3-48. Assess is the fourth function of targeting and occurs throughout the operations process. The commander and staff assess the results of mission execution. The assessment process is continuous and directly tied to the commander's decisions throughout planning, preparation, and execution of operations. Staffs help the commander by monitoring the numerous aspects that can influence the outcome of operations and provide the commander timely information needed for decisions. The following are key considerations in assessment:

3-19. Protection prioritization lists are organized through the proper alignment of critical assets. The commander’s priorities and intent and the impacts on mission planning determine critical assets. A critical asset is a specific entity that is of such extraordinary importance that its incapacitation or destruction would have a very serious, debilitating effect on the ability of a nation to continue to function effectively (JP 3-07.2). Critical assets can be people, property, equipment, activities, operations, information, facilities, or materials. For example, important communications facilities and utilities, analyzed through criticality assessments, provide information to prioritize resources while reducing the potential application of resources on lower-priority assets. Stationary weapons systems might be identified as critical to the execution of military operations and, therefore, receive additional protection. The lack of a replacement may cause a critical asset to become a top priority for protection.

3-83. In deployed operations, many units reconfigure command post processes to create a fusion center for different types of intelligence, particularly in a counterinsurgency mission. Any information received from a variety of sources is funneled to the fusion center where it is analyzed and used in databases. While a powerful tool in combat situations, units engaged in DSCA should not use a fusion center to combine operational information with any sensitive information, including criminal intelligence or law enforcement information. Fusing information using combat intelligence techniques and procedures with information received from civilian police authorities on any persons not affiliated with the DOD will invariably lead to violations of intelligence oversight and sensitive information restrictions. In a DSCA mission, commanders and their staffs segregate any sensitive information into appropriate law enforcement channels and keep it there only until the mission is complete.

1-19. Intelligence provides a deep understanding of the threat and how the threat can affect mission accomplishment, which is essential to conducting operations. Commanders and staffs must understand how current and potential threats organize, equip, train, employ, and control their forces. Therefore, the intelligence warfighting function must continually identify, monitor, and assess threats as they adapt and change over time. (For more information on threats and hazards see ADP 3-0 and FM 3-0.)

2-58. Success in the stability component of an operation often depends on the commander’s ability to identify, prioritize, and sequence the tasks essential to mission success. Commanders prioritize and sequence the performance of those tasks with available combat power, the diverse array of actors participating, and the ability of the host nation to accept change. Even more so than in the offense and defense, stability operations require commanders demonstrate cultural awareness and a clear understanding of stability operations to determine those truly essential to mission success.

2-65. The MEDCOM (DS) is the senior medical command in support of the ASCC based upon operational and mission variables. The MEDCOM (DS) commander is responsible for maintaining a regional focus in support of the GCC and ASCC theater engagement plan, while providing effective and timely direct health service support and force health protection to tactical commanders and general support (on an area basis) to theater forces at echelons above brigade. The enduring regional focus of the ASCC drives organizational specialization in the supporting MEDCOM (DS) to address unique health threats, specific needs of the local populace, availability of other Service medical capabilities, and geographic factors that are distinctly related to a particular region.

3-24. An unexpected change in conditions often requires commanders to direct an abrupt transition between phases. In such cases, the overall composition of a military force remains unchanged despite sudden changes in mission, task organization, and rules of engagement. Typically, task organization evolves to meet changing conditions; however, transition planning also accounts for changes in the mission. Commanders attuned to sudden changes can better adapt their forces to dynamic conditions. They continuously assess the situation and task-organize and cycle their forces to retain the initiative. They strive to achieve changes in emphasis without incurring an operational pause.

