14-10. While the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) seeks the optimal solution (see chapter 9), the rapid decisionmaking and synchronization process seeks a timely and effective solution within the commander’s intent, mission, and concept of operations. Using the rapid decisionmaking and synchronization process lets leaders avoid the time-consuming requirements of developing decision criteria and comparing courses of action (COAs). Operational and mission variables continually change during execution. This often invalidates or weakens COAs and decision criteria before leaders can make a decision. Under the rapid decisionmaking and synchronization process, leaders combine their experience and intuition to quickly reach situational understanding. Based on this, they develop and refine workable COAs.

2-20. Task-organizing results in a task organization—a temporary grouping of forces designed to accomplish a particular mission. The unit’s task organization is stipulated in the base plan or order or addressed in Annex A (Task Organization) to the base plan or order. The OPLAN or OPORD also stipulates changes in the task organization by phase or event. During execution, commanders modify the task organization as required based on the situation through FRAGORDs. (See FM 6-0 for task organization formats in Army plans and orders.)

4-91. During operations to prevent, the theater army can provide the GCC with a deployable command post (CP) for contingencies that develop in the AOR. The GCC may use the theater army contingency CP as the nucleus of a small JTF headquarters. The contingency CP receives additional personnel based upon a joint manning document or individual augmentation requests for Army and other Service personnel to accomplish the mission. The contingency CP is a viable option for short notice and limited duration operations because of its established internal staff working relationship and experience base in the AO. This selection capitalizes on the contingency CP’s flexibility and rapid deployment.

4-31. A liaison officer represents a commander or staff officer. Liaison officers transmit information directly, bypassing headquarters and staff layers. A trained, competent, trusted, and informed liaison officer, either a commissioned or a noncommissioned officer, is the key to effective liaison. Liaison officers must have the commander’s full confidence and sufficient experience for the mission. At higher echelons, the complexity of operations often requires more senior ranking liaison officers.

5-3. Special operations intelligence support requirements are mission- and situation-dependent, largely driven by diverse and unique operational environments. These forces are tasked to address country- and region-specific challenges, as well as transregional, all-domain, and multifunctional challenges. Therefore, intelligence support requires a thorough understanding of special operations requirements at the tactical level and the integration of intelligence products from across the operational environments and geographic combatant commands.

2-15. An area of operations is an operational area defined by a commander for land and maritime forces that should be large enough to accomplish their missions and protect their forces (JP 3-0). The joint force land component commander, Army Service component command commander, or Army forces commander assigns subordinates AOs. Those subordinates further assign AOs from their assigned AO, down to the battalion or company echelon based on the mission variables. A unit assigned an AO may not change control measures imposed by a higher echelon headquarters within its AO. However, it may establish additional control measures to coordinate and synchronize its operations. Assigning an AO to a subordinate headquarters decentralizes execution by empowering subordinate commanders to use their own initiative to accomplish their missions. (See ADP 6-0 for more information on AO assignment.)

2-12. Paragraphs 2-13 through 2-79 discuss the basic tactical concepts common to both the offense and defense. These concepts—along with the principles of joint operations, the mission variables, operational design, warfighting functions, running estimates, input from other commanders, and their own experience and judgment—allow commanders to articulate their concept of operations.

4-104. The corps headquarters assumes a command relationship over units as they complete integration of personnel equipment and unit logistics and the TSC releases units from their staging areas for onward movement and integration. Even as the units complete RSOI, the corps headquarters ensures that unit commanders and key leaders are briefed on the situation and their subsequent missions. Effective RSOI establishes a smooth flow of personnel, equipment, and materiel from ports of debarkation through employment as reassembled, mission capable forces. A deploying unit is most vulnerable between its arrival and operational employment, so operations security (OPSEC), protection, deception, and dispersion are vital planning considerations. If the corps is conducting operations while major subordinate units are still arriving, the corps commander may employ the corps tactical CP as the corps’ interface with the ESC and arriving forces at the port of debarkation and their various staging areas.

3-69. Support relationships can facilitate unified action when federal and state National Guard forces operate in the same area, subject to mission assignments. Following requests from FEMA or the state, a federal military installation or unit may support a National Guard force, particularly in cases where the federal installation is supporting FEMA efforts. However, because the command lines remain separate, any supporting relationship requires approval by both DOD and the affected state's adjutant general, in coordination with their respective federal and state coordinating officers.

10-8. Leaders begin TLP when they receive the initial WARNORD or receive a new mission. As each subsequent order arrives, leaders modify their assessments, update tentative plans, and continue to supervise and assess preparations. In some situations, the higher headquarters may not issue the full sequence of WARNORDs; security considerations or tempo may make it impractical. Commanders carefully consider decisions to eliminate WARNORDs. Subordinate units always need to have enough information to plan and prepare for the operation. In other cases, leaders may initiate TLP before receiving a WARNORD based on existing plans and orders and on their understanding of the situation.

