8-16. A civilian population’s perception of legitimacy may influence how it reacts to military forces. Forces establish credibility and legitimacy with local populations through the way they conduct operations. Adversaries are likely to seek legitimacy by assuming roles that gain favor with the population, such as resolving disputes, influencing key social leaders, providing essential services, or providing protection from criminal elements. Consolidation of gains activities may ultimately decide who possesses the ability to compel, control, influence, and gather support from a population. Therefore, throughout an operation, Army leaders have legal and moral responsibilities to establish area security and restore services while countering the efforts of those working against friendly goals. (See ADRP 3-07 for further information on legitimacy and other stability considerations.)

5-9. Commanders and staffs use the Army planning methodologies (Army design methodology, the military decision-making process, and troop leading procedures) to analyze multiple courses of action to determine the most suitable one. Once the commander approves a course of action, the remainder of the military decision-making process determines the specific tasks assigned to subordinate units that will accomplish the mission in the area of operations and ultimately achieve the identified end state. These specific tactical tasks come from the set of tasks of decisive action, the tactical tasks of offense, defense, and stability or defense support of civil authorities, and enabling tasks, and the subordinate tasks thereof. The end result of this process should be an operation order. The operation order will establish the relationship between mission, commander’s intent, and concept of operations. The operation order guides commanders’ arrangement of warfighting functions to mass the effects of combat power at the chosen place and time to overwhelm an enemy or dominate the situation.

1-79. Enemies are likely to initiate hostilities against a friendly force from initial positions of relative advantage. These include physical, temporal, and cognitive positions and cultural, informational, and other human factors peculiar to the land domain. Once an enemy is in a position of disadvantage, the joint force must rapidly exploit its advantage with force-oriented operations to destroy key enemy capabilities. Well synchronized, high-tempo offensive action, often in the form of ground maneuver, is required to defeat enemies with significant long-range fires and air defense capabilities. Understanding the importance of planning and executing area security and stability tasks is also necessary to consolidate gains across multiple domains in ways that support the purpose of friendly tactical operations to achieve strategic goals.

1-70. A consolidation area is the portion of the land commander’s area of operations that may be designated to facilitate freedom of action, consolidate gains through decisive action, and set conditions to transition the area of operations to follow on forces or other legitimate authorities (ADP 3-0). In the consolidation area, special operations are integral to assisting the transition of civil activities, supporting host-nation sovereignty, and setting conditions to prevent further conflict and stabilize the security environment. Drawing on their ability to work closely with foreign security forces, Army special operations forces may prove uniquely suited to identifying and neutralizing bypassed enemy forces attempting to organize continued or new resistance to joint operations. To consolidate gains and stabilize the environment, additional Army special operations forces may be introduced to the joint operations area. Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations forces may augment existing conventional forces or work directly with other legitimate authorities to consolidate gains. These forces are specially trained, equipped, and organized to support and conduct stability activities, Civil Affairs operations, and civil-military operations, as well as to influence populations. Not only do these activities contribute to stabilization, but by influencing local populations, remaining enemy forces, and supporting other relevant actors, Army special operations forces ensure minimal interference with continued friendly operations and enable freedom of action in the close area. Like operations elsewhere, Army special operations forces must continue to coordinate their efforts with the commander assigned responsibility for the consolidation area. This coordination facilitates unity of effort by keeping everyone informed of the joint forces’ efforts.

2-41. Populace control provides security for the indigenous populace, mobilizes human resources, denies enemy access to the population, and detects and reduces the effectiveness of enemy agents. Populace control measures are a key element in the execution of primary stability tasks in the areas of civil security and civil control. Commanders and leaders set the conditions for the operation by gaining the cooperation and support of the populace by building mutual trust. This involves establishing public order and safety, securing borders, protecting population centers and people, holding individuals accountable for criminal activities, controlling the activities of individuals or groups that pose a security risk, reestablishing essential civil services, and setting operational area conditions that support stability through unity of effort. Populace control may become necessary as a result of military operations or man-made or natural disasters.

