organization, or rules of engagement. Phasing helps in planning and controlling, and it may be indicated by time, distance, terrain, or an event. The ability of Army forces to extend operations in time and space, coupled with a desire to dictate tempo, often presents commanders with more objectives and decisive points than the force can engage simultaneously. This may require commanders and staffs to consider sequencing operations.

5-17. Special Forces Groups and the 75th Ranger Regiment have organic collection capabilities organized into Military Intelligence companies and detachments. These multidiscipline collection capabilities enable organic collection, when task organized and deployed, in support of special operations. In support of this mission, special operations intelligence staffs process requests for information, tailor, and disseminate products produced at the joint force, combatant command, and national levels for special operations. They combine this tailored intelligence with organic intelligence collection and tactical information collected by subordinates to develop all-source intelligence and products for the commander, staff, and operators. Critical to this process is the translation of operational requirements, articulated by tactical subordinates, into the information collection plan. Joint and Service component interoperability of intelligence systems is critical to successful information sharing and collaboration across the intelligence enterprise. Army special operations forces intelligence elements typically have a mix of Army and special operations-specific intelligence systems to enable this collaboration. Detailed theater intelligence architecture planning and coordination, for each deployment or operation, is essential for success.

5-81. A relief can be characterized as either deliberate or hasty, depending on the amount of planning and preparations associated with the relief. The major differences are the depth and detail of planning and, potentially, the execution time. Detailed planning generally facilitates shorter execution time by determining exactly what the unit commander believes needs to be done and the resources needed to accomplish the mission. Deliberate planning allows unit commanders and staffs to identify, develop, and coordinate solutions to most potential problems before they occur and to ensure the availability of resources when and where they are needed. (See FM 3-90-2 for additional information on the conduct of a relief in place.)