5-46. A Level II threat is an enemy force or activities that can be defeated by a base or base cluster’s defensive capabilities when augmented by a response force (ATP 3-91). A typical response force is an MP platoon (with appropriate supporting fires); however, it can be a combined arms maneuver element. Level II threats consist of enemy special operations teams, long-range reconnaissance units, mounted or dismounted combat reconnaissance teams, and partially attrited small combat units. Typical objectives for a Level II threat include the destruction, as well as the disruption, of friendly mission command nodes and logistics and commercial facilities; and the interdiction of friendly lines of communications.

5-45. Threats in the division support area are categorized by the three levels of defense required to counter them. Any or all threat levels may exist simultaneously in the division support area. Emphasis on base defense and security measures may depend on the anticipated threat level. A Level I threat is a small enemy force that can be defeated by those units normally operating in the echelon support area or by the perimeter defenses established by friendly bases and base clusters (ATP 3-91). A Level I threat for a typical base consists of a squad-sized unit or smaller groups of enemy soldiers, agents, or terrorists. Typical objectives for a Level I threat include supplying themselves from friendly supply stocks; disrupting friendly mission command nodes and logistics facilities; and interdicting friendly lines of communication.

3-9. The foundations of Army doctrine are a set of basic ideas grounded in the American vision of war and warfare and guided by the Army Ethic, which in turn represents American moral and ethical values. Much of Army doctrine results from the Army Ethic. This professional ethos respects the inherent dignity and worth of all people and minimizes friendly casualties while avoiding harm to noncombatants. The American values (articulated in Army Values and the law of war) guide Army leaders in the conduct of operations. These ideas have guided Army doctrine almost from the inception of the 1905 FSR. Three foundational ideas that have remained part of Army capstone publications from the beginning are the need for combined arms operations, the need for mission command, and the need for adherence to the law of war. A fourth idea—Army operations take place within a context of joint, and now, unified actions partners—is a more recent but central addition of Army doctrine. While the terms in paragraphs 3-10 through 3-13 may not have been used explicitly, the ideas have consistently pervaded Army doctrine.

5-68. Screen and guard missions can be forward, on the flank, or in the rear of the main body, and they can be moving or stationary. Moving flank guards must also conduct a zone reconnaissance between the main body and the guard force to prevent bypassing significant enemy forces. The screen, guard, and cover security tasks, respectively, contain increasing levels of combat power and provide increasing levels of security for the main body. However, more combat power in the security force means less for the main body. Also, commanders should incorporate signature reduction techniques into local security plans. Area security preserves a commander’s freedom to move reserves, position fire support assets, provide for mission command, and conduct sustaining operations. Local security provides immediate protection to the friendly force. (See ADRP 3-37 for more information on protection.)

1-14. The competency of getting results requires special mention to counter beliefs that only the end result matters. While the other elements in the model address enablers, conditions, and processes, the achieves category is where leadership is most direct and most challenging. The actions for gets results integrate all other components in a way that brings people, values, purpose, motivation, processes, and task demands together to make the difference in outcomes related to the mission. The integrating actions of this competency also affect all other attributes and competencies. Getting results must simultaneously address improvements to the organization, Soldier and civilian well-being and motivation, adjustments due to situational changes, ethical mission accomplishment, and so on. All the competencies and attributes together lead to trust between the leader and the led, trust that lays the foundation for mission command and effective teamwork.

2-4. Land combat consists of operations against a thinking and lethal enemy in conditions that include violence, chaos, fatigue, fear, and uncertainty. Large-scale ground combat is the most lethal and demanding environment human beings have ever devised to resolve conflict. Soldiers face enemy forces with advanced weapons and sophisticated means of communication. Enemy forces use every means available to achieve their ends to include terror, criminal activities, and information warfare. They operate in and among noncombatants for concealment and protection. To an ever-increasing degree, information and cyber activities are inseparable from land operations. Cyber activities directly affect our ability to communicate, meaning that successfully conducting land combat requires protecting friendly networks while exploiting or degrading enemy networks. Compensating for the likelihood of degraded communications and the resulting ambiguity or uncertainty requires highly skilled Soldiers in well-trained units able to exercise disciplined initiative and accept risk. The Army adapts to and compensates for uncertainty with its mission command approach, which focuses each echelon on the purpose of operations in context and not simply on the execution of specific tasks that may no longer contribute to achieving an operational goal.

