7-177. Commanders resource dedicated security forces during an attack only if the attack will uncover one or more flanks or the rear of the attacking force as it advances. In this case, the commander designates a flank or rear security force and assigns it a guard or screen mission, depending on the mission variables. Normally an attacking unit does not need extensive forward security forces; most attacks are launched from positions in contact with the enemy, which reduces the usefulness of a separate forward security force. An exception occurs when the attacking unit is transitioning from the defense to an attack and had previously established a forward security area as part of the defense.

5-57. Commanders orient their reconnaissance assets by identifying a reconnaissance objective within an AO. The reconnaissance objective is a terrain feature, geographic area, enemy force, adversary, or other mission or operational variable, such as specific civil considerations, about which the commander wants to obtain additional information (ADRP 3-90). The reconnaissance objective clarifies the intent of the reconnaissance effort by specifying the most important result to obtain from the reconnaissance effort. Every reconnaissance mission specifies a reconnaissance objective. Commanders assign reconnaissance objectives based on priority information requirements resulting from the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process and the reconnaissance asset’s capabilities and limitations. A reconnaissance objective can be information about a specific geographic location, such as the cross country trafficability of a specific area, a specific enemy or adversary activity to be confirmed or denied, or a specific enemy or adversary unit to be located and tracked. A reconnaissance unit uses the reconnaissance objective to guide it in setting priorities when it does not have enough time to complete all the tasks associated with a specific form of reconnaissance.

7-114. Commanders can impose other measures to control the infiltration, including checkpoints, PLs, and assault positions on the flank or rear of enemy positions. If it is not necessary for the entire infiltrating unit to reassemble to accomplish its mission, the objective may be broken into smaller objectives. Each infiltrating element then moves directly to its objective to conduct operations.

1-35. Commanders and staffs should consider the sizes and types of potential threats to friendly forces when determining and describing levels of threat. Threat levels should be based on the activity, capability, and intent of enemy agents or forces. They can be further described by looking at mission impact. A Level I threat may require only a routine response by base camp security forces and have a negligible impact on the mission, or a Level I threat may have a catastrophic impact. An example of this is the attack on the USS Cole by two suicide bombers. According to the chart, it was a Level I threat; however, the attack was catastrophic, killing 17 U.S. Servicemen and rendering the ship inoperable. A Level III threat could cause mission failure and requires a tactical combat force response. The following are descriptions of the levels of threat:

3-19. Commanders use common offensive control measures to synchronize the effects of combat power. Chapter 2 introduced airspace coordinating measures, permissive FSCMs, and restrictive FSCMs used in the offense. Commanders use the minimum control measures required to synchronize the application of the combat power required to accomplish their mission. This provides subordinates the flexibility needed to respond to changes in the situation. Understanding and using commonly understood control measures enable commanders and staffs to develop and publish clear and concise mission orders, as well as direct tactical actions quickly, with minimal communication during execution.

3-20. Commanders, command sergeants major, and staffs help assimilate new units into the force and new Soldiers into their units. They also prepare new units and Soldiers in performing their duties properly and integrating into an upcoming operation smoothly. Integration for new Soldiers includes training on unit SOPs and mission-essential tasks for the operation. It also means orienting new Soldiers on their places and roles in the force and during the operation. This integration for units includes, but is not limited to—

3-24. Commanders cannot recognize all their information requirements. There is information that results from an extraordinary event, an unseen opportunity, or a new threat. This is exceptional information— specific and immediately vital information that directly affects the success of the current operation. It may directly affect mission accomplishment or survival of the force, and usually reveals the need for a decision. It would have been a CCIR if it had been foreseen. Therefore, it is treated as a CCIR and is reported to the commander immediately. Identifying exceptional information requires initiative from subordinate commanders and staffs, shared understanding of the situation, and a thorough understanding of the commander’s intent. It also requires professional judgment; if there is doubt it is better to report.

3-97. Commanders should never assume friendly air superiority. A ground force’s primary air defense systems are joint fighter aircraft conducting offensive counterair operations. These systems are operated by the joint force air component commander. Air and missile defense systems include organic or attached mounted or dismounted maneuver short-range air defense systems. During mission analysis, commanders, informed by the air defense coordinator, determine the air threat and its effect on the operation. During offensive operations, commanders direct the positioning of available organic or supporting radars and short- range air defense systems to locations where they can best support the unit’s attack in accordance with the critical and defended asset lists. The air defense and airspace management element in a unit staff ensures that it has communications with the appropriate air and missile defense organization’s command post.

2-46. Commanders determine the amount of combat power essential to each task and allocate sufficient resources to accomplish it. When allocating resources, commanders consider the cost to the force and the effects of the current operation on the ability to execute follow-on operations. If subordinates believe they have not received adequate resources, or believe accomplishing their mission would produce an unacceptable cost to the force, they inform their commander. The commander then decides whether to accept risk, allocate more resources, or change the plan.

