2-34. ASC integrates and synchronizes the delivery of USAMC and materiel enterprise capabilities at echelon from the strategic to the tactical level. ASC delivers materiel readiness, force generation, power projection, and sets the conditions for future readiness at home station. ASC forward stationed capabilities provide mission command to all USAMC assets in theater and shape the logistics environment and help set the theater to accelerate force reception into theater. Deployable logistics support elements provide expeditionary corps and divisions the ability to rapidly integrate into the theater delivery of USAMC capabilities at echelon for responsive support to warfighter priorities. ASC serves as the Army’s lead materiel integrator, identifying excess and obsolete major end items, then providing disposition instructions to units. It is responsible for integrating logistics support with strategic partners and links the national sustainment base with the expeditionary Army. Major mission areas include logistics synchronization in support of Army Sustainable Readiness Model, Army pre-positioned stocks (APS), materiel management, the life cycle management command Logistics Assistance Program, and the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program. Mission execution is through a global network of organizations to include the ASC staff, Army field support brigades, Army field support battalions, logistics readiness centers, and logistics support elements embedded in units from brigade to corps. For additional information on the Army Sustainment Command, see FM 4-95 and ATP 4-91.

3-37. In many cases, commanders are tempted to rely too much on written communications; especially email. Email messages, written papers, briefs, and directives do not have the same impact as oral orders, consultations, and briefings. Staffs possess the ability to produce vast amounts of documents; however, just because the capability exists does not mean it should be used. Quality communication is superior to quantity for enabling a mission command approach to command and control.

7-49. Corps and division commanders assign responsibility for the support area to a maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB) headquarters. The MEB commander designates bases and base clusters for all units operating within the support area. Within that support area, the MEB commander has TACON of all friendly forces for terrain management, movement control, clearance of fires, and security. Division commanders can also choose to establish a support area command post (SACP) with one of the assistant division commanders to provide better coordination and mission command of the support area units and missions. All units located in support and consolidation areas are responsible for defending themselves against enemy Level I threats. All units in support and consolidation areas also perform information collection within their organic capabilities and report that information to the appropriate headquarters.

4-75. Theater communications include DODIN operations and satellite communications. DODIN operations provide network and information system availability, information protection, and information delivery across strategic, operational, and tactical boundaries. Army space operations focus on defensive space control activities to protect space-based mission command capabilities.

2-294. Space-based capabilities enable military forces with positioning, navigation, and timing; satellite communications; space-based information collection; missile warning; space and terrestrial weather forecasting; and space control capabilities. Many mission command systems and fires and maneuver units rely on space-based capabilities, creating potential vulnerabilities.

7-238. Battalion task forces and company teams advance from one covered and concealed position to the next. Corps and divisions move along maneuver corridors and lines of communications that provide for rapid advance of all combined arms and supporting forces. To sustain forward momentum, all elements of combat power—leadership, information, mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection—move forward in an orchestrated manner as part of the combined arms team.

9-67. The who, where, and when of a mission statement are straightforward. The what and why are more challenging to write and can confuse subordinates if not stated clearly. The what is a task and is expressed in terms of action verbs. These tasks are measurable and can be grouped as “actions by friendly forces” or “effects on enemy forces.” The why puts the task into context by describing the reason for performing it. The why provides the mission’s purpose—the reason the unit is to perform the task. It is extremely important to mission command and mission orders.

3-12. Feedback should not flow only from lower to higher headquarters; it should also flow from higher to lower headquarters. Normally information from higher echelons to lower echelon headquarters consists of information to adjust the subordinates’ resources, plans, or missions. Multidirectional information flow produces shared understanding between higher commanders and subordinate forces that supports exercise of mission command.

1-59. Army special operations unit leaders foster a professional organizational climate in which all live by and uphold the Army Ethic. The Army Ethic establishes the foundation for accomplishing the mission in the right way and in an environment of mutual trust—one that encourages critical thinking, ethical reasoning, adherence to and upholding the Army Ethic, freedom of action, and disciplined initiative in subordinates. This environment provides a force with the ability to make independent, time-critical decisions using all available information and guidance presented in higher headquarters commander’s intent. Successful missions result from subordinate leaders at all echelons understanding the commander’s intent, assessing and accepting risks, and exercising disciplined initiative to accomplish missions. Army special operations forces at any echelon describe how their tasks support objectives—up to and including national objectives. Special operations unit commanders use the mission command approach to command and control in order to—

3-42. Arguably, the most challenging aspect of DSCA for Army leaders is the nature of providing support alongside numerous partners when there is no unity of command. During emergencies, many of the military forces supporting first responders will be working with each other for the first time. Federal forces may be providing DSCA for the first time. Effective command and control in this type of environment is just as important as in combat operations. Commanders need to understand how the exercise of authority in DSCA differs from combat operations. However, the principles of Army mission command doctrine still apply.