4-13. Understanding is fundamental to a commander’s ability to establish a situation’s context. It is essential to ethical and effective decision making and the development of plans. Analysis of the operational and mission variables provides the information used to develop understanding and frame a problem. In planning for stability operations, active collaboration with military and civilian partners assists commanders in developing their initial understanding of an operational environment and problem. Civil affairs capability is designed to understand and engage the factors and actors that comprise the civilian component of the operational environment. Thus, civil affairs is integral to a commander’s ability to conduct stability planning. (See ADP 5-0 for more information on the operational and mission variables.)

high-value target – (DOD) A target the enemy commander requires for the successful completion of the mission. Also called HVT. (JP 3-60) Referenced in ADP 2-0, FM 3-09, FM 3-96, ATP 2-01.3, ATP 2-19.3, ATP 2-19.4, ATP 2-33.4, ATP 3-09.24, ATP 3-09.42, ATP 3-21.20, ATP 3-60, ATP 3-60.1, ATP 3-92, ATP 3-90.98.

3-37. A friendly force information requirement is information the commander and staff need to understand the status of friendly force and supporting capabilities (JP 3-0). FFIRs identify the information about the mission, troops and support available, and time available for friendly forces that the commander considers most important. In coordination with the staff, the operations officer manages FFIRs for the commander.

4-41. An operation is a series of military actions to achieve assigned objectives and accomplish the mission. The focus of an operation is an outcome. Commanders integrate the warfighting functions to generate and maintain combat power to perform tasks, achieve objectives, and attain the operation’s end state—an outcome.

deception goal – (DOD) Commander’s statement of the purpose of military deception as it contributes to the successful accomplishment of the assigned mission. (JP 3-13.4) Referenced in FM 3-13.4.

11-33. The military deception goal is the desired contribution of the military deception to friendly mission success. The military deception goal is often expressed in terms of the desired optimal situation under which the commander wants to conduct the primary operation. The military deception goal is usually recommended in the running estimate and confirmed by the commander’s planning guidance at the conclusion of mission analysis. Alternatively, the commander can identify the military deception role and leave it to the staff to identify desired military deception actions.

2-47. Phasing can extend operational reach. When a force lacks the capability to accomplish its mission in a single action, commanders phase the operation. Each phase should strive to—

2-170. A contingency CP is a facility tailored from the theater army headquarters that enables a commander to conduct crisis response and limited contingency operations within an AOR. Employing the contingency CP for a mission involves a trade-off between the contingency command post’s immediate response capability and its known limitations. These limitations include the scale, scope, complexity, intensity, and duration of operations that it can effectively command without significant augmentation. The contingency CP depends upon the main CP for long-range planning and special staff functional support. (See FM 3-94 for doctrine on theater army CP organization and operations.)

1-44. While each situation is different, commanders avoid undue caution or commitment of resources to guard against every perceived threat. An unrealistic expectation of avoiding all risk is detrimental to mission accomplishment. Waiting for perfect intelligence and synchronization increases risk or closes a window of opportunity. Successful operations require commanders and subordinates to manage accepted risk, exercise initiative, and act decisively even when the outcome is uncertain.

1-43. A friendly force information requirement is information the commander and staff need to understand the status of friendly force and supporting capabilities (JP 3-0). Friendly force information requirements identify the information about the mission, troops and support available, and time available for friendly forces that the commander considers most important. In coordination with the staff, the operations officer manages friendly force information requirements for the commander.

3-22. A friendly force information requirement is information the commander and staff need to understand the status of friendly force and supporting capabilities (JP 3-0). Friendly force information requirements identify the information about the mission, troops and support available, and time available for friendly forces that the commander considers most important to the plan or decisions. In coordination with staffs, the operations officers manage friendly force information requirements for commanders.

2-78. An uncommitted force is a force that is not in contact with an enemy and is not already deployed on a specific mission or course of action. Commanders use uncommitted forces to exploit success or avoid failure. Echelon reserves are examples of uncommitted forces.

9-46. The mission analysis process identifies gaps in information required for further planning and decisionmaking during preparation and execution. During mission analysis, the staff develops information requirements. Some information requirements are of such importance to the commander that staffs