4-117. Commanders deliberately plan for the transition process and allow the setting of the conditions necessary for a successful transition. Such planning addresses the need to control the tempo of operations, maintain contact with both enemy and friendly forces, and keep enemy forces off balance. It establishes the procedures and priorities by which a unit prepares for its next mission. It establishes the required organization of forces and control measures necessary for success in accordance with the mission variables.

1-7. Commanders and staffs synchronize, integrate, and organize capabilities and resources to preserve combat power and identify and prevent or mitigate the effects of threats and hazards. Protection integrates all protection capabilities to safeguard the force, personnel (combatants and noncombatants), systems, and physical assets of the United States and its mission partners. In addition to the primary protection task, commanders and staffs must coordinate, synchronize, and integrate additional protection capabilities and resources of unified action partners.

2-19. Commanders must resource minimum-essential stability operations tasks. When a demand for resources exceeds an organization’s capability, commanders provide additional resources. Sometimes commanders provide the chain of command with the necessary information to provide additional resources to meet the requirements. At other times they request higher commanders provide follow-on forces to conduct the tasks expeditiously. Commanders at all levels assess resources available against the mission to determine how best to conduct these minimum-essential stability operations tasks and what risk they can accept.

5-9. Commanders and staffs use the Army planning methodologies (Army design methodology, the military decision-making process, and troop leading procedures) to analyze multiple courses of action to determine the most suitable one. Once the commander approves a course of action, the remainder of the military decision-making process determines the specific tasks assigned to subordinate units that will accomplish the mission in the area of operations and ultimately achieve the identified end state. These specific tactical tasks come from the set of tasks of decisive action, the tactical tasks of offense, defense, and stability or defense support of civil authorities, and enabling tasks, and the subordinate tasks thereof. The end result of this process should be an operation order. The operation order will establish the relationship between mission, commander’s intent, and concept of operations. The operation order guides commanders’ arrangement of warfighting functions to mass the effects of combat power at the chosen place and time to overwhelm an enemy or dominate the situation.

12-72. Commanders do not normally address small problems that arise during rehearsals. Instead, the G-3 (S-3) recorder keeps a record of these problems. This ensures the commander does not interrupt the rehearsal’s flow. If the problem remains at the end of the rehearsal, the commander resolves it then. If the problem jeopardizes mission accomplishment, the staff accomplishes the coordination necessary to resolve it before the participants disperse. Identifying and solving such problems is a major reason for conducting rehearsals. If commanders do not make corrections while participants are assembled, they may lose the opportunity to do so. Coordinating among dispersed participants and disseminating changes to them often proves more difficult than accomplishing these actions in person.

1-110. Commanders cannot exercise command and control alone except in the simplest and smallest of units. Even at the lowest level, commanders need support to exercise command and control effectively. At every echelon of command, each commander has a command and control system. Commanders arrange people, processes, and networks into command posts to best facilitate their exercise of authority and direction to accomplish the mission.

6-145. Commanders use reserves to counterattack, to exploit enemy weaknesses such as exposed flanks or units vulnerable to defeat in detail, or deny the enemy control of critical terrain. The reserve can also reinforce forward defensive positions, contain enemy penetrations, or react to threats in the support or consolidation areas. Commanders decide on the size, composition, and mission of the reserve as early as possible after determining what risk is acceptable. Commanders down to the BCT level normally retain one third of their maneuver strength in reserve; the higher the degree of uncertainty regarding the enemy, the larger the reserve should be.

7-8. Commanders use judgment when identifying risks, deciding what risks to accept, and mitigating accepted risks. Commanders accept risks to create opportunities, and they reduce risks by foresight and careful planning. Commanders use risk management to identify and mitigate risks. Risk is a function of the probability of an event occurring and the severity of the event expressed in terms of the degree to which the incident affects combat power or mission capability.

2-2. Commanders must deliberately plan and integrate the ethical application of military force against an enemy while protecting the force and preserving combat power. Commanders develop protection strategies for each phase of an operation or major activity. They integrate and synchronize protection tasks and systems to reduce risk, mitigate identified vulnerabilities, and act on opportunity. When properly integrated and synchronized, the tasks and systems that comprise the protection warfighting function increase the probability of mission success. Units must consider all protection tasks and systems and apply them as appropriate. Each task and its associated system are typically associated with a staff or staff proponent that performs specific duties.

2-7. Commanders integrate fire support into the concept of operations during planning. FA commanders assisted by fire support personnel and organizations at all echelons integrate Army, joint, interagency and multinational fires capabilities during the operational process for use at the designated place and time. Fires are critical to accomplishing offensive and defensive tasks. However, nonlethal effects are also important contributors to decisive action, regardless of which element dominates. Accomplishing the mission by creating an appropriate mix of effects remains an important consideration for every commander.

5-6. Commanders must accept risk when exploiting time-sensitive opportunities by acting before adversaries discover vulnerabilities, take evasive or defensive action, and implement countermeasures. Commanders and leaders can continue to act on operational and individual initiative if they make better risk decisions faster than the enemy or adversary, ultimately breaking enemy or adversary will and morale through relentless pressure. Commanders can leverage information collection capabilities, such as geospatial intelligence products or processes, to minimize fratricide and increase the probability of mission accomplishment.