2-36. The theater army normally receives one military police (MP) command when more than one MP brigade is required. The MP command reinforces and augments tactical-level MP efforts and develops theater detention areas or dislocated civilian operations bases. The commander of the MP command also serves as the commander of detainee operations. The MP brigade is one of the Army’s functional brigades. It can command up to five mission-tailored MP battalions; integrate capabilities from all three MP disciplines (police operations, detention operations, and security and mobility support); and integrate police intelligence operations. It can also command other non-MP units (focused on performing area support, detention, or dislocated civilian tasks) and synchronize MP support across multiple organizations that control an AO in support of stability tasks. A functional MP brigade is not designed to control terrain; significant augmentation and task organization would be required to assign an MP brigade an AO.

1-9. An operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). Army forces assist in shaping an operational environment by providing trained and ready forces to geographic combatant commanders in support of their combatant commander’s campaign plans. Shaping activities include security cooperation, military engagement, and forward presence to promote U.S. interests and assure allies. The theater army and subordinate Army forces assist the geographic combatant commander in building partner capacity and capability and promoting stability across an area of responsibility. Army operations to shape are continuous throughout a geographic combatant commander’s area of responsibility and occur before, during, and after a specific joint operation. If operations to shape are successful, they may prevent conflict and negate the requirement to conduct large-scale ground combat operations.

8-12. When required to achieve national, strategic objectives or to protect national interests, the national command authority may decide to conduct a major operation involving large-scale combat, placing the United States in a wartime state. In such cases, the general goal is to prevail against the enemy as quickly as possible, to conclude hostilities, and to establish conditions favorable to the United States, its multinational allies, and partners. Large-scale combat operations are usually a blend of traditional and irregular warfare activities relying on offensive, defensive, and stability tasks and activities. Army special operations forces efforts to consolidate gains during the activities that preceded the decision to conduct large-scale combat operations prepare the environment for successful combat operations. The integration of special operations discreet, precise, and scalable principles into unified land operations enables the Army to conduct large-scale combat operations.

8-59. Theater army supports consolidation of gains through the execution of Title 10, United States Code (USC) and executive agent activities. During planning, the theater army headquarters anticipates and requests the additional Army combat forces, functional capabilities, and resources required to consolidate gains. It plans the mechanisms required to move those capabilities in and out of the theater of operations. Upon request from the joint force commander or the activation of the time-phased force and deployment data, the theater army requests forces to support the ARFOR in enabling local authorities across all phases of an operation. The theater army should provide the joint task force (JTF) with troops specifically task-organized to focus on area security and stability tasks as part of force tailoring. This requires refined logistic estimates, security cooperation plans, engineer units capable of infrastructure development, CA requirements, communications shortcomings, and other critical capabilities.

3-39. Foreign internal defense is participation by civilian and military forces of a government or international organizations in any of the action programs and activities undertaken by a host-nation government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security (JP 3-22). Foreign internal defense involves all instruments of national power. Primarily a series of programs, it supports friendly nations operating against or threatened by hostile elements. Foreign internal defense promotes regional stability by helping a host nation respond to its population’s needs while maintaining security. Participating Army forces normally advise and assist host-nation forces while refraining from combat operations. Military necessity determines if U.S. forces train host-nation security forces under a foreign internal defense. Necessity increases when negative cultural and social consequences affect host nation security forces and their relationships with indigenous populations. USG support normally requires a host nation to positively apply the rule of law and legitimate governance.