1-19. Teams are an essential configuration of how people come together to accomplish missions. In the Army, teams occur throughout every structure level of the organization. The Army as a whole is teams of teams. It begins with buddy teams––two military members who look after each other in a variety of positions and environments. The missions of the Army demand that leaders and teams be developed and ready. It is proven that a team is more effective than an individual when members work together, using their unique skills, experiences, and capabilities. The Army leadership competency categories cover how Army leaders lead; develop themselves, their subordinates, and organizations; and bring efforts together to achieve results. Army leaders are charged with developing others and conducting team building. Holistic leader development programs contribute to unit cohesion, resilience, and agility by producing leaders and teams that are creative, life-long learners, adaptable, and capable of exercising mission command.

2-9. Command responsibilities include mission accomplishment; the health, welfare, morale, and discipline of Soldiers; and the use and maintenance of resources. In most cases, these responsibilities do not conflict; however, the responsibility for mission accomplishment sometimes conflicts with the responsibility for Soldiers or the stewardship of resources. The importance of the mission informs commanders how much risk to Soldiers and equipment to accept. When there is conflict among the three, mission accomplishment comes before Soldiers, and Soldiers come before concerns for resources. Commanders try to keep such conflicts to an absolute minimum.

16-45. The commander or a facilitator restates the mission and commander’s intent. Facilitators may guide the discussion to ensure that everyone present understands the plan and intent. Another method is to have subordinate leaders restate the mission and discuss the commander’s intent. Automated information systems, maps, operational graphics, terrain boards, and other aids can help portray this information.

2-125. Mission orders clearly convey the unit’s mission and commander’s intent. They summarize the situation, describe the operation’s objectives and end state, and provide a simple concept of operations to accomplish the mission. When assigning tasks to subordinate units, mission orders include all components of a task statement: who, what, when, where, and why. However, a task statement emphasizes the purpose (why) of the tasks to guide (along with the commander’s intent) subordinate initiative.

2-100. The mission statement, commander’s intent, and concept of operations are key components of a plan that serve as the framework for an operation. Commanders ensure their mission and commander’s intent nest with those of their higher headquarters. While the commander’s intent focuses on the end state, the concept of operations focuses on the way or sequence of actions by which the force will achieve the end state. The concept of operations expands on the mission statement and commander’s intent. Within the concept of operations, commanders establish objectives as intermediate goals toward achieving the operation’s end state.

4-44. A defensive mission generally imposes few restrictions on a defending commander. It allows freedom of maneuver within assigned boundaries, but it requires commanders to prevent enemy penetration of their rear boundary. Defending an AO is a typical mission for battalion and higher-echelon units. This mission allows commanders to distribute forces to advantageously use the terrain and plan engagement areas that integrate direct and indirect fires. Commanders ensure that subordinate unit defensive plans are compatible and that control measures, such as contact points and phase lines, are sufficient for flank and rear coordination when assigning AOs. The defensive plan addresses what happens when friendly forces succeed and gain an opportunity to transition from defensive operations to offensive operations.

4-2. Commanders use the analyses of the operational environment and their assigned area of operations in conjunction with the operations process to determine the effects required to achieve objectives. They use mission orders and the integrating process of targeting to obtain and/or provide the required capability in order to achieve that required effect. Army special operations commanders and planners make ethical, effective, and efficient decisions and take actions consistent with the moral principles of the Army Ethic. Employment of fires in decisive action requires the judicious use of lethal force that is balanced with restraint and tempered by professional judgment. Restraint requires the careful and disciplined balancing of the need for decisive combat action, security and protection, and the strategic end state (or overall combatant command mission). Army leaders should clearly understand how adherence to the Army Ethic provides a moral basis for decisive action and how it becomes a force multiplier in all operations.

