2-250. Commanders, with input from their staffs, determine the degree to which potential threats and hazards can disrupt operations, and then they counter or mitigate those threats and hazards. Many of the assets grouped within the protection warfighting function, such as MP units, engineers, CBRN assets, and other forces with protection responsibilities, will probably be assigned or attached to BCTs in the close area to accomplish their mission, limiting the availability of their associated capabilities in the support or consolidation areas.

1-90. Commanders use the elements of operational art to help them form their commander’s visualization— the mental process of developing situational understanding, determining a desired end state, and envisioning an operational approach by which the force will achieve that end state (ADRP 5-0). In building their visualization, commanders first seek to understand the OE. Next, commanders envision a set of desired future conditions that represents the operation’s end state. Commanders complete their visualization by conceptualizing an operational approach—a broad description of the mission, operational concepts, tasks, and actions required to accomplish the mission (JP 5-0). (See ADRP 3-0 for a discussion of each element of operational art.)

7-180. Commanders may need to designate a unit or units to conduct shaping operations to create windows of opportunity for executing the decisive operation. Commanders allocate the unit or units assigned to conduct shaping operations the minimum combat power necessary to accomplish their missions. Overwhelming combat power cannot be employed everywhere during large-scale combat operations. Units conducting shaping operations usually have a wider AO than those conducting a decisive operation. If a commander has sufficient forces to conduct shaping operations, the commander can assign the tasks of follow and assume or follow and support to subordinate units. (FM 3-90-1 defines these two tactical mission tasks.)

2-28. Commanders and their staffs use intellectual tools to help understand the operational environment and visualize and describe their approach for conducting an operation. Collectively, these tools make up the elements of operational art and include risk (see ADP 3-0). Risk is the probability and severity of loss linked to hazards. Risk, uncertainty, and chance are inherent in all military operations. Risk management is the process to identify, assess, and control risks and make decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits (JP 3-0). It is an invaluable tool for commanders and staffs that provides a systematic and standardized process to identify hazards and react to changes within an operational environment. Commanders must understand, visualize, and describe their protection priorities clearly within their intent and guidance to ensure that proper integration and synchronization of protection assets are considered throughout the entire operation.

2-84. Successful commanders recognize that all subordinates contribute to mission accomplishment. They establish clear and realistic goals and communicate their goals openly. Commanders establish and maintain open, candid communication between subordinate leaders. They encourage subordinates to bring creative and innovative ideas to the forefront. They also seek feedback from subordinates. The result is a command climate that encourages initiative.

3-38. The Commanding General, U.S. Army Special Operations Command fills roles as the commander of U.S. Special Operations Command’s Army component and the commander of an Army Service Component Command. Its mission, assigned by U.S. Special Operations Command, is to man, train, equip, educate, organize, sustain, and support forces to conduct special operations across the full range of military operations in support of joint force commanders and interagency partners to meet theater and national objectives. The commander is responsible for recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping, training, servicing, mobilizing, demobilizing, maintaining, administering, supporting, educating, and preparing the readiness of assigned Special Forces, Ranger, Special Operations Aviation, Psychological Operations, and Civil Affairs units, including those forces temporarily under the operational control of other unified commanders. The commander exercises command of continental United States-based Regular Army special operations forces. He also oversees and evaluates continental United States-based Army National Guard special operations forces. The command is responsible for the development of unique Army special operations doctrine; tactics, techniques, and procedures; and materiel.

5-91. Maneuver commanders may order clearing activities to facilitate mobility within an AO. They may order a critical route or area to be cleared of mines, explosive hazards, or other obstacles. The activity could be conducted as a single mission to open or reopen a route or area, or it may be conducted on a recurring basis in support of efforts to defeat an enemy’s reestablishment of obstacles along critical routes.

6-132. Corps commanders employ security forces to their front and flanks to provide additional security for divisions and BCTs in the MBA. These security forces perform a cover, guard, or screen task depending on the mission variables. Usually the corps employs a defensive covering force in front of MBA divisions. This covering force is a combined arms force task organized to operate forward out of supporting range of the corps’ MBA divisions (the protected force). The corps commander assigns the covering force an AO with enough depth to allow sufficient room to maneuver and to force the enemy to reposition its artillery and air defense systems prior to attacking into the MBA. Enemy repositioning of artillery and air defense artillery (ADA) indicates the enemy main effort, makes those systems vulnerable to friendly attacks in depth, and limits the effectiveness of enemy massed artillery fires.