2-43. Combat places civilians in harm’s way. It often affects their access to necessary items, such as food, water, shelter, and emergency medical care. Generally, the responsibility for providing the basic needs of the people within a unit’s AO rests with their government or designated civil authorities, agencies, and organizations. Individual families, private commercial companies, and corporations also provide many of these goods and services. Unit plans for combat operations address the provision of minimum-essential stability tasks—providing civil security, food, water, shelter, and emergency medical treatment—to civilians located within their AO in accordance with the laws of war and international standards. Unit commanders balance the provision of those minimum-essential stability tasks with their capability to conduct the offense or defense. Units address area security and the six primary stability tasks as practical until they can transfer responsibility for those tasks to another organization. The six primary stability tasks are—

2-21. The Army’s capability and capacity to conduct large-scale ground combat is unique and foundational to its other roles. Only the Army has the capabilities necessary for sustained ground combat anywhere in the world. The credibility inherent in its ability to conduct large-scale ground combat as part of the joint force is a critical part of U.S. conventional deterrence. It is a primary source of assurance to friendly nations and an important factor in worldwide stability. The U.S. Army conducts large-scale ground combat as part of the joint force. When it deploys and fights, the Army both enables and is enabled by the other Services when they perform their roles. An Army that can defeat any enemy worldwide requires professionally committed leadership, well-equipped and trained units, and proficiency in the conduct of joint and multinational operations. Maintaining the readiness necessary for large-scale ground combat is a difficult and continual process that consumes significant time and resources. Readiness for large-scale ground combat operations saves lives.

2-46. Area security is a security task conducted to protect friendly forces, installations, routes, and actions within a specific area (ADP 3-90). Area security may be the predominant method of protecting the support areas and consolidation areas that are necessary to facilitate the positioning, employment, and protection of resources required to sustain, enable, and control forces. When designated, a consolidation area refers to an AO assigned to an organization that extends from its higher headquarters boundary to the boundary of forces in close operations. It requires a purposefully task-organized, combined-arms unit to conduct area security and stability tasks and to employ and clear fires. (See FM 3-0 for additional information on consolidation areas.)

9-115. After determining the broad concept, planners create a task organization by assigning headquarters to groupings of forces. They consider the types of units to be assigned to a headquarters and the ability of that headquarters to control those units. Generally, a headquarters controls at least two subordinate maneuver units (but not more than five) for fast-paced offensive or defensive tasks. The number and type of units assigned to a headquarters for stability tasks vary based on factors of the mission variables: mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). If planners need additional headquarters, they note the shortage and resolve it later. Task organization takes into account the entire operational organization. It also accounts for the special command requirements for operations, such as a passage of lines, or air assault.

3-74. Sustainment activities during stability facilitate the establishment of civil security, civil control, restoration of essential services, support to governance, and support to economic and infrastructure development. For example, U.S. sustainment forces provide the essential food, water, shelter, and medical support necessary to sustain a host-nation population until local civil services are restored. U.S. sustainment forces may also assist a host nation with instituting the rule of law in order to eliminate the inequalities in the administration of the law that contribute to instability. U.S. sustainment forces may also provide sustainment support to stability in construction activities to build infrastructure for transportation, distribution, warehousing, and power generation. U.S. forces can plan and execute many sustainment actions via operational contract support to augment or substitute for U.S. logistic and engineering forces. Finally, U.S. sustainment forces may train, advise, and assist teams that build host-nation capacity by providing training for sustainment operations.

7-126. In figure 7-15 the lead division is the decisive operation and the trail division follows and supports. The lead division engages and destroys enemy security forces. +The trail division with the follow and support mission eliminates bypassed enemy forces, secures key terrain, screens the flanks of the corps, and conducts minimum-essential stability tasks, if required. It also provides one IBCT as the corps reserve. Depending upon the mission variables, the trail division may conduct a forward passage of lines through the lead division and conduct the corps decisive operation. In this example, the corps reserve is an IBCT positioned in a heavy pickup zone in the corps AO. The corps provides aviation support obtained by tasking the combat aviation brigades (CABs) of its subordinate divisions and coordinates with the United States Air Force (USAF) and theater aviation brigade to air move or air assault the reserve upon commitment. A corps normally uses PLs to control an operation as its divisions advance. A corps transitions to a deliberate operation if the lead division encounters a prepared enemy defense. A corps conducts hasty operations and exploits any favorable situations if an enemy is unprepared or defending weakly.

