6-115. Corps and division commanders shape their defensive battles through information collection, joint fires, and cyberspace electromagnetic activities (CEMA) before an enemy reaches the MBA. Defensive cyberspace operations (DCO) are threat-specific and mission prioritized to retain the ability to use the Department of Defense Information Network (DODIN). Corps and division headquarters focus on disrupting attacking enemy forces before they encounter the MBA and breaking up the integrity of their attack. Corps commanders pay particular attention to disrupting an enemy’s C2 elements through the employment of lethal and nonlethal effects, with the intent of making enemy forces more vulnerable to corps and division counterattacks and spoiling attacks.

9-85. It is important in COA development that commanders and staffs appreciate the unpredictable and uncertain nature of the operational environment, and understand how to cope with ambiguity. Some problems that commanders face are straightforward, as when clearly defined guidance is provided from higher headquarters, or when resources required for a mission are available and can easily be allocated. In such cases, the COA is often self-evident. However, for problems that are unfamiliar or ambiguous, Army design methodology may assist commanders in better understanding the nature of the problem, and afford both the commander and staff a level of comfort necessary to effectively advance through COA development. Commanders and staffs that are comfortable with ambiguity will often find that the Army design methodology provides flexibility in developing COAs that contain multiple options for dealing with changing circumstances. Staffs tend to focus on specific COAs for specific sets of circumstances, when it is usually best to focus on flexible COAs that provide the greatest options to account for the widest range of circumstances.

1-35. Offensive operations at all levels require effective intelligence to assist the commander in avoiding the threat's main strength and to deceive and surprise the threat. The entire staff, led by the intelligence staff, develops IPB products to assist the commander in identifying all aspects in the area of interest that can affect mission accomplishment within all domains. The IPB process is collaborative and requires information from all staff elements and some subordinate units that use IPB results and products for planning.

1-35. In building their visualization, commanders first seek to understand those conditions that represent the current situation. Next, commanders envision a set of desired future conditions that represents the operation’s end state. Commanders complete their visualization by conceptualizing an operational approach—a broad description of the mission, operational concepts, tasks, and actions required to accomplish the mission (JP 5-0). Figure 1-3 depicts activities associated with developing the commander’s visualization.

1-79. Risk management is the process to identify, assess, and control risks and make decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits (JP 3-0). Commanders and staffs use risk management throughout the operations process to identify and mitigate risks associated with hazards (to include ethical risk and moral hazards) that have the potential to cause friendly and civilian casualties, damage or destroy equipment, or otherwise impact mission effectiveness. Like targeting, risk management begins in planning and continues through preparation and execution. Risk management consists of the following steps:

2-45. The third aspect of resource allocation is based on two of the principles of war—mass and economy of force. The principle of mass means that commanders always weight the main effort with the greatest possible combat power to overwhelm an enemy force and ensure mission accomplishment. Economy of force refers to allocating the minimum essential combat power to all supporting efforts. Supporting efforts typically receive fewer resources than the main effort. Commanders must accept risk in supporting efforts in order to weight the main effort.

2-76. In building their visualization, commanders first seek to understand those conditions that represent the current situation. Next, commanders envision a set of desired future conditions that represents the operation’s end state. Commanders complete their visualization by conceptualizing an operational approach—a broad description of the mission, operational concepts, tasks, and actions required to accomplish the mission (JP 5-0).

5-5. Once a mission is assigned or a prospective mission is determined, it starts the operations process that brings everything together in a headquarters. Planning starts with the receipt of a mission and updating the current understanding of an operational environment in which the mission will be accomplished. The higher headquarters’ operation order or plan creates a task organization that allocates resources to the command. This task organization delineates the combat power the unit has to perform the assigned task.

2-33. Decisive points apply to both the operational and tactical levels when shaping the concept of operations. Decisive points enable commanders to seize, retain, or exploit operational initiative. Controlling them is essential to mission accomplishment. Enemy control of a decisive point may stall friendly momentum, force early culmination, or allow an enemy counterattack.

