airborne mission coordinator – (DOD) The designated individual that serves as an airborne extension of the component commander or supported commander responsible for the personnel recovery mission. Also called AMC. (JP 3-50) Referenced in ATP 3-50.10, ATP 3-55.6.

resource management operations – The execution of the resource management mission includes analyze resource requirements, ensure commanders are aware of existing resource implications in order for them to make resource informed decisions, and then obtain the necessary funding that allows the commander to accomplish the overall unit mission. (FM 1-06)

9-48. Commanders consider staff input when determining their CCIRs. CCIRs are situation-dependent and specified by the commander for each operation. Commanders continuously review CCIRs during the planning process and adjust them as situations change. The initial CCIRs developed during mission analysis normally focus on decisions the commander needs to make to focus planning. Once the commander selects a COA, the CCIRs shift to information the commander needs in order to make decisions during preparation and execution. Commanders designate CCIRs to inform the staff and subordinates what they deem essential for making decisions. Typically, commanders identify ten or fewer CCIRs; minimizing the number of CCIRs assists in prioritizing the allocation of limited resources. CCIR fall into one of two categories: PIRs and friendly force information requirements (FFIRs).

5-2. Commanders orient their reconnaissance assets by identifying a reconnaissance objective within an AO. The reconnaissance objective is a terrain feature, geographic area, enemy force, adversary, or other mission or operational variable about which the commander wants to obtain additional information. Every reconnaissance mission specifies a reconnaissance objective that clarifies the intent of the effort and prioritizes those efforts by specifying the most important information to obtain. Commanders assign reconnaissance objectives based on priority information requirements resulting from the IPB process and the reconnaissance asset’s capabilities and limitations. As information about a specific location, such as the cross country trafficability of a specific area, a reconnaissance objective can confirm a specific activity or location of a threat. Furthermore, a reconnaissance unit uses the reconnaissance objective to guide it in setting priorities when it lacks time to complete all the tasks associated with a specific type of reconnaissance operation.

reconnaissance objective – A terrain feature, geographic area, enemy force, adversary, or other mission or operational variable about which the commander wants to obtain additional information. (ADP 3-90)

4-17. As commanders begin to understand their operational environment and problem, they start visualizing a desired end state and potential solutions to solve the problem. Collectively, this is known as commander’s visualization—the mental process of developing situational understanding, determining a desired end state, and envisioning an operational approach by which the force will achieve that end state (ADP 6-0). Assignment of a mission provides the focus for developing the commander’s visualization that, in turn, provides the basis for developing plans and orders.

3-14. The sustainment staff’s role in synchronizing sustainment planning with operations is necessary to assist operational commanders and their staffs establish the conditions for what is possible. To ensure maximum freedom of action sustainment planners must understand the commander’s intent, be able to visualize the operation and articulate the operational risks. Limitations like, insufficient infrastructure or the availability of a key class of supply or replacement weapon systems has bearing on the commander’s ability to execute the mission. Sustainment commanders and staffs must present credible courses of action commensurate with sustainment capabilities to allow as much freedom of action as possible to accomplish the operational end state. While sustainment should not be an impediment to an operation, poor planning, lack of coordination, and understanding could severely influence the success of the operation.

3-66. Corps headquarters maximize use of available talent to build interdependence in their assigned forces. Corps headquarters have the ability to design exercises that integrate conventional forces and SOF working together. The type of training depends on the nature of the FSF being trained, and commanders should consider transitioning the initial mission from SOF to a conventional force that can teach FSF using the crawl-walk-run approach.

9-5. Depending on the situation’s complexity, commanders can initiate the Army design methodology before or in parallel with the MDMP. If the problem is hard to identify or the operation’s end state is unclear, commanders may initiate Army design methodology before engaging in detailed planning. Army design methodology can assist the commander and staff in understanding the operational environment, framing the problem, and considering an operational approach to solve or manage the problem. The understanding and products resulting from Army design methodology guide more detailed planning during the MDMP. When used in parallel, the commander may direct some staff members to conduct mission analysis while engaging others in Army design methodology activities prior to course of action development. Results of both mission analysis and Army design methodology inform commanders in development of their commander’s intent and planning guidance. In time-constrained conditions, or when the problem is not complex, commanders may conduct the MDMP without incorporating formal Army design methodology efforts. During execution, the commander can use Army design methodology to help refine understanding and visualization as well as assessing and adjusting the plan as required.