7-14. Force health protection and special operations medical personnel do not focus solely on operations. The elements of force health protection include enabling health and fitness and preventing of injuries and illness. In addition to unit level internal activities, medical personnel integrate the United States Army Special Operations Command’s Tactical Human Optimization Rapid Rehabilitation Reconditioning program as part of a larger United States Special Operations Command mission-specific human performance program. As tactical athletes, Army special operations Soldiers must maintain peak performance in addition to general health and fitness. At the elite tactical athlete level, there are major distinctions in programs designed solely for fitness versus human performance optimization. Tactical Human Optimization Rapid Rehabilitation and Reconditioning increases combat performance and effectiveness, prevents injuries, improves health and longevity, and facilitates rapid return to duty.

7-129. A movement to contact mission requires the commander not to have contact with the enemy main body. However, the commander may still know the location of at least some enemy reserve and follow-on forces. If the corps or division commander has enough information and intelligence to target enemy uncommitted forces, reserves, or sustaining activities, the commander normally designates forces, such as long-range artillery systems, attack helicopters, extended-range UASs, and fixed-wing aircraft to engage known enemy elements regardless of their locations within the AO. At all times the forward security element and the main body perform information collection. Reconnaissance is largely force oriented and not as detailed as a typical zone reconnaissance that gathers detailed information on both the enemy and terrain. The terrain reconnaissance tasks are minimized to only those necessary to facilitate mobility of the force.

2-23. Regardless of mission, every Army staff has common broad areas of expertise that determine how the commander divides duties and responsibilities. The duties and responsibilities inherent in an area of expertise are called functional responsibilities. Grouping related activities allows an effective span of control and unity of effort. Areas of expertise may vary slightly, depending on the echelon of command and mission. For example, at battalion level there is no financial manager, while certain sustainment units combine the intelligence and operations functions.

7-5. When communicating the mission, leaders provide clear guidance so subordinates and others understand the mission and their commander’s intent. Leaders ensure tasks are within the capabilities of the organization and do not detract from the ability to accomplish the mission. If leaders are unable to deconflict the friction between taskings, they should seek relief by approaching superiors with the impact on their critical task and possible alternative courses of action.

9-109. In developing the broad concept of the operation, the commander describes how arrayed forces will accomplish the mission within the commander’s intent. The broad concept concisely expresses the how of the commander’s visualization and will eventually provide the framework for the concept of operations and summarizes the contributions of all warfighting functions. The staff develops the initial concept of the operation for each COA expressed in both narrative and graphic forms. A sound COA is more than the arraying of forces. It presents an overall combined arms idea that will accomplish the mission. The initial concept of the operation includes, but is not limited to, the following:

1-68. HR planning and operations are the means by which HR leaders envision a desired HR end state in support of the operational commander’s mission requirements through the use of the military decision-making process, rapid decision and synchronization process, and Army design methodology. It communicates to subordinate HR professionals the intent, expected requirements, and desired outcomes in the form of an operation plan and operation order. It also communicates the process of tracking execution of planned HR support to ensure effective support to the operational commander through the following processes:

9-11. The staff’s effort during the MDMP focuses on helping the commander understand the situation, make decisions, and synchronize those decisions into a fully developed plan or order. Staff activities during planning initially focus on mission analysis. The products the staff develops during mission analysis help commanders understand the situation and develop the commander’s visualization. During course of action (COA) development and COA comparison, the staff provides recommendations to support the commander in selecting a COA. After the commander makes a decision, the staff prepares the plan or order that reflects the commander’s intent, coordinating all necessary details. (See figure 9-1.)