1-133. A JSOA is an area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a JFC to the commander of SOF to conduct special operations activities. It may be limited in size to accommodate a discreet direct action mission or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range of unconventional warfare operations. A JSOA is defined by a JFC who has geographic responsibilities. JFCs may use a JSOA to delineate and facilitate simultaneous conventional and special operations. The joint force special operations component commander is the supported commander within the JSOA.

3-17. Although all military assets are important and all resources have value, the capabilities they represent are not equal in their contribution to decisive operations or overall mission accomplishment. Determining and directing protection priorities may involve the most important decisions that commanders make and their staffs support. There are seldom sufficient resources to simultaneously provide the same level of protection to all assets.

1-34. A deliberate operation is an operation in which the tactical situation allows the development and coordination of detailed plans, including multiple branches and sequels. Commanders conducting deliberate operations task-organize forces to accomplish a specific mission. That tasked combined arms team conducts extensive rehearsals and shaping operations to create the conditions for the conduct of the force’s decisive operation. For example, the 1st Infantry Division’s breaching operation during the opening hours of the ground phase of Operation Desert Storm in February 1991 illustrates a deliberate operation.

3-12. The initial generation of intelligence knowledge about the operational environment occurs far in advance of detailed planning and orders production. This intelligence assists in focusing information collection once a mission is received or in anticipation of a mission. Commanders and staffs often begin planning in the absence of a complete and approved higher headquarters' operation plan or operation order. In these instances, the headquarters begins a new planning effort based on a warning order and other directives, such as a planning order or an alert order from their higher headquarters.

4-9. The military decision-making process is an iterative planning methodology. It integrates activities of the commander, staff, subordinate headquarters, and other partners. This integration enables them to understand the situation and mission; develop, analyze, and compare courses of action; decide on the course of action that best accomplishes the mission; and produce an order for execution. The military decision-making process applies to both conceptual and detailed approaches. It is most closely associated with detailed planning.

2-90. A national support element is any national organization or activity that supports national forces that are a part of a MNF. Their mission is nation-specific support to units and common support that is retained by the nation. National support elements operating in the NATO commander’s area of operation are subject to the status of forces agreement, memorandums of agreements, and other HN arrangements.

3-57. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield is a systematic process of analyzing the mission variables of threat, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in a specific area of interest to determine their effects on operations. By conducting the intelligence preparation of the battlefield, commanders gain the information necessary to selectively apply and maximize operational effectiveness at critical points in time and space.

4-74. These entities may cooperate for a particular mission, support different agencies on different missions within an operational area, or conduct missions separated across large distances. Geography, type of hazards, number of response agencies, and size of the incident influence how commanders determine the employment of these forces.

5-70. Leaders must understand the unique operational and mission variables associated with this complex OE and be able to rapidly transition—from conventional wartime terrain to the constraints inherent to the homeland—to contribute to prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and initial recovery from an assortment of threats and hazards. Commanders must operationally adapt to the characteristic blend of legal and policy challenges that have a distinctive effect on their freedom of action while operating in the homeland. In particular, leaders need to have a good understanding of the Posse Comitatus, information collection activities, and the standing rules for the use of force. The integration of Army capabilities into the guidance and parameters set forth by national policy requires the innovative integration of command and control and other warfighting functions to achieve a unity of effort. Commanders must be able to integrate and synchronize protection efforts with the lead federal agency or other governmental agencies. This results in protecting Soldiers in various duty statuses and civilian personnel from hostile actions while conducting defense support of civil authority tasks. The requirement to deploy into a constrained OE and operate with joint and interagency elements requires a unity of command and flexible Soldiers who are able to improvise and adapt systems originally intended for combat into robust, civilian disaster response systems that are based on the National Incident Management System.

9-178. Comparison of COAs is critical. The staff uses any technique that helps develop those key outputs and recommendations and assists the commander to make the best decision. A common technique is the decision matrix. This matrix uses evaluation criteria developed during mission analysis and refined during COA development to help assess the effectiveness and efficiency of each COA. (See table 9-7.)

12-86. Once the rehearsal director finishes discussing the ground rules and answering questions, the G-3 (S-3) reads the mission statement, the commander reads the commander’s intent, and the G-3 (S-3) establishes the current friendly situation. The rehearsal then begins, following the rehearsal script.