5-34. Commanders consider the supporting distance in operations dominated by stability or DSCA tasks. Units maintain mutual support when one unit can draw on another unit’s capabilities. An interdependent joint force may make proximity less significant than available capability. For example, Air Force assets may be able to move a preventive medicine detachment from an intermediate staging base to an operational area threatened by an epidemic.

4-5. Given the inherently complex and uncertain nature of operations, particularly those operations dominated by stability, commanders and staffs use the Army design methodology to help them understand the root causes of instability and approaches to solving problems. The Army design methodology is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe problems and approaches to solving them (ADP 5-0). The Army design methodology is an iterative process of understanding and problem framing that uses elements of operational art to conceive and construct an operational approach to solve identified problems. (See the discussion beginning in paragraph 4-19 on selected elements of operational art used in stability planning. See ADP 5-0 and ATP 5-0.1 for detailed discussions on the Army design methodology.)

3-54. Commanders and their staffs are not limited to Soldier and leader engagement and military information support operations to achieve stability objectives. Information operations use any capability necessary to generate effects in and through the information environment that support attainment of the desired end state. Other capabilities include but are not limited to civil affairs and civil-military operations; combat camera; public affairs; and presence, posture, and profile. (See FM 3-13 for more information on information operations.)

2-17. In addition to defeating an enemy, Army forces often seek to stabilize an area of operations by performing stability tasks. Stability tasks are tasks conducted as part of operations outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (See ADP 3-0 for more information on stability.) There are six primary stability tasks:

9-131. Three recommended war-gaming methods exist: belt, avenue-in-depth, and box. Each considers the area of interest and all enemy forces that can affect the outcome of the operation. Planners can use the methods separately or in combination and modified for long-term operations dominated by stability.

4-123. The division headquarters performs many of the same activities as the corps headquarters. The division headquarters fulfills its primary role as an Army tactical headquarters commanding up to five subordinate BCTs and other subordinate units. Upon deployment into a theater, the division may undergo significant task organization to enable operations. Initially, during operations to prevent, the division conducts defensive, security, and stability tasks supporting joint operations. The primary role of the division is to demonstrate national resolve by presenting a credible coercive force. Divisions should expect to conduct training exercises with multinational partners and perform other activities that demonstrate friendly capabilities. In an immature theater, the division headquarters should be prepared to accommodate the command structure of the next higher echelon until that echelon’s systems are in place. (See FM 3-94 and ATP 3-91 for additional information on division operations.)

1-83. There is no standard battle rhythm for every situation. Different echelons, types of units, and types of operations require commanders and staffs to develop a battle rhythm based on the situation. During large- scale ground combat, where lethality and time constraints require rapid planning and decision cycles, the unit’s battle rhythm focuses on defeating the enemy. Daily battle rhythm events may consist of a morning and evening current operations update brief, a targeting meeting, and a combined plans and future operations update brief. In operations dominated by stability tasks, where headquarters are often static, the battle rhythm may be more deliberate with daily, weekly, and monthly working groups and boards. While the battle rhythm establishes a routine for a headquarters, the unit’s battle rhythm is not fixed. Commanders modify the battle rhythm as the situation evolves. (See ATP 6-0.5 for a detailed discussion of battle rhythm to include examples of common meetings, working groups, and boards.)

2-111. Leaders influence not only Soldiers but other people as well. Leadership is crucial in dealing with civilians in any conflict. Face-to-face contact with people in an AO encourages cooperation between civilians and Soldiers. Army leaders work with members of other Services and civilian organizations. These leaders strive for the willing cooperation of unified action partners. The Army requires self-aware, adaptive leaders who can both defeat the enemy in large-scale combat operations and master the complexities of operations dominated by stability tasks.

5-1. Section I discusses joint large-scale combat operations in paragraphs 5-2 through 5-13. It discusses Army forces in large-scale combat operations in paragraphs 5-14 through 5-29. It discusses the threat in paragraphs 5-30 through 5-33. It discusses stability in large-scale combat operations in paragraphs 5-34 through 5-54.

5-36. Stability tasks during large-scale combat operations include restoration of essential services and population control in areas controlled by friendly forces. During the performance of defensive tasks, forces protect civilians from enemy attacks, maintain control, or evacuate civilians from AOs controlled by friendly units. Initially, the performance of stability tasks may be incidental to combat operations. Divisions conducting large-scale combat operations are not task-organized to simultaneously perform stability tasks, but they often include civil affairs (CA) units in their organizations. A corps headquarters retains control over functional support brigades, such as military police (MP) and engineers, so it can reinforce subordinate divisions or direct the performance of stability tasks. A corps headquarters adjusts subordinate division task organizations in anticipation of them performing stability tasks as combat requirements diminish.