5-118. The JFC defines the conditions to which an AO is to be stabilized. The theater army is normally the overseer of the orderly transition of authority to appropriate U.S., international, interagency, or host-nation agencies. The theater army and subordinate commanders emphasize those activities that reduce post-conflict or post-crisis turmoil and help stabilize a situation. Commanders address the decontamination, disposal, and destruction of war materiel. They address the removal and destruction of unexploded ordnance and the responsibility for demining operations. (The consolidation of friendly and available enemy mine field reports is critical to this mission.) Additionally, the theater army must be prepared to provide Army Health System support, emergency restoration of utilities, support to social needs of the indigenous population, and other humanitarian activities as required. (See ADRP 3-07 and FM 3-07 for more information on the performance of stability tasks.)

1-138. Understanding the relationship between an AO, area of influence, and area of interest assists commanders in developing their operational framework. It also requires physically, temporally, cognitively and virtually understanding operations in depth. The proper application of the operational framework enables simultaneous operations and converging of effects against an enemy. An area of influence is a geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander’s command or control (JP 3-0). Understanding an area of influence helps commanders and staffs plan branches to the current operation in which the force uses capabilities outside the AO. An AO should not be substantially larger than a unit’s area of influence. Ideally, an area of influence would encompass the entire AO. An AO that is too large for a unit to control can allow sanctuaries for enemy forces, creates friendly vulnerabilities and positions of advantage for the enemy to exploit and may limit joint flexibility. An area of interest is that area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory (JP 3-0). This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. An area of interest for stability tasks may be much larger than that area associated with the offense and defense. Cognitive and virtual aspects of an area of interest are often broader than physical aspects.

3-26. Security sector reform is a comprehensive set of programs and activities undertaken by a host nation to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice (JP 3-07). Security sector reform (SSR) is an umbrella term that addresses beneficial security reforms for a host nation. A host-nation government undertakes SSR to improve rule of law, security, and stability. SSR includes whole-of-government programs to cultivate the following reform programs: disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; defense and other security forces ministerial-level advising; rule of law (for example, constitutional reform); civilian management and oversight; justice, police, corrections, border management; intelligence reform; strategic defense planning system; and establishment of security and stability as needed. In SSR, Army forces primarily support reforming, restructuring, or reestablishing the armed forces and the defense sector across the range of military operations. The establishment of border police, coast guard, and customs officials is integral to SSR. Border control seeks to prevent illicit activities, such as the arms trade, human trafficking, smuggling, and insurgent transit. SSR recognizes the interdependence of the security sector with institutional reform and rule of law. (See JP 3-07 and FM 3-07 for more detailed discussions of security sector reform.)

2-4. Civil Affairs operations are actions planned, coordinated, executed, and assessed to enhance awareness of, and manage the interaction with, the civil component of the operational environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; and/or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government (JP 3-57). Civil Affairs operations are performed by assigned Civil Affairs forces. Civil Affairs are designated Active Component and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct Civil Affairs operations and to support civil-military operations (JP 3-57). Military commanders must consider not only military forces but also the entirety of the operational environment in which they operate. This operational environment includes a populace that may be supportive, neutral, or antagonistic to the presence of military forces, both friendly and opposing. A supportive populace can provide resources and information to facilitate friendly operations. Civil Affairs operations ensure that commanders are advised on civil considerations, to include fulfillment of legal and moral obligations to the populace (in conjunction with the commander’s legal advisor), which can impact foreign policy objectives. Commanders and staffs use the principle of precise operations to ensure that noncombatants are treated with dignity and respect, minimizing harm to them and protecting their personal property, and to establish trust with the host-nation populace. A hostile populace threatens the operations of deployed friendly forces, can undermine mission legitimacy, and can often undermine public support at home for the nation’s policy objectives. Civil-military operations are activities of a commander performed by designated military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions by directly supporting the achievement of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation (JP 3-57).