2-37. By the time of the Civil War, the growth of armies in size and complexity extended forces beyond the direct view of one person. Commanders could no longer personally control all the forces under their command. As a result, American commanders began to practice an approach that favored decentralized execution. This approach meant using mission orders that emphasized the purpose of an operation to achieve a desired end state rather than the accomplishment of individual tasks. Subordinate leaders at all echelons were required to exercise initiative within the commander’s intent to accomplish missions.

14-3. During execution, continuous assessment is essential. Assessment involves a deliberate comparison of forecasted outcomes to actual events, using criteria to judge operational progress towards success. The commander and staff assess the probable outcome of the operation to determine whether changes are necessary to accomplish the mission, take advantage of opportunities, or react to unexpected threats. Commanders also assess the probable outcome of current operations in terms of their impact on potential future operations in order to develop concepts for these operations early. (See ADRP 5-0 for fundamentals of assessment. See chapter 15 for details for building an assessment plan).

2-62. Divisions are the tactical units of execution for a corps. A division’s primary role is as a tactical headquarters commanding brigades in decisive action. A division combines offensive, defensive, and either stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks in an AO assigned by its higher headquarters, normally a corps. It task-organizes its subordinate forces to accomplish its mission. During large-scale combat operations, a division operates as a formation and not only as a headquarters. The corps commander determines the number and types of BCTs necessary for the divisions to accomplish their respective missions. Divisions have operational and administrative responsibilities.

3-21. Information collection and processing activities transition when requirements change, the unit mission changes, the unit proceeds through the phases of an operation, or the unit prepares for future operations. Successful information collection and processing results in timely collection and reporting of relevant and accurate information, which supports the production of intelligence. The intelligence staff coordinates with other unit staffs, subordinate and lateral commands, and higher echelon units to ensure specific units, capabilities, personnel, equipment (especially communications), and procedures are in place.

4-213. Both state National Guard and federal Army forces will encounter situations where Soldiers and small unit leaders will have to know and adhere to the RUF. Therefore, leaders at every level review the RUF with their subordinates as part of their pre-mission inspections and confirm that the Soldiers know the rules. Commanders should obtain and issue a rules for the use of force summary card to each Soldier before deploying from home station, and small unit leaders should inspect to ensure that the Soldiers have it. The potentially confusing situations associated with infrastructure and property protection require particular attention from commanders. The Soldiers securing a facility or an area must understand the RUF as they apply to the specific location. Above all, unit leaders must understand if, when, and how they may use lethal force to protect a facility or to save lives.

7-10. Corps and division headquarters ensure that their offensive tasks and the actions of joint and multinational forces assigned to or supporting their organizations are synchronized to maximize the application of combat power. Normally, corps and division commanders assign specific AOs for performing offensive tasks to define responsibilities to subordinate units. Based on the nature of the enemy and the mission, these subordinate AOs may be contiguous or noncontiguous.

7-200. Assigned missions for an exploiting force include seizing objectives deep in the enemy rear, cutting enemy lines of communications, isolating and destroying enemy units, and disrupting enemy C2. The exploiting force commander must have the greatest possible freedom of action to accomplish the mission. This commander takes the initiative and moves aggressively and boldly. The objective—a critical enemy communications center, a mountain pass, or key terrain that significantly contributes to destruction of organized enemy resistance—may often be some distance away. At other times, the objective may simply be a point of orientation. Exploitation operations are decentralized.

4-34. In contiguous operations, the MBA extends from the FEBA to the rear boundary of a specific echelon’s subordinate units. Commanders locate subordinate unit boundaries along identifiable terrain features and extend them beyond the FLOT by establishing forward boundaries. Unit boundaries should not split avenues of approach or key terrain. Commanders select the MBA based on the products of the IPB process and their own analysis using the mission variables. The IPB anticipates how an enemy force will use the available avenues of approach.

1-21. Army special operations units conducting military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence operations, do so under forward-based and distributed command and control nodes; the forces and their command and control elements operate under the operational control of the Commander, theater special operations command. Army special operations units with the mission to close with and destroy an enemy are the U.S. Army Special Forces Groups, Special Mission Units (a generic term to represent an organization composed of operations and support personnel that is task-organized to perform highly classified activities [JP 3-05]), and the 75th Ranger Regiment. Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs units provide unique capabilities in support of both Army special operations maneuver units, conventional forces, and U.S. Ambassadors.

3-21. The assault time is the moment to attack the initial objectives throughout the geographical scope of the operation. A higher echelon headquarters imposes this time during the offense to achieve simultaneous results. It is similar to the time on target control method for fire mission processing used by the field artillery. A commander uses it instead of a time of attack because of the different distances that different elements of the force must traverse, known obstacles, and differences in unit tactical mobility.