3-34. The primary stability mechanisms Army units employ during operations to shape are influence and support. By influencing regional perceptions and improving the ability of partner nations to secure themselves through unilateral security partnerships and regional alliances, Army forces can isolate adversaries and thwart behavior that runs counter to U.S. interests. During operations to shape, Army forces gain access and establish the relationships, agreements, and contracts necessary for rapidly setting the theater should a larger force be required to deter hostility or conduct large-scale combat operations in the future.

5-40. CA and psychological operations units and other information-related capability (IRC) units support stability tasks during large-scale combat operations engaging the civilian population within the corps or division AO. They also target selected foreign civilian populations outside of those AOs. They publicize curfews, checkpoint procedures, evacuation routes, food and water distribution points, emergency health care, and necessary vector control measures to assist the overarching stability effort, minimize civilian casualties, facilitate freedom of movement, and avert potential humanitarian tragedies.

1-69. At the heart of the Army’s operational concept is decisive action. Decisive action is the continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks (ADRP 3-0). During large-scale combat operations, commanders describe the combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks in the concept of operations. As a single, unifying idea, decisive action provides direction for an entire operation. Based on a specific idea of how to accomplish the mission, commanders and staffs refine the concept of operations during planning and determine the proper allocation of resources and tasks. They adjust the allocation of resources and tasks to specific units throughout an operation, as subordinates develop the situation or conditions change.

2-26. Foreign internal defense operations promote and protect U.S. national interests by influencing the threat and operational variables of political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to crisis. Army forces, including special operations forces, accomplish stability goals through security cooperation. The military activities that support these operations are diverse, continuous, and often long-term. Their purpose is to promote and sustain regional and global stability. While foreign internal defense is an Army special operations forces core activity, stability tasks also employ Army special operations forces, in addition to Army forces, to assist civil authorities as they prepare for or respond to crises. Foreign internal defense is a broad program that covers a large range of activities. The primary intent is to help the legitimate host government address internal threats and their underlying causes. Commensurate with U.S. policy goals, the focus of all U.S. efforts is to support the host-nation internal defense and development program.

3-36. Consolidate gains may occur over a significant period and involve several changes in focus and emphasis as conditions change. An initial emphasis on defeating threat conventional forces will shift to more broadly based area security of populations and infrastructure. Eventually the emphasis and focus changes to meeting the needs of the population, influencing their perceptions, and allowing for a transition to a legitimate authority. Transitions are not generally abrupt, and units will manage different stability and security tasks concurrently until operations are complete. All activities should be prioritized towards securing and stabilizing the AO to meet the conditions necessary to achieve the desired conflict end state.

4-3. Operations focused on maintaining or reestablishing stability are often protracted and involve numerous military and civilian organizations. The multifaceted drivers of instability are difficult to identify. In addition to the principles of the operations process described in ADP 5-0, when planning for stability commanders and staffs—

3-49. Commanders consider the presence of civilians within their AOs on their operations and determine what minimum-essential stability tasks their units need to perform. All units have the capability to perform stability tasks if the tactical situation allows. These minimum-essential stability tasks generally involve some aspects of civil control, civil security, and the restoration of essential services.

8-76. The transfer of an AO to a legitimate authority relieves the land force of area security and stability tasks and represents a transition from operations to consolidate gains to operations to shape or prevent. As the theater army headquarters coordinates the movement of most Army forces out of theater, it resumes the tasks necessary to sustain the gains consolidated during large-scale combat operations. Conditions on the ground and resources available determine what security and cooperation tasks have priority. It is possible that Army forces occupy long-term garrisons to prevent a recurrence of hostilities, as happened in Europe, Japan, and Korea in the 20th century. Alternatively, there may be a more robust security cooperation arrangement involving training of forces. Regardless of the tasks required in a specific AO, Army units will continue to perform the missions that reflect their strategic roles of shape, prevent, win, and consolidate gains in support of U.S. interests.

8-2. Consolidation of gains occurs in portions of an area of operations (AO) where large-scale combat operations are no longer occurring. Consolidation of gains activities consist of security and stability tasks and will likely involve combat operations against bypassed enemy forces and remnants of defeated units. Therefore units may initially conduct only minimal essential stability tasks and then transition into a more deliberate execution of stability tasks as the primary mission as security improves. Operations to consolidate gains require combined arms capabilities and the ability to employ fires and manage airspace, but at a smaller scale than large-scale combat operations. Units in the close area involved in close combat do not conduct consolidation of gains activities. Consolidation of gains activities are conducted by a separate maneuver force in the designated corps or division consolidation areas.

2-27. The Warrior Ethos requires unrelenting resolve to do what is right regardless of the mission. Understanding what is right requires respect for everyone involved in complex missions, such as stability or defense support of civil authorities operations. Ambiguous situations, such as when to use lethal or nonlethal force, are a test of the leader’s judgment and discipline. The Warrior Ethos creates a collective commitment to succeed with honor.