1-132. For operations somewhat limited in scope and duration, or for specialized activities, the commander can establish a JOA. A JOA is an area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a GCC or subordinate unified commander, in which a JFC (normally a joint task force [JTF]) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. JOAs are particularly useful when operations are limited in scope and geographic area or when operations are to be conducted on the boundaries between theaters.

3-37. There are numerous methods and techniques for disseminating information and intelligence. The appropriate technique in any particular situation depends on many factors, such as capabilities and mission requirements. Information presentation may be in a verbal, written, interactive, or graphic format. The type of information, time allocated, and commander's preferences all influence the information format. Answers to PIRs require direct dissemination to the commander, subordinate commanders, and staff. Direct dissemination is conducted person-to-person, by voice communications, or electronic means. Other dissemination methods and techniques include-

2-7. During planning, commanders and their staffs use the Army design methodology to develop an operational approach that informs detailed planning. The Army design methodology is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe unfamiliar problems and approaches to solving them (ADP 5-0). By applying the Army design methodology, commanders and staffs gain a shared understanding of the environment, and they can define the problems preventing the desired end state. This differs from mission analysis, since it is not mission specific. (See figure 2-1.) These items enable commanders and staffs using Army design methodology:

5-12. An enemy force may resort to the use of CBRN capabilities or scorched-earth techniques to delay, divert, or culminate an operation against it. Friendly CBRN reconnaissance and surveillance assets must be positioned and synchronized to allow commanders an early CBRN detection, identification, and avoidance capability that enables rapid and decisive movement and maneuver and the adjustment of mission-oriented protective posture levels while preparing for decontamination. Force health practitioners monitor offensive running estimates for the evidence of a deliberate or incidental epidemic.

7-41. Contingencies for the use of the reserve should be part of the corps or division plan. The operations order assigns “be prepared” tasks to the reserve to aid in its planning and execution. Planners must consider the aspects of time and space when recommending the positioning of reserve forces to their commander. Commanders must remember that subordinate commanders require planning and preparation time for each “be prepared” mission.

1-18. Direction is telling others what to do. Providing effective direction requires that leaders communicate the desired end state for the direction they provide. To accomplish a mission, leaders prioritize tasks, assign responsibility, supervise, and ensure subordinates perform to standard. They ensure subordinates clearly understand their guidance, while allowing subordinates the opportunity to demonstrate initiative within the overall commander's intent. Providing clear direction allows subordinate initiative to adapt their tasks within the commander’s intent when circumstances change.

5-1. Reconnaissance is a mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area (JP 2-0). Reconnaissance accomplished by small units primarily relies on the human dynamic rather than technical means. Reconnaissance is a focused collection effort. Units perform it before, during, and after operations to provide commanders and staffs information used in the IPB process so they can formulate, confirm, or modify COAs.

9-7. Today’s operations present Army leaders, particularly organizational leaders, with nonlinear, dynamic, and ambiguous conditions. These varied, information-intense conditions challenge leaders to synchronize efforts beyond the traditional military chain of command. Likely mission complexities demand the full integration and cooperation of unified action partners to accomplish missions.

2-15. The Army gives the combatant commander depth and versatility. Because land forces can conduct a broad range of operations on a large scale, Army forces offer the combatant commander multiple options to achieve national military objectives. These capabilities include combinations of armored, mechanized, motorized, airborne, and air assault formations; attack as well as lift and reconnaissance aviation; special operations forces; and long-duration sustainment. With their ability to combine diverse capabilities for specific mission requirements, Army forces provide the combatant commander with tailorable and scalable force packages to address a broad range of possible contingencies. This simultaneous use of a broad range of friendly capabilities from across the Army, the joint force, and unified action partners creates dilemmas and narrows options for both adversaries and enemies.

3-76. Airborne sensors and unmanned aircraft systems pose particular challenges for intelligence oversight. These intelligence systems provide commanders and civil authorities with powerful tools to help them assess the situation on the ground, particularly in the initial stages of a response. However, information gathered by these systems can conflict with the intelligence oversight restrictions. For example, an Army helicopter equipped with forward looking infrared may be tasked to assess the stability of flood control constructed earlier in the day. During the course of the surveillance mission, the aircrew may spot a group of looters near the flooding. They may legally report this to their chain of command, without identifying the looters, according to DOD Publication 5240.1-R, Procedure 12. According to DODM 5240.1, Procedure 3, information on U.S. persons, whether collected intentionally, incidentally, or voluntarily provided, must be evaluated promptly, and may be retained for evaluation for up to 5 years.

