3-46. Good control measures foster freedom of action, decision making, initiative, and reporting during operations. Commanders tailor their use of control measures to conform to the higher echelon commander’s intent. They also consider the mission, terrain, and amount of authority delegated to subordinates. Effectively employing control measures requires commanders and staffs to understand their purposes and ramifications, including the permissions or limitations imposed on subordinates’ freedom of action and initiative. Each measure should have a specific purpose: mass the effects of combat power, synchronize subordinate forces’ operations, minimize the possibility of fratricide, or comply with the law of armed conflict.

1-43. Force tailoring is the selection and sequencing of forces for deployment. Army force packages are primarily developed by the Department of the Army and its subordinate commands based on the requirements determined by the theater army. These requirements may be part of either security cooperation plans or contingency plans to react to a crisis. When analyzing the mission to determine what fires capabilities are required, staffs should examine their target list with the commander to receive guidance on the commander’s objectives and what effects must be created against each target. Additionally, the staff should review the defended asset list (DAL) with the commander to determine what assets are required to defend against air and missile threats. These discussions should inform what fires capabilities are required. The commander and staff must also determine when those capabilities are likely to be required. As discussed above, commanders may use fires as flexible deterrent and response options, and deployment of these capabilities should be prioritized to allow the commander to either deter escalation or respond to aggression.

6-130. In an area defense, reconnaissance and surveillance operations overlap the defending unit’s planning and preparing phases. Leaders performing reconnaissance and surveillance tasks must understand that they often deploy before the commander fully develops the plan. These leaders must be responsive to changes in orientation and mission. The commander ensures that the staff fully plans, prepares, and assesses the execution of the intelligence portion of the overall plan.

10-14. Often, leaders do not receive their final unit mission until the WARNORD is disseminated after COA approval or after the OPORD. Effective leaders do not wait until their higher headquarters completes planning to begin their planning. Using all information available, leaders develop their unit mission as completely as they can. They focus on the mission, commander’s intent, and concept of operations of their higher and next higher headquarters. They pick major tasks their unit will probably be assigned and develop a mission statement based on information they have received. At this stage, the mission may be incomplete. For example, an initial mission statement could be, “First platoon conducts an ambush in the next 24 hours.” While not complete, this information allows subordinates to start preparations. Leaders complete a formal mission statement during TLP step 3 (make a tentative plan) and step 6 (complete the plan).

3-13. Intelligence planning is also an inherent part of the Army design methodology and the military decision-making process. Intelligence analysts must prepare detailed planning products for the commander and staff for orders production and the conduct of operations. Through thorough and accurate planning, the staff allows the commander to focus the unit's combat power to achieve mission success.

2-12. The Directive Authority for Logistics is the CCDR’s authority to issue directives to subordinate commanders to ensure the effective execution of approved operation plans, optimize the use or reallocation of available resources, and prevent or eliminate redundant facilities and/or overlapping functions among the Service component commands (JP1). The CCDRs may delegate directive authority for as many common user commodities and services as required to accomplish the assigned mission. It includes peacetime measures to ensure the effective execution of approved operation plans, effectiveness and economy of operation, prevention or elimination of unnecessary duplication of facilities, and overlapping of functions among the Service component commands.

2-21. The theater army commander and TSC commander task-organize sustainment brigades for a joint operation or campaign. +Each sustainment brigade is a multifunctional sustainment organization with a flexible headquarters capable of accomplishing multiple sustaining missions. The number of combat sustainment support battalions (CSSBs) and functional logistics battalions attached to the sustainment brigade varies with the task organization established by the ESC commander. The specific task organization of each sustainment brigade will vary based on its mission.

3-13. Close coordination is required to integrate airspace use with the employment of fires. Fire support agencies normally establish FSCMs. Integration and deconfliction of airspace and joint fires normally occurs during mission planning where FSCMs, ACMs, and other appropriate coordination measures are disseminated through command, airspace control, air and missile defense, and fire support channels. Real-time coordination, integration, and deconfliction of airspace and joint fires with airspace control elements and C2 nodes are essential in developing situations. For more information on fire support coordination and FSCMs, see FM 3-09.

5-69. All maneuver forces are capable of conducting security operations. All three types of Army BCTs— armored, infantry, and Stryker—have conduct security operations as part of their mission-essential task lists (METLs). Commanders ensure that subordinate units perform those specific security tasks required by the situation. Habitual support relationships with attachments and standard operating procedures are required to obtain proficiency in the conduct of these tasks.

6-142. Defending corps and divisions fight the decisive battle in accordance with their commander’s concept of operations. That battle occurs either at the FEBA or within the MBA. Commanders position forces in the MBA to control or to repel enemy penetrations. The division commander assigns each BCT an AO within the MBA on the basis of the defending BCT’s capability, the terrain within that AO, and the mission. Assigned BCT AOs usually coincide with a major regimental- or brigade-size avenues of approach. Commanders should not split responsibilities for avenues of approach. The force responsible for the most dangerous AO in the MBA normally receives priority in the initial allocation of artillery, engineer, EW, and CAS capabilities. It is the initial main effort.