5-4. Context determines when a Soldier or DA Civilian is a leader or follower. A first sergeant receives guidance from the company commander as a follower and then as a leader translates that guidance to the platoon sergeants. As a leader, the first sergeant does not simply parrot the guidance received. The first sergeant translates the guidance into terms that are appropriate for the company NCOs in the context of other information received from the battalion command sergeant major and issues instructions that best meet the commander’s intent. The activity of influencing others depends on the followers’ knowledge, skills, and commitment level. The principles of mission command in ADP 6-0 inform the level of control leaders employ in a particular situation.

7-60. Battlefield success requires effective communications. Redundant systems are necessary to allow for communications throughout corps and division AOs in contested environments. Both corps and division commanders must be able to communicate with adjacent units, supporting joint forces, and host-nation and multinational forces in addition to their subordinates. The use of primary, alternate, contingency and emergency (PACE) forms of communication as well as organic unit liaison teams and digital liaison detachments provide commanders options to ensure effective coordination and interoperability. Continuous mission command requires adequate, but not continuous, connectivity.

2-291. The Army depends on the DODIN to enable all warfighting functions. Understanding threats to networks, including likely adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures is critical. Units must train to identify key terrain in cyberspace in relation to their commander’s priorities to enable a focused defense. Establishing a properly configured, monitored, and secured network increases the ability to detect malicious and unauthorized activity and enables mission command and the warfighting functions.

2-307. +The ability to deliver fires against peer threats requires units that can stealthily position themselves to create effects and then rapidly reposition or disperse to avoid effective counterfire. The superior range and lethal effects of many enemy missile, rocket, and cannon systems requires significant training to overcome, and they require a combined arms approach to execution. Enemies able to contest the cyberspace domain can disrupt the mission command and targeting process for friendly artillery units. To prevent this, units require training in analog methods of employment. Army units cannot always depend upon Army aviation or joint fires to solve tactical problems, so unit organic fires elements (including tube, rocket, and mortar units) must become proficient in maneuvering into positions of advantage to shoot and then rapidly displace.

1-45. There is a tendency to think of people as either a leader or subordinate, but leading and following are simultaneous responsibilities. This is particularly true in a hierarchical organization like the Army. Everyone charged with leading others has a responsibility to follow their superior in the chain of command. Being an effective follower requires the same attributes and competencies required to be an effective leader, although application is different. When following, Army leaders respond to their superiors’ authority and guidance. The principles of mission command capture this: leaders empower followers, by fostering mutual trust and creating shared understanding, to take initiative based on the commander’s intent. The subordinate leader transitions from follower to leader as they take action and direct their followers.

2-100. The regional cyber center is the single point of contact for operational status, service provisioning, incident response, and all Army network services in its assigned theater. It coordinates directly with tactical units to provide DODIN-A services, support to DODIN operations, and (when required) defensive cyberspace operations to enable mission command and the warfighting functions. (See FM 3-12 for more information on the cyber protection brigade.)

2-94. The Army allocates an MP brigade to a division when the magnitude of functional MP requirements exceeds the capability of the MEB to control MP activities. In these instances, MP brigade-level control capability is required to allocate, synchronize, control, and provide technical oversight for MP assets and to provide consistent application of MP capabilities across the division AO. The situation requires a brigade-size mission command capability if that situation needs more than two MP battalions’ worth of capabilities within the division AO. Some functional MP elements remain under control of the MEB, even if a corps or higher echelon headquarters provides a functional MP brigade to the division. (See FM 3-39 for additional information on the MP brigade and MP operations.)

9-90. Combat power is the total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply at a given time (ADRP 3-0). Combat power is the effect created by combining the elements of intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires, sustainment, protection, mission command, information, and leadership. The goal is to generate overwhelming combat power to accomplish the mission at minimal cost.

4-4. Mental agility is the ability to think flexibly. Mental agility helps leaders effectively react to change and adapt to the dynamic situations inherent to military operations. Mental agility keeps leaders from fixating on the wrong problems or getting stuck on poor solutions. Agility enables thinking when current decisions or actions are not producing the desired results and a new approach is necessary. Mental agility in leaders and followers provides organizations with the adaptability necessary for the disciplined initiative essential to mission command.

2-62. The 528th Sustainment Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne) sets operational support conditions in order to enable Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) operations. Key tasks include providing tailored logistics management, limited aerial delivery, unique ARSOF surgical capability, signal, military intelligence and mission command of assigned, adjacent, and mission aligned elements. ARSOF units rely upon the GCC theater infrastructure for virtually all of their support above their organic capabilities. The planning and execution of logistics support to ARSOF must be nested within the GCC’s concepts of operation and support, as well as tailored to interface with the theater logistics structures. For further information on ARSOF logistics capabilities refer to FM 3-05.