13-3. A liaison officer (LNO) represents a commander or staff officer. LNOs transmit information directly, bypassing headquarters and staff layers. A trained, competent, trusted, and informed LNO (either a commissioned or a noncommissioned officer [NCO]) is the key to effective liaison. LNOs must have the commander’s full confidence and experience for the mission. At higher echelons, the complexity of operations often requires an increase in the rank required for LNOs. (See table 13-1.)

1-7. Analysis of the broad aspects of an operational environment in terms of the operational variables provides relevant information that senior commanders use to understand, visualize, and describe the operational environment. The operational variables are political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT). Upon receipt of a warning order or mission, Army leaders filter relevant information and narrow their focus to six mission variables-mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). Extensive analysis of the operational and mission variables involves significant intelligence support as intelligence often provides the critical context and cultural understanding necessary to support staff planning and facilitate situational understanding.

1-52. Multinational operations present challenges and demands. These include cultural and language issues, interoperability challenges, national caveats on the use of respective forces, the sharing of information and intelligence, and the rules of engagement. Commanders analyze the particular requirements of a mission in the context of friendly force capabilities to exploit the multinational force’s advantages and compensate for its limitations. Establishing effective liaison with multinational partners is critical to situational awareness.

2-1. As the Nation’s decisive land force, the Army provides a mix of headquarters, units, and capabilities to geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) in support of a theater campaign plan (TCP) and specific joint operations. In order to effectively command these organizations, the Army provides an echeloned array of higher headquarters designed toward a specific function or mission. Winning in large-scale ground combat requires Army forces that can integrate landpower in a multi-domain approach to defeat enemy forces and control terrain. The theater army, corps, and division headquarters give the combatant commander several options necessary for the employment of landpower. (See paragraphs 2-4 through 2-103 for a discussion of Army echelons.)

9-88. COA development should also identify decision points, the person responsible for making the decision, and what measures may be taken to provide the commander with additional time before making a decision. (See paragraph 9-127 for a discussion of decision points.) Good COAs provide commanders with options they can take based on anticipated and unanticipated changes in the situation. (See Chapter 14 for further discussion on decisionmaking in execution.) Staffs should highlight to the commander options that may be critical to mission success. Staffs should also identify points in time when options may no longer be viable, while working to keep options open to the commander as long as possible. In all cases, staffs provide commanders with options that are flexible, while clearly identifying risks associated with committing to options. Staffs also assess how possible options may impact on a commander’s options at a higher echelon.

3-2. Military support to stability efforts during peacetime generally takes the form of presence, peace operations (specifically conflict prevention), and security cooperation. During military engagement, security deterrence activities and stability activities support the objectives of geographic combatant commanders’ theater campaign plans and country teams’ integrated country strategies (formerly mission strategic resource plans). (See JP 3-07.3 for more information on conflict prevention. See FM 3-22 for more information on security cooperation.)

2-48. The Army provides information operations support to the theater army through elements dedicated to helping theater organizations analyze and operate within an increasingly complex information environment. These units augment theater forces with deployable, mission-tailored, support teams and continental U.S. based operational planning support, intelligence analysis, and technical assistance. These support organizations include the 1st Information Operations Command (Land) from the Regular Army and theater information operations groups from the Reserve Component. The 1st Information Operations Command (Land) is assigned to the United States Army Intelligence and Security Command and OPCON to ARCYBER. These organizations provide the following support—

3-47. Assess is part of the overall assessment activity of the operations process. For intelligence purposes, assessment is the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation, particularly significant threat activities and changes in the operational environment. Assessing the situation begins upon receipt of the mission and continues throughout the intelligence process. This assessment allows commanders, staffs, and intelligence leaders to ensure intelligence synchronization. Friendly actions, threat actions, civil considerations, and events in the area of interest interact to form a dynamic operational environment. Continuous assessment of the effects of each element on the others, especially the overall effect of threat actions on friendly operations, is essential to situational understanding.

1-29. The protection warfighting function preserves the combat power potential and survivability of the force by providing protection from threats and hazards. Threats and hazards have the potential to cause personal injury, illness, or death; equipment or property damage or loss; or mission degradation. Commanders and staffs analyze the following potential threats and hazards:

4-24. Leaders require cultural and geopolitical awareness to properly prepare subordinates for the places they will work, the people with whom they will operate, and the adversaries or enemies they will face. The Army requires leaders who are geopolitically aware and can explain how their unit mission fits into the broader scheme of operations. These are important factors when Army leaders attempt to extend influence beyond the chain of command.