6-143. Division commanders strengthen the effort at the most dangerous avenue of approach by narrowing the AO of the BCT assigned to that avenue of approach. The corps or division commander may use cavalry squadrons, Stryker battalions, or other maneuver forces as an economy of force measure in close terrain or to secure one of the division’s flanks. (Economy of force requires a sound estimate of what is sufficient for the security mission to allow the massing of combat power at the decisive time and place. It is not the application of as little force as possible.) This allows the division commander to concentrate BCTs on the most dangerous approaches. Corps and division defensive plans must be flexible enough to allow changes in the main effort during the course of the battle.

7-107. A commander conducting a frontal attack may not require any additional control measures beyond those established to control the overall mission. This includes an AO, defined by unit boundaries, and an objective, at a minimum. The commander can also use any other control measure necessary to control the attack, including—

7-130. A commander conducting a movement to contact typically organizes the forward security element into a covering force or an advanced guard to protect the movement of the main body and to develop the situation before committing the main body. This forward security element is normally the unit’s initial main effort. A covering force is task-organized to accomplish specific tasks independent of the main body such as conduct mobility and selected countermobility tasks in accordance with the mission variables. This covering force reports directly to the establishing commander. If it is unable to resource a covering force, a force conducting a movement to contact may use an advance guard in the place of a covering force. The advanced guard accomplishes similar tasks as the covering force, but it must remain with supporting range of the main body, resulting in less protection and reaction time for the main body.

8-9. The commander and staff transition from planning to execution. As they transition, they use running estimates to identify the current readiness of the unit in relationship to its mission. The commander and staff also use running estimates to develop, then track, mission readiness goals and additional requirements.

11-25. The commander determines if sufficient assets exist to support both the operation and the military deception. There are few assets specifically designed and designated for military deception. This means the commander must shift assets from the operation to support the military deception. Commanders must be certain that shifting assets to support a military deception does not adversely affect the operation or prevent mission success.

2-12. When commanders destroy, they apply lethal combat power on an enemy capability so that it can no longer perform any function. Destroy is a tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force combat-ineffective until it is reconstituted. Alternatively, to destroy a combat system is to damage it so badly that it cannot perform any function or be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt (FM 3-90-1). An enemy cannot restore a destroyed force to a usable condition without entirely rebuilding it.

2-103. The commander’s intent succinctly describes what constitutes success for the operation. It includes the operation’s purpose, key tasks, and conditions that define the end state. When describing the purpose of the operation, the commander’s intent does not restate the “why” of the mission statement. Rather, it describes the broader purpose of the unit’s operation in relationship to the higher commander’s intent and concept of operations.

1-46. The commander's intent succinctly describes what constitutes success for the operation. Commanders convey their intent in a format they determine most suitable to the situation. It may include the operation's purpose, key tasks, and conditions that define the end state. When describing the purpose of the operation, the commander's intent does not restate the “why” of the mission statement. Rather, it describes the broader purpose of the unit's operation in relationship to the higher commander's intent and concept of operations. Doing this allows subordinates to gain insight into what is expected of them, what constraints apply, and, most importantly, why the mission is being conducted. If it is longer than a brief paragraph it is probably too long.

1-62. The commander’s intent defines the limits within which subordinates may exercise initiative. It gives subordinates the confidence to apply their judgment in ambiguous situations because they know the mission’s purpose and desired end state. They can, on their own responsibility, take actions that they think will best accomplish the mission when communication with higher echelons is intermittent or decisions must be made immediately.

4-48. Successful commanders understand that networks may be degraded through threat or environmental factors during operations. They develop methods and measures to mitigate the impact of degraded networks. This mitigation may be through exploiting the potential of technology or through establishing trust, creating shared understanding, or providing a clear intent using mission orders.

2-59. The commander and staff identify essential stability operations tasks based on consideration of relevant mission variables. (See ADP 5-0 for a discussion of mission variables.) Military forces must successfully execute stability operations tasks to accomplish specific missions. These essential tasks may include specified and implied tasks required to establish the end state conditions that define success. They include stability operations and supporting information operations that communicate to a wide array of audiences. Some stability operations are executed simultaneously and some sequentially.

2-22. The commander and staff use the operational variables (PMESII-PT) and the mission variables (METT-TC) to assess the OE to refine their understanding of the situation and its relationship to personnel recovery. Threats to isolated personnel vary based on the OE and include peacetime captivity, hostage and prisoner of war. Threats to isolated personnel vary based on the OE. During large-scale ground combat, the scale and scope of operations will likely create situations during which personnel recovery must address isolated units as big as companies, battalions, or even brigades.