1-14. Improvisation is the ability to adapt sustainment operations to unexpected situations or circumstances affecting a mission. It includes creating, arranging, or fabricating resources to meet requirements. It may also involve changing or creating methods that adapt to a changing operational environment. Sustainment leaders must apply operational art to visualize complex operations and understand additional possibilities. These skills enable commanders to improvise operational and tactical actions when enemy actions or unexpected events disrupt sustainment operations. While deception is related to survivability in that deception contributes to survivability, improvisation is where logisticians can actively achieve deception of enemy forces. Improvisation is also a principle of financial management.

3-73. The mission-essential task list (METL) provides focus for training. The credibility of Army forces stems first and foremost from their capability to wage large-scale combat operations. Brigade combat teams (BCTs) and multifunctional brigades generally provide most of the Soldiers performing operations to shape. Those operations may require proficiency in tasks not directly linked to the METL, so commanders determine where to assume risk during preparation in order to ensure flexibility across the force. Realistic training with limited time and resources demands that commanders focus their unit training efforts to maximize training proficiency. (See chapter 2 for additional information on training.)

4-20. The theater army works closely with FORSCOM to match the composition of the force with the forces identified in theater security cooperation plans or contingency plans for a crisis. FORSCOM modifies force packages as needed. The theater army commander identifies the major task organization and predeployment training required for a mission. FORSCOM then modifies force packages and training as needed. Whenever possible, FORSCOM (or the supporting ASCC) attaches forces to its gaining higher headquarters during deployment (for example, attaching brigade combat teams [BCTs] to a different gaining division headquarters). If geography or the sequence of deployment makes this impractical, the theater army executes task organization changes when forces arrive in the AOR. The gaining theater army commander modifies administrative control (ADCON) as required based upon the organization of the JTF and the support structure available in the theater. Figure 4-2 illustrates force tailoring.

1-12. The complex and dynamic nature of an operational environment makes determining the relationship between cause and effect difficult and contributes to the friction and uncertainty inherent in military operations. Commanders must continually assess their operational environments and re-assess their assumptions. Commanders and staffs use the Army design methodology, operational variables, and mission variables to analyze an operational environment to support the operations process. (See paragraphs 4-7 through 4-8 for a discussion of the Army design methodology.)

3-38. The time of attack is the moment the leading elements of the main body cross the line of departure, or in a limited-visibility attack, the point of departure. A commander uses it when conducting simultaneous operations where a shaping operation must accomplish its mission to create the conditions for success of the decisive operation. When determining the time of attack, commanders consider the time subordinates require to—

4-80. The theater requirements for AMD, for example, often exceed the available capabilities. Mission requirements, informed by sustainment considerations, help determine the allocation of AMD resources. The theater army staff coordinates with the GCC and is supported by the GCC’s aligned AMD command. The staff estimates the protection assets necessary for both the campaign and an increased threat across the AOR in accordance with the commander’s priorities, forces available, and the adversary’s perceived intent.

3-51. During the planning process, the protection cell provides input to the commander’s MDMP by integrating the threat and hazard assessment with the commander’s EEFI and the protection prioritization list. While the planning cell develops plans, the protection cell and working group attempt to minimize vulnerability based on the developing COA. The intent is to identify and recommend refinements to the COA that are necessary to reduce vulnerability and ensure mission success. The protection cell and working group provide vulnerability mitigation measures to help reduce risks associated with a particular COA and conduct planning and oversight for unified land operations.

4-99. The incident staging area is the equivalent of an intermediate staging base. Units move to an incident staging area determined by an incident command staff before moving into a CBRN incident site. The staging area personnel receive the unit's personnel and equipment accountability information and provide details regarding the incident. Before leaving the staging area, a unit receives it mission, safety briefings, and updated information regarding the incident. Debris, contaminated areas, other responding agencies, and terrain conditions might delay movement.

4-222. Each chain of command makes the decision to deploy federal forces with weapons. The Secretary of Defense makes the decision whether federal forces carry weapons and ammunition. Should the situation require arming of federal forces, the joint task force commander submits a request to arm them through the chain of command to the Secretary of Defense. If approved by the Secretary of Defense, the joint task force commander issues necessary orders to subordinate units that require weapons to accomplish their mission. Soldiers authorized to carry weapons also carry ammunition; Soldiers should not carry weapons to create an appearance of capability they do not actually possess. In general, the decision to arm some or all federal troops is based on the threat posed by criminal elements to Soldiers.

1-69. Reasonably estimating and intentionally accepting risk is not gambling. Gambling is making a decision in which the commander risks the force without a reasonable level of information about the outcome. Therefore, commanders avoid gambles. Commanders carefully determine risks, analyze and minimize as many hazards as possible, and then accept risk to accomplish the mission.