6-195. The corps or division plan specifies certain parameters to the subordinate units conducting the delay. First, it directs one of two alternatives: delay within their AOs or delay forward of a specified trigger line or terrain feature for a specified time. (See figure 6-27 on page 6-44.) The second parameter is that the order specifies the acceptable risk. The commander prescribes the delaying force’s mission, composition, and initial location. The delaying force accomplishes its mission by delaying on successive positions, by delaying on alternate positions, or by a combination of the two. It also attacks, defends, feints, or demonstrates. (See chapter 9 of FM 3-90-1 for additional planning, preparation, and execution considerations for conducting a delay.)

2-16. Understanding the situation requires both analysis and synthesis. Analysis is the process of studying a situation by successively dividing it into parts and addressing each part in turn. For example, the initial stages of mission analysis and IPB rely heavily on analysis. Understanding the parts of a situation is necessary; however, understanding the parts alone does not provide an appreciation of the relationships among the parts. That appreciation requires synthesis. Synthesis is thinking about how the parts of a situation work together as a whole rather than in isolation. As part of planning, the commander and staff synthesize results of mission analysis to make sense of the situation before developing COAs.

13-7. Commanders organize liaison elements based on the mission variables (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations [METT-TC]) and echelon of command. (See appendix A for more details.) Two command liaison teams are authorized in division, corps, and theater army headquarters. Common ways to organize liaison elements include, but are not limited to—

3-46. Commanders and staffs translate a unit’s mission into specific objectives for all subordinates. (Reserve forces have planning priorities, not objectives.) These objectives can involve the conduct of the offense. If the assigned type of offensive operation has associated forms of maneuver, a commander may specify which form to use, but effective commanders minimize actions that restrict subordinates’ freedom of action. (See ADP 5-0 for a discussion of the military decision-making process.)

2-7. Commanders may delegate authority to subordinates to accomplish a mission or assist in fulfilling their responsibilities. This includes delegating authority to members of their staffs. Delegation allows subordinates to decide and act for their commander, or in their commander’s name, in specified areas. When delegating authority, commanders still remain accountable to their superiors for mission accomplishment, for the lives and care of their Soldiers, and for effectively using Army resources. Therefore, commanders use judgment in determining how much authority to delegate.

2-78. Commanders direct action to achieve results and lead forces to mission accomplishment. Commanders make decisions and direct action based on their situational understanding maintained by continuous assessment. Throughout the operations process, commanders direct forces by—

4-63. Commanders establish the priority of mobility support based on the mission variables. This support consists mainly of reducing obstacles and improving or constructing combat roads and trails to allow tactical support vehicles to accompany combat vehicles. Commanders coordinate carefully to ensure that units leave lanes or gaps in their obstacles that allow for the repositioning of main body units and the commitment of the counterattacking force. CBRN reconnaissance systems also contribute to a force’s mobility in a contaminated environment by marking contaminated and clean routes as well as providing CBRN expertise while developing alternate COAs.

8-7. Commanders and staff elements immediately begin updating their running estimates upon receipt of a mission. They continue to build and maintain their running estimates throughout the operations process in planning, preparation, execution, and assessment.

2-121. Commanders and staffs constantly assess where an operation is in relation to the end state and make adjustments to accomplish the mission and posture the force for future operations. The commander’s visualization and the staffs’ running estimates are the primary assessment tools. Keeping running estimates current is essential to ensuring commanders are aware of feasible options. Staffs continuously replace outdated facts and assumptions in their running estimate with new information. They perform analysis and form new, or revise existing, conclusions and recommendations. The commander’s visualization identifies decisions commanders expect to make and focuses their staffs’ running estimates. Up-to-date running estimates provide the recommendations commanders need to make timely decisions during execution. (See FM 6-0 for more information on running estimates.)

2-90. Commanders do not underwrite subordinate mistakes when a subordinate operates outside of the commander's intent or displays poor judgment that endangers life or mission accomplishment. Nor do commanders tolerate a subordinate who repeatedly makes the same mistakes, does not learn, or violates the Army Ethic. Discriminating between which mistakes to underwrite as teaching points and which mistakes are unacceptable in a military leader is part of the art of command.

9-7. Commanders initiate the MDMP upon receipt of, or in anticipation of, a mission. Commanders and staffs often begin planning in the absence of a complete and approved higher headquarters’ operation plan (OPLAN) or operation order (OPORD). In these instances, the headquarters begins a new planning effort based on a WARNORD and other directives, such as a planning order or an alert order from its higher headquarters. This requires active collaboration with the higher headquarters and parallel planning among echelons as